THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JACOBITO MARQUEZ, ALIAS “BOY MARQUEZ”, SATURNINO JARON, CELESTINO ABRIGO, ALIAS “CELING WARAY”, ALIAS “CELES­TINO JAVINEZ”…

People versus Marquez

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in a murder case. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Jacobito Marquez, together with Saturnino Jaron and Celestino Abrigo, for the stabbing death of Rolando Jardiel inside a passenger jeepney in Davao City on the evening of December 23, 1965. The charge was murder committed by conspiracy, attended by treachery, evident premeditation, and nighttime. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a clean illustration of the rule that conspiracy must be proved by positive evidence and cannot rest on mere inference, and of the corollary that where there is no preconceived plan, each participant answers only for his own individual act.

Procedural History

The original information charged only Jacobito Marquez. An amended information later charged Marquez, Saturnino Jaron, and Celestino Abrigo with murder by conspiracy. All three pleaded not guilty at arraignment. Saturnino Jaron later changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Trial continued against Marquez and Abrigo. The Court of First Instance of Davao, through Judge Alfredo Gonzales, found conspiracy established, held each conspirator privy to the acts of the others, and convicted all the accused as principals of murder, sentencing each to life imprisonment and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased twelve thousand pesos. Jaron was excluded from the effects of that judgment because he had already been sentenced on his plea of guilty. Marquez appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court. Celestino Abrigo escaped from the Davao City Jail and remained at large. The Supreme Court ordered the temporary release of Marquez after he filed a bond.

Facts

On the evening of December 23, 1965, Vicente Baez was driving an A.C. passenger jeepney in the poblacion of Davao City. Between nine and ten o'clock that night he picked up Bernardino Mempin, and later Rolando Jardiel joined them. The three proceeded to a place where each took a bottle or two of beer, then headed toward a Christmas party at the government building in Matina where Jardiel and Mempin were employed. Jardiel sat in the front seat between the driver Baez on his left and Mempin on his right. At Bankerohan, four persons hailed the jeepney and took the rear seats: Celestino Abrigo, Saturnino Jaron, Perfecto Obenza, and Jacobito Marquez. Marquez and Abrigo sat together, with Marquez directly behind Mempin.

When the jeepney reached the Coca-Cola plant at Matina, approaching Tulip Drive Crossing, someone behind told the driver to stop. According to the prosecution, Marquez suddenly stabbed Jardiel from behind with a Batangas knife. Jardiel cried out that he had been stabbed. Mempin looked behind, held Marquez's right hand which was holding the knife, and alighted still holding him, but released his hold when he saw Abrigo about to throw a stone at him. The driver saw Mempin holding Marquez's wrist. The group of four then ran away. Jardiel was brought to the Brokenshire Hospital where he died. The autopsy showed a single stab wound on the left chest at the level of the third rib, involving the heart, causing severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade.

The defense told a different story. Marquez claimed that on that night he met Obenza with Abrigo and Jaron, and the four boarded a jeepney bound for Matina to enjoy the floor show at a night club. All of a sudden, Jaron told the driver to stop, stood up, and without warning stabbed the passenger seated in front of him. Jaron, Obenza, and Abrigo then alighted and ran. Marquez said he was so surprised that he was left alone in the jeepney, became afraid, alighted, and went to the house of a friend, keeping silent out of fear of retaliation. Jaron, who had pleaded guilty, testified that he stabbed Jardiel because the latter kept staring at him, and that he had no intention to stab him.

Issues

• Whether or not conspiracy was established beyond reasonable doubt between Jacobito Marquez and Saturnino Jaron.
• Whether or not Marquez may be held liable for the single stab wound inflicted by one person on the strength of the trial court's finding of conspiracy.

Applicable Provisions

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code defines conspiracy, and the Court cites it as the governing rule:

Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

This definition supplies the test the Court applies: there must be an agreement to commit the felony and a decision to commit it, which the evidence here failed to show.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that no conspiracy existed between Jaron and Marquez. The victim received only one stab wound, inflicted by one person, so Marquez could be held liable only if a conspiracy between him and Jaron were proven. The Court acknowledged the well established rule that when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, conspiracy exists, and that conspiracy can also arise from the proven concerted criminal act of several persons on the same occasion. But a scrutiny of the evidence showed no evidence of a preconceived plan to commit the crime. Jaron himself admitted that his attack on the victim, done by him alone, was sudden, unexpected, and at the spur of the moment. The Court laid down the consequence in these words:

It is fundamental, that when the criminal act is not the result of a pre-conceived plan, the criminal liabilities of the participants can only be considered in the light of their individual participation, and not of a common criminal design.

The Court further held that conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence, and that conviction must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumptions. The prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy. On the second issue, because conspiracy was not proven, the trial court's premise that the act of one conspirator is the act of all could not be applied to Marquez, and he could not be held liable for the fatal knife thrust delivered by another.

Doctrine

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and it may also be inferred from the proven concerted criminal act of several persons on the same occasion. Conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence, not by mere inferences and presumptions. Where the criminal act is not the result of a preconceived plan, the criminal liability of each participant is considered only in the light of his individual participation, and not of a common criminal design. The rule that the act of one conspirator is the act of all applies only once conspiracy is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the judgment of conviction with respect to Jacobito Marquez and acquitted him on the ground of reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: when the criminal act is not the result of a preconceived plan, the liability of the participants is measured by their individual participation, not by a common criminal design. Examiners use this case to test whether a candidate will presume conspiracy from mere presence and flight, when the law demands positive evidence of agreement beyond reasonable doubt.