DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) AND LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), PETITIONERS, V. HON. CARLOS A. VALENZUELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE…
ELBINIAS, J.:
The antecedent facts are:
On July 18, 2008[6], private respondent Belinda Martizano (“private respondent Martizano” or “private respondent” for brevity) filed before respondent court a “PETITION FOR INJUNCTION [WITH PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION]”[7] (“Petition for Injunction below” for brevity) against petitioner Department of Transportation and Communications (“petitioner DOTC” for brevity), petitioner Land Transportation Office (“petitioner LTO” for brevity), the Government Service Insurance System (“GSIS” for brevity), STRADCOM Corporation (“STRADCOM” for brevity), and the Insurance Commission (“IC” for brevity).[8]
Private respondent Martizano, in her Petition for Injunction[9] below, questioned the validity and sought the nullification[10] of petitioner DOTC’s Department Order No. 2007-28 (“D.O. No. 2007- 28” for brevity), otherwise known as the “Rules and Regulations on Integration of the Issuance and Payment of Compulsory Third Party Liability (CTPL) Insurance with the LTO Information Technology (IT) Project’s System and Database”[11].
On July 25, 2008, private respondent Martizano filed before respondent court, an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion (For the immediate resolution of issuance of Temporary Restraining Order)”[12], which Motion was granted by respondent court in its Order[13] of July 25, 2008.
After respondent court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO” for brevity) against D.O. No. 2007-28, STRADCOM filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of the issued TRO with a Motion for Inhibition”[14] against respondent Judge. Such “Motion for Reconsideration of the issued TRO with a Motion for Inhibition”[15] however, was denied by respondent court in an Order[16] dated August 11, 2008 for lack of merit.[17]
On August 4, 2008[18], petitioner DOTC, petitioner LTO, and IC filed before respondent court, a “Motion to Dismiss”[19] private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[20] below on grounds of “litis pendentia, forum shopping, absence of cause of action, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies”[21]. GSIS and STRADCOM also filed their separate Motions to Dismiss[22] private respondent’s Petition.[23]
The rest of the facts are those as stated in respondent court’s assailed Order[24] dated August 14, 2008, to wit:
“The petitioner (private respondent here) filed her opposition to the motions to dismiss filed by the public respondent GSIS and private respondent Stradcom on August 5, 2008. With respect to the motion to dismiss filed by public respondent DOTC, LTO (petitioners here) and the Insurance Commission, the petitioner (private respondent) filed a Manifestation on August 11, 2008 submitting the incident for resolution.
In sum, the respondents moved to dismiss this petition on the grounds of litis pendentia, forum shopping, absence of cause of action, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In her opposition, the petitioner (private respondent) countered that there is no commonality of interests between her (private respondent) and the plaintiffs in the other cases. She (private respondent) is not related to any of the other parties who are assailing the same Department Order No. 2007-28. She (private respondent) is a natural person who is an independent insurance agent and not an insurance company who are members of the Philippine Insurance and Reinsurance Association, nor is she (private respondent) a member of the ALLIANCE, BMIS, or MUNLI, who are insurance brokers, or related to the other individuals, who are parties in the other cases. xxx”[25] (Emphasis Supplied)
On August 14, 2008, respondent court issued its first assailed Order[26], which denied the respective Motions to Dismiss[27] of petitioner DOTC, petitioner LTO, IC, GSIS, and STRADCOM for lack of merit.[28]
Petitioner DOTC and petitioner LTO, together with IC, GSIS, and STRADCOM, then filed an “OMNIBUS MOTION”[29], which included the following: (a) “Motion for Inhibition”[30] of respondent Judge, (b) “Motion for Reconsideration”[31] of the Order[32] dated August 14, 2008 and, (c) “Motion to Suspend Proceedings”[33].
After petitioners DOTC and LTO’s “Motion for Inhibition”[34] and “Motion for Reconsideration”[35] that were embodied in their “OMNIBUS MOTION”[36] were denied by respondent court in its other assailed Order[37] dated October 7, 2008, petitioners DOTC and LTO filed the Petition[38] at bench, praying as follows:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Pending resolution of the case on the merits, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be ISSUED enjoining respondent Judge from implementing his assailed Orders; and
2. After due hearing, the subject Orders issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. MC- 08-3660 be REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Other forms of relief just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.”[39] (Emphasis was made in the original)
Petitioners raised these grounds:
“I
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ASSAILED ORDER DATED OCTOBER 7, 2008 DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR INHIBITION BECAUSE THERE EXIST LEGITIMATE AND FACTUAL BASES FOR HIS INHIBITION. IN FACT, SAID ORDER, BY ITSELF, CLEARLY SHOWS RESPONDENT JUDGE’S MANIFEST PARTIALITY.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ASSAILED ORDERS AS THERE ARE CLEAR BASES FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT.”[40] (Emphasis and underscoring were made in the original)
Contrary to the arguments raised by petitioners DOTC and LTO in their assigned ground I., the grant or denial of a Motion for Inhibition rests on the sound discretion of the Judge whose disqualification is being sought for.[41]
In insisting that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their “Motion for Inhibition”[42], petitioners DOTC and LTO had argued as follows:
“Indeed, the manifest partiality of respondent Judge is readily apparent in his Order. First, respondent Judge skirted the issues raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration and incipiently denied said motion because of a simple error. Undoubtedly, the Order sought to be reconsidered, erroneously denominated as August 21, 2008, should have read August 14, 2008. xxx
xxx
xxx respondent Judge’s outright dismissal on such basis not only demonstrated his manifest partiality but also constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Second, contrary to respondent Judge’s sweeping declaration xxx the arguments raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration cannot be considered a mere reiteration of the arguments already raised elsewhere. Distinctly, xxx petitioners expounded on the issue of litis pendentia and compared private respondent’s petition to that of PIRA, Inc., still pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145 of Makati City, docketed as SCA No. 07-673. In fact, in said argument, petitioners raised several new and important matters to be reconsidered. Unmistakably, respondent Judge demonstrated his manifest partiality and gravely abused his discretion when he declared that the arguments in petitioners’ motion for reconsideration were a reiteration of those already resolved.
