RUBEN BUSTAMANTE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PETE ALFONSO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Pete Alfonso, owner of a restaurant in Manila, was sued in the municipal
court of said city by Ruben Bustamante, a cook in said establishment, for the
recovery of the sum of P1,465,98 as backpay and the further sum of P300 as
attorney’s fee. Sentenced by that court to pay plaintiff P698.82, with legal
interest, and the further sum of P100 as attorney’s fee, defendant appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the case had been received and
docketed in that court, notice of that fact was served on defendant’s employee
on February 8, 1954 and upon his counsel on February 10. This, notwithstanding,
.defendant’s answer, though dated February 23, was not filed in court until
February 26. On March 2 plaintiff filed a motion to have defendant declared in
default, and the motion having been granted, the court, after hearing
plaintiff’s evidence, rendered judgment on March 18 sentencing defendant to pay
plaintiff the Sum claimed plus attorney’s fee in the sum of P300 and the costs
of suit. On March 29 defendant filed a verified motion for reconsideration and
new trial, explaining that his failure to file his answer on time was due to
accident and excusable negligence, and alleging further that he had a good
defense supported by documentary evidence already presented in the municipal
court, on the strength of which that court substantially reduced plaintiff’s
claim. But the motion having been denied, defendant appealed directly to this
Court, alleging that the court erred in declaring him in default and overruling
his motion for reconsideration.

We find the appeal meritorious.

The tardiness in the filing of the answer in the present case is explained in
paragraph (c) of the motion for reconsideration and new trial, which is under
oath. The facts therein alleged have not been rebutted. The said paragraph
reads:

“(c) That the, undersigned counsel for the defendant prepared the
answer on February 23, 1954 and on the same morning instructed his Secretary to
personally mail a copy of the said answer, to the attorney for the plaintiff and
then to file on the same day with the Clerk of Court the original of the answer
accompanied by the proof of the notification to the counsel for plaintiff. The
undersigned attorney’s secretary, Aida Manahan was the person instructed to make
the said service to the plaintiff and the filing of same in Court and she took
the original of the answer on the said 23rd day 6f February, 1954 when she left
the office at noon to go home for lunch, with the plan and intention to file the
said answer in Court and serve the same on the plaintiff before she returned to
the office that afternoon but unfortunately the said Aida Manahan fell suddenly
ill with fever early that afternoon and did not report for work in the office of
the undersigned attorney until the morning of Friday, the 26th of February 1954
and all the time she had the original and copies of the answer in Court and the
undersigned attorney all the time believed that the same have been duly filed as
per instruction on February 23, 1954. That when the said Aida Manahan arrived on
Friday morning, February 26, and informed the undersigned attorney of what
happened, she was instructed to file same, the said answer with the office of
the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila arid notice be made
to plaintiff’s attorney. It can bo seen that the delay of one day in the filing
of the answer was an accident or surprise considering the facts alleged herein
regarding the illness of Aida Manahan and in accordance with decision of the
Supreme Court, the judgment by default may be set aside when happenings amount
to accident or surprise delay the answer of the defendant and the defendant
shows by affidavit or otherwise that he has a valid and meritorious defense. Ong
Guan Can vs. Century Insurance Co., 45 Phil., 667.”

Petitions for new trial or relief from judgment on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence are addressed to the discretion of
the court. But the discretion meant is sound discretion exercised in accordance
with law. If a given case falls both within the letter and spirit of the rule
providing for relief, a denial thereof would amount to an abuse of discretion.
(Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.)

This Court has already held that the failure of defendant’s attorney to file,
an answer on time may be excused where such failure was due to the fact that an
employee in his office, whose duty it was to notify him of the dates when the
time expires for answering or presenting other pleadings in court, had fallen
sick and failed to notify him of the deadline for filing the said answer.
(Coombs vs. Santos, supra.) And tardiness in filing the answer
was also excused where it was due to the fact that the attorney’s messenger to
whom the answer was given for mailing inadvertently misplaced it in a drawer and
neglected to mail it, and the attorney, due to illness, was prevented from
verifying on time, whether the answer was filed wilhin the period fixed by the
rules. (Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transport Inc., G. R. No. L-2587,
September 19, 1950.)

In the present case it appears that the employee who was commissioned one
morning to file the answer which the attorney for the defendant had prepared on
time was suddenly taken ill at home early in the afternoon of that day and
though she failed to file the answer in court as directed she did not inform the
attorney about it until it was too late. Even admitting that, as contended by
the appellee, the attorney was negligent in not ascertaining on the last day for
the filing of the answer whether that answer was filed or not, still we think
that such negligence was excusable. For as the attorney had no knowledge of the
employee’s sickness, he was justified in assuming that the employee had filed
the answer as directed. The attorney’s omission to make immediate inquiry as to
whether the answer was filed or not may be regarded as mere inadvertence, and it
appearing from his verified petition for new trial or relief that he has a
meritorious defense which might at least reduce the amount of the claim asserted
against him, as it was in fact reduced in the municipal court, we think that the
interests of justice would be better served if the defendant were given his day
in court and allowed to prove his defense.

Wherefore, overruling as unmeritorious the appellee’s motion for the
dismissal of the appeal, the order of default and the judgment appealed from are
set aside and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.