ALFREDO B. ENOJAS, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., RTC, BRANCH 47, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN, RESPONDENT.

Enojas versus Gacott

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Alfredo B. Enojas, Jr. against Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, charging him with serious misconduct, inefficiency, and gross ignorance of the law. The charge arose from the judge's order dismissing an election protest on the ground of alleged deliberate non-payment of docket fees. The case matters because it draws the line between a mere error of judgment, which does not warrant discipline, and an utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the law, which does.

Procedural History

The complainant filed an election protest before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, presided over by Judge Panfilo S. Salva. After the revision of ballots had begun, Judge Salva inhibited himself because the protestee was related by consanguinity to his wife, and the case was re-raffled to Branch 47, presided over by the respondent judge. The respondent judge then issued the order dismissing the election protest. The complainant elevated the matter to the Commission on Elections by a petition for certiorari, which the Commission gave due course and decided in his favor; on remand, the respondent judge voluntarily inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to Branch 50, and the protest was eventually decided for the complainant, who took his oath of office as municipal mayor. Meanwhile, the complainant instituted this administrative complaint directly before the Supreme Court. The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation, and the case was resolved on the pleadings on record.

Facts

In the May 1995 local elections, the complainant ran for mayor of Roxas, Palawan, and lost to Jose R. Rodriguez by forty-eight votes. The complainant filed an election protest covering one hundred two precincts, alleging massive fraud and irregularities. The protestee answered and sought dismissal with a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees, but Judge Salva denied the motion to dismiss. Finding that the ballot boxes and election documents had been delivered and the required fees and deposits remitted, Judge Salva ordered the revision of ballots to proceed. After thirty-nine contested ballot boxes were revised, he terminated the revision and set the case for hearing, then inhibited himself, and the case was re-raffled to the respondent judge.

Before the respondent judge, the protestee was allowed to file an amended answer containing new matters affecting the merits, and later sought leave to file a motion to dismiss. On a Sunday, the respondent judge issued an order denying admission of certain certified true copies of documents for not being properly identified. He then gave the complainant until noon of the next day to oppose the motion to dismiss. The complainant filed his opposition the same day, calling the motion frivolous and dilatory.

On December 19, 1995, the respondent judge issued the assailed order dismissing the election protest, holding that the court had no jurisdiction because of the protestant's deliberate non-payment of the required or correct fee, relying on the Manchester case. It turned out that as early as August 1995, Judge Salva had already ordered the release of the complainant's deposit, part to be paid to the revisors and stenographer and the balance refunded to the protestant. The amount the government was supposedly shortchanged could easily have been deducted from that refundable amount, which remained within the court's control.

Issues

• Whether or not the desistance or withdrawal of the complaint by the complainant warrants dismissal of the administrative case.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law in dismissing the election protest on the ground of non-payment of docket fees.
• Whether or not the respondent judge should be held administratively liable, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

The Court applied the doctrine of the Pahilan case, which it quoted, holding that the Manchester doctrine cannot be made to apply to election cases:

Furthermore, there are strong and compelling reasons to rule that the doctrine we have established in Manchester and cases subsequent thereto cannot be made to apply to election cases.

This doctrine is decisive because the respondent judge relied precisely on Manchester in dismissing the protest.

The Court also quoted the same ruling explaining why the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester cannot arise in election cases:

To summarize, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and similar cases can never obtain in election cases since (1) the filing fee in an election case is fixed and not dependent on the amount of damages sought to be recovered, if any; and (2) a claim for damages in an election case is merely ancillary to the main cause of action and is not even determinative of the court's jurisdiction which is governed by the nature of the action filed.

This bears on the case because the filing fee in an election case is a fixed amount, so there is no occasion to dismiss for failure to state the exact amount of damages.

The Court likewise quoted its ruling on the limits of judicial liability:

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable.

This frames the distinction between a correctible error of judgment and the gross ignorance of the law for which the respondent was held liable.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the withdrawal of a complaint or the subsequent desistance of the complainant does not necessarily warrant dismissal of an administrative case. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant, and desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint, because public interest is at stake in the conduct of officials of the judiciary.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge ignored applicable pronouncements on the payment of docketing fees. The Manchester doctrine, as modified in Sun Insurance, cannot be applied to election cases. The Pahilan case had been decided on February 21, 1994, long before the respondent's order of December 19, 1995, so he was duty bound to adhere to it and could not feign ignorance, since the Code of Judicial Ethics requires judicial competence. The Court also found that the conclusion of deliberate non-payment was belied by Judge Salva's earlier order releasing the deposit, from which the supposed shortage could easily have been deducted. The dismissal was therefore inappropriate and improper.

On the third issue, the Court held that the charge was not a mere error of judgment but an utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the law. It considered that the respondent's conduct was untainted by fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, that he was sixty-six years old and afflicted with hypertension and diabetes, and that he had previously been fined ten thousand pesos for gross ignorance of the law. The Court found the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator in order.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the Manchester doctrine, that jurisdiction is acquired only upon payment of the prescribed docketing fee, cannot be applied to election cases, because the filing fee in an election case is fixed and not dependent on the amount of damages, and a claim for damages is merely ancillary. Second, not every error or mistake of a judge renders him liable; absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, a judge may not be disciplined for an error of judgment. Third, a judge may be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law where he utterly disregards established rules and prevailing jurisprudence, for he is duty bound to be abreast of the law and jurisprudence. Fourth, the desistance of a complainant does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction over an administrative case, because public interest is at stake.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law and ordered him to pay a fine of fifteen thousand pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be punished more severely.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the Manchester doctrine does not apply to election cases, and a judge who disregards prevailing jurisprudence commits gross ignorance of the law. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between a correctible error of judgment and gross ignorance of the law, and the rule that desistance does not divest the Court of its disciplinary jurisdiction.