CARLOS YOUNG, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANASTASIO OLIVARES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant, Anastasio Olivares, is the
occupant of a house of light materials, valued at less than P150, built
on a lot on Calle Luna, in the municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna. While the house itself is owned by the appellant, the lot upon
which the house stands belongs to the owners of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
being occupied by the appellant under a rental contract, with rent
prepaid. The appellee, Carlos Young, has an unsatisfied judgment
against the appellant for the sum of P59; and it is admitted that the
appellant has no other property out of which said judgment could be
satisfied except the house occupied by him as stated.

On July 7,1916, the sheriff, having in his hands an execution
issued upon the judgment aforesaid, levied the same upon the house, and
was about to sell the same, when the appellant claimed the property as
exempt from execution under subsection 1 of section 452 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. In the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Laguna it was held, reversing the judgment of the court of the justice
of the peace wherein the controversy had originated, that the
appellant, Anastasio Olivares, was not entitled to the exemption. From
said judgment an appeal was thereupon taken by him.

The question presented for consideration is purely one of law,
namely, whether the exemption allowed in subsection 1 of section 452 of
the Code of Civil Procedure can be claimed with respect to a house
located upon land of which the execution debtor has lawful possession
but of which he is not owner. The provision referred to mentions, among
other species of property exempt from execution, “the debtor’s
homestead, in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection
therewith, both not exceeding in value one hundred and fifty pesos.”
(Subs. 1, sec. 452, Code of Civ. Proc.)

For the appellee it is contended that there can be no exemption of
a residential house under this provision except in relation with the
land necessarily used in connection with it, and that to be entitled to
this exemption the debtor must be owner of both. This contention
appears to be based chiefly upon the fact that the two expressions
“debtor’s homestead” and “land necessarily used in connection
therewith” are united by the conjunction “and;” and the argument for
this view is supposed to be strengthened by the circumstance that the
exemption is coupled with the qualification that the value of “both”
the homestead and the land shall not exceed the sum of P150.

It must be admitted that the peculiar phraseology of the provision
under consideration lends some countenance to the interpretation
advanced in favor of the appellee; but upon a careful examination of
the language used and a review of the decisions of the American courts
in similar cases, it becomes quite apparent that the idea upon which
the Judge of the Court of First Instance acted is incorrect.

The word “homestead,” as used in English, usually imports not only
the residential house occupied as a home but also the adjacent land
necessarily used in connection therewith: and yet the word is sometimes
used for either house or land separately. (See New Standard Dictionary,
s. v. homestead.) Now, in drafting the provision under
consideration, the authors of the Code of Civil Procedure. out of
abundant precaution and in order to avoid a narrow interpretation of
the word “homestead,” added the expression “and land necessarily used
in connection therewith.” By giving independent expression to this
element in the signification of the word, the codifiers thereby
narrowed the necessary import of the word “homestead,” with the result
that, as it stands here, it means nothing more than house.

At this point one should not be misled by the use of the term
“homestead” as the designation of the tract of public land which can be
acquired from the Government upon compliance with certain conditions
specified in the Public Laws. This is a specialized meaning of the word
which had its origin from the original Homestead Law, passed by Congress of the United States in 1862 (U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 2289 et. seq.)
The similar Philippine statute is found in sections 1-9 of Act No. 926
(Public Land Act). In those laws the term “homestead” is applied to the
tract of land acquired by the occupant without particular reference to
the residential house maintained upon it.

When advertence is had to the nature of the right of exemption
created by section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is at once
apparent that said right is nothing more than a privilege, personal to
the execution debtor, whereby the exempt property is withheld from
liability to execution. The right of exemption is not a real right in
property; it constitutes rather a positive inhibition restraining the
officer from laying hands thereon. Such being the nature of the
exemption, it results that the extent of the interest which the debtor
possesses in the property which he claims as a homestead is wholly
immaterial. The statute does not specify the kind of title a party
shall have in order to enable him to secure a homestead. It says
nothing about title. The right is impressed on the property to the
extent of the interest claimed in it by the party entitled to the
exemption, if not in excess of the value fixed by law as exempt; and
this right in no wise depends upon the character of the title held by
the claimant. The protection extends to whatever title he may have.
This doctrine has been enunciated in the American decisions too often
to justify extended comment. (13 R. C. L., subject, Homestead,
sees. 3, 30-33.) Indeed, it is declared by the courts in a number of
States that mere occupancy is sufficient to support the exemption; and
it has been held in numerous cases that a leasehold interest may be
claimed as exempt. As has been sententiously said by more than one
court, if the debtor’s possessory right is of sufficient value to be
coveted by his creditors, it is of sufficient value to the debtor
himself to entitle him to have it protected as exempt.

In this connection it will be sufficient to quote the following
passage from a decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama:

“The great controlling purpose and policy of the
constitution, is the protection, the preservation of the homestead,—the
dwelling-place. A houseless, homeless population, is a burden upon the
energy and industry, and corrupting to the morals of the community, of
which they may be members. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime,
can befall a family, than to be expelled from the roof under which it
has been gathered and sheltered. Protection of an estate or interest in
lands, whatever may be its dignity or inferiority, merely because it is
an estate or interest in lands, is not the purpose of the constitution,
or of the statutes. * * * It is the house, the dwelling place,—not of
necessity, an estate or interest in lands,— which must be protected and
preserved. Usually, it is accompanied by such estate or interest; but,
if it is not, it is the misfortune of the occupant, and of those who
are dependent upon him, and can not subject it to a liability, to which
it would not be exposed if such an estate or interest attended it. * *
* Whether these houses, attended by a legal right to the use and
occupation of the land on which they stand, are a homestead within the
purview of the constitution, and protected by it, depends, not on the
quantity or quality of the estate of the lessee, but on the nature and
character of the act with which they were put in place, and the
intention of the lessee, as shown by the uses to which they are
appropriated.” (Watts vs. Gordon, 65 Ala., 546-549.)

In the case before us it is agreed that the house upon which the
sheriff has levied an execution is worth less than P150. The agreed
statement of facts contains no stipulation as to the value of the
leasehold interest which the appellant has in the lot upon which the
house stands. In the absence of proof upon this point, we must assume
that the tenant is paying full value therefor by way of rent and that
the leasehold interest of the appellant is of only nominal value. We
accordingly find that the value of both the house and the interest of
the owner in the leasehold is not in excess of P150.

It results that both the house and the appellant’s interest in the
leasehold are exempt. Levy of execution was therefore improperly made
upon the house, and said levy must be quashed.

Judgment will be reversed, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.

Araullo, Malcolm, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.