LUZON BROKERAGE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. LUZON LABOR UNION, JUDGES ARSENIO ROLDAN, JUAN LANTING AND MODESTO CASTILLO, RESPONDENTS.

It appears that on October 16, 1947, the Court of Industrial
Relations handed down a decision in case No. 59-V (2), entitled “Luzon Labor
Union vs. Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc.,” finding that Eduardo Lineses, dismissed or
suspended employee of the Luzon Brokerage Co., had not committed any
irregularity in the performance of his duties and ordering that he be
“reinstated to his previous positions as driver with back pay from the day of
suspension untill actual reinstatement.” On January 13, the Luzon Labor Union
filed a motion for the execution of the above decision. As no evidence had been
introduced and the judgment was silent on Lineses’ wages and number of working
days a week before his suspension or dismissal, the motion for execution was set
for hearing, with timely notice to both parties, for the purpose of determining
these data. After the hearing on February 7, 1948, which was attended by the
counsel for the Labor Union but not by any representative of the Luzon Brokerage
Co., the court, under date of February 12, 1948, issued a nes order embodying
the following finding and judgment: “That the daily wage of Lineses is P7.50 a
day on the basis of eight hours work; and it appearing, furthermore, that his
regular working days in the company is from Monday to Saturday; or a total,
therefore, of 188 days from June 7, 1947 to January 16, 1948, exclusive of
holidays and/or Sundays, let a writ of execution be issued against respondent
company for the total amount of P1,410.”

The question that emerges from these facts is the power of the
Court of Inudustrial Relations to amend or modify its decision on the date and
in the manner and form above set forth. It is the contention of the respondent
that the said decision had become final and that the court had lost jurisdiction
to alter, modify or change it.

We do not think that the Court of Industrial Relations acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction. The hearing and the taking of evidence was
necessary to carry into effect the decision. The change is in reality not a
modification but a confirmation of the judgment.

Even if the order complained of were out of harmony with the
original decision, the same would still be within the authority of the court to
make under sections 17 and 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which read:

“Limit of effectiveness of award.—An award, order or
decision of the Couert shall be valid and effective during the time therein
specified. In the absence of such specification, any party or both parties to a
controversy may terminate teh effectiveness of an award, order or decision after
three years have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by
giving notice ot that effect to the Court: Provided, however, That at any
time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the Court may, on
application of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in
whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any
question involved therein.

“Interpretation of award.—Whenever a doubt shall arise
as to the meaning or interpretation of an award, order or decision of the Court
of Industrial Relations, any interested party may petition the Court to
determine such meaning or interpretation and the Court, upon receiving such
petition, shall set a date for the hearing of the case and shall dispose of the
same as soon as practicable.”

The court’s action was, in our opinion, in entire conformity
with these provisions.

The petition is denied with costs against the petitioner.

Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

TUASON, J.:

I certify that the Chief Justice concurs in this decision.