ROYAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO GONZALES AND THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Royal Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to
as the Company, seeks a review by certiorari of a resolution dated
August 17, 1971 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission affirming the decision
dated July 7, 1971 of its Chairman ordering the Company to pay (1) to
respondent Rosario Gonzales and her five minor children, the sum of P4,992.00
as death benefit, plus P200.00 as burial expenses; (2) to respondent’s counsel,
the sum of P499.00 as attorney’s fees; and (3) to the Commission, the amount of
P50.00 as costs of the proceedings, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act.

Respondent Rosario Gonzales is the widow of Perfecto Bilbao who
worked for the Company as a laborer, whose job was to shovel copra cake and to
sew sacks occasionally.

Records disclose that on July 17, 1966, the deceased, despite his
headache, reported for work, and on his way home, while passing along the
bridge near the Company’s compound, together with his friend Francisco Aguda,
the deceased swerved, then fell into the river and drowned. As his companion does not know how to swim,
he (Aguda) summoned other persons for help but it was too late.

A claim for compensation was filed by respondent with the
Regional Office in San Pablo City. The
Company filed an answer and a petition to reinstate right to controvert
alleging that it had no knowledge of the death of the deceased not until August
18, 1967 when it received a
notice of claim.

The Acting Referee without resolving the petition to reinstate
right to controvert, dismissed the claim for compensation for lack of
merit. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the case was elevated for review by the
Commission, which reversed the referee’s decision.

Unable to secure reconsideration of such reversal, the Company
filed the instant petition. The Company
maintains that (1) the questioned decision and resolution are contrary to law
and not supported by evidence; (2) the accidental drowning of Perfecto Bilbao
did not arise out of and in the course of employment; and (3) that the claim
was not filed within the period provided for under Section 24 of the Act and
therefore, is barred by the statute of limitations of action.

We find no merit in the contentions
of the Company. On July 18,
1966, the widow of Bilbao notified Tomas Tan, the Manager of the Company
regarding the death of the de­ceased.^[1]
However, it was only on August 28, 1967 when the Company filed its notice of
controversion alleging lack of official knowledge of the accident there being
no formal claim or notice within the statutory period of 3 months after
death. The purpose of giving notice of
injury and claim for compensation is to apprise said employer of the injury or
disease. Where the employer is already
aware of such occurrence or where circumstances are shown from which such
awareness or knowledge may be reasonably inferred, the purpose of the notice
has already been served and want of a notice or a delay in giving it, is deemed
excusable, as what happened in the case at bar. It is true that a formal notice of claim for compensation was
made by the widow only on August 2, 1967, a period of more than one (1) year
from death of her husband, but the Company’s disclaimer that it had no
knowledge of the accident prior to its notification is not tenable. It may be pointed out that the law does not
speak of “formal notice”; it specifies only “knowledge of the
accident.”^[2]
For petitioner to say that it had no actual knowledge of the incident would run counter to the ordinary course of
human behaviour. The Company’s cashier
who was presented as witness testified that the death of Bilbao was the talk of
the people.^[3]
Hence, the defense of the Company that the claim of the widow is barred by prescription will not lie. The fact remains
that the Company failed to seasonably controvert the right of claimant to
compensation as required by the Act. It
is a settled rule that failure or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to
the proceed­ings in the claim for compensation if it is shown that the
employer, his agent or representative has knowledge of the injury or death or
that the employer did not suffer by such delay or failure.^[4] Even
if the claim was filed beyond the period of 3 months after death, the defense
of prescription may be also rejected on the ground of the employer’s failure to
controvert the claim within ten days after the Company had knowledge of the
accident.^[5]
Such failure of the employer to controvert the claim constitutes a waiver (or a
forfeiture by law) of its right to question the validity and reasonableness of
the claim and precludes the setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses such
as non-compensability of injuries, prescription and the like.^[6]

It is insisted by the Company that the death of Bilbao did not
arise out of and in the course of the employment, since the deceased died on
July 17, 1966, which is a Sunday and not a working day, and the cause why the
deceased swerved while passing the bridge cannot by any stretch of imagination
be considered a work-connected cause. In this regards, Associate Commissioner Priscilla A. Medina, concurring
in the result, said:

“At any rate, in the case at bar, even without the favorable
effect of respondent’s failure to controvert, the compensability of the
worker’s death could stand the test. It
is not disputed that in the morning of the fatal day of July 17, 1966, Bilbao
was complaining of headache. That this
could be the symptom of an ailment such as hypertension is not far fetched. The fact remains however, that his
conditions of work – the heat emana­ting from a ceiling-less iron roofing and
the strenuous job of shovelling coconut meat
must have tolled heavily
on his physical resistance to the point of aggravating whatever ailment he had
been suffering all along. The circum­stances
of reeling on the bridge because of dizziness and falling down to his death (by
drowning) was the clear and continuing effect of an ailment the worsening of
which was caused by and occurred while at work. We are convinced that the claimant had sufficiently made out her
case.”^[7]

Suffice it to note that the findings of respondent com­mission
are supported by substantial evidence, and such find­ings cannot be disturbed
by the Court, and are no longer subject to review, unless there is patent
showings of failure of the Commission
to properly evaluate the evidence on the record or to consider the clear
logical relationship in the evidence.^[8]

Moreover, even assuming that there exist some doubts as to
whether the circumstances surrounding the death of the employee have been aggravated by the conditions of his work, such doubts, for the purpose of
carrying out the intent of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended should be
resolved in favor of claimants.^[9]

WHEREFORE, the
questioned decision and resolution are hereby affirmed with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Answer to Petition, p. 58, Rollo.

^[2]
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. WCC, 27 SCRA 1140-1141.

^[3]
Answer to Petition, p. 60, Rollo.

^[4]
Manila Railroad Company vs. WCC, 20 SCRA 981-983.

^[5]
Rio y Compañia vs. WCC, 20 SCRA 1203.

^[6]
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. WCC, supra; Pampanga
Sugar Mills vs. De Espeleta, 22 SCRA 325; NDC vs. WCC, 19 SCRA
861, etc.

^[7]
Annex “H” to the Petition, p. 38, Rollo.

^[8]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. WCC, et al., 15 SCRA 413-414; Vda. de Macabenta vs.
Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., 32 SCRA 553.

^[9]
C. A. Shiong Shipping Co. vs. WCC, 25 SCRA 76, 79.