Third, xxx [a] reading of petitioners’ manifestation dated September 22, 2008 reveals no such intention of petitioners to adopt its Opposition to the application for the writ as their Comment to the main petition.
xxx
Truly, there was nothing in said manifestation which could serve as basis for respondent Judge to declare that petitioners are adopting their opposition to the application for the writ of injunction as their comment to the main petition. Thus, respondent Judge clearly demonstrated his manifest partiality and gravely abused his discretion when he declared such.
Finally, petitioners reiterate their arguments in their motion for inhibition that in granting private respondent’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), respondent Judge openly demonstrated his partiality. Respondent judge hastily issued his Order without waiting for the comment or opposition of their co-respondent (Stradcom) therein, which he, himself ordered filed within five (5) days, with the reason that Stradcom is merely a nominal party.
xxx
Respondent judge’s unusual haste in issuing the TRO, as shown by his unwillingness to wait for Stradcom’s comment or opposition thereto, clearly demonstrates his partiality towards private respondent. xxx
Even more unusual was respondent Judge’s ratiocination for his decision not to wait for said party’s comment or opposition. In the ruling abovequoted, respondent Judge considered Stradcom a mere nominal party, an agent of ‘principal’ respondent DOTC which cannot argue more than its principal.
How respondent Judge arrived at such conclusion is baffling. Stradcom is a private corporation, with a personality separate and distinct from petitioner DOTC. In no way is it an agent of petitioner DOTC.
xxx
By such act of respondent Judge, petitioners had began to entertain serious doubts as to his impartiality and his ability to render a just and impartial judgment.“[43] (Emphasis Supplied)
Defeating the allegations of petitioners DOTC and LTO however, is that the Order[44] dated October 7, 2008, which denied petitioners’ “Motion for Inhibition”[45], enjoys the presumption of regularity and the presumption that official duty had been performed, as is in accordance with the similar pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Enriquita Angat and the Legal Heirs of Federico Angat vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175788, June 30, 2009, to wit:
“It is a legal presumption, borne of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of petitioners who in this case clearly failed to discharge the same.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Moreover, no showing was made by petitioners DOTC and LTO that respondent Judge’s issuance of a TRO against D.O. No. 2007-28 was tantamount to an act or conduct that would have proven petitioners’ allegations of “doubts as to [respondent Judge’s] impartiality and his ability to render a just and impartial judgment”[46].
The rule is settled that mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition. Extrinsic evidence showing arbitrariness or prejudice must also be presented by a party, which was not done so here.
All of these are pursuant to the following declaration of the Supreme Court in Bgen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4th Division, Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 173057- 74, September 20, 2010:
“The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. xxx The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. xxx
xxx We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the ‘just or valid reasons’ contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the judge’s partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough.” (Emphasis Supplied)
However, there is no need to discuss petitioners DOTC and LTO’s assigned ground II. regarding the propriety of respondent court’s denial of petitioners’ “Motion to Dismiss”[47] private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[48] below in its assailed Order[49] of August 14, 2008. This is because petitioners’ arguments on such ground, had been rendered moot and academic by the rendering by the Court of Appeals (Former Special Fifth Division) of its Decision dated June 25, 2009 in CA G.R. SP No. 105674 entitled Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano (“GSIS Petition” for brevity). In such Petition[50] filed by GSIS, which was the co-respondent of petitioners DOTC and LTO in private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[51] below, GSIS also assailed the propriety of respondent court’s denial of petitioners’ “Motion to Dismiss”[52] private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[53] below in the assailed Order[54] of August 14, 2008.
Here, petitioners DOTC and LTO argued that respondent court should have dismissed private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[55] below on ground of litis pendentia. This is because, according to petitioners, respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[56] below was among six (6) “alike or similar” Petitions “initiated by or in behalf of insurance companies, managers, agents, brokers or workers in the non-life insurance industry”[57]. In particular, petitioners DOTC and LTO claimed that a similar Petition[58] filed by the Philippine Insurers and Reinsurers Association, Inc. (“PIRA” for brevity) was “still pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145 of Makati City”[59], to wit:
“Second, the failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to her petition.
xxx the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies do not apply in that case.
xxx
In the case before respondent Judge, private respondent had failed to avail of the administrative remedy available to her which was to appeal the Department Order to the Office of the President. She thus deprived the proper government agency the opportunity to dispose of the matter and correct errors committed, if any. This renders her petition fatally defective.
xxx
Third, granting that private respondent is a real party in interest, then contrary to respondent Judge’s ruling, there is a substantial identity between the parties in said case and that in PIRA, Inc. vs. DOTC, et al., SCA Case No. 07-673, still pending in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 145 of Makati City. xxx
xxx
At the outset, for litis pendentia to exist, only a substantial identity of parties is required. And this substantial identity of parties may be shown by the commonality of the parties’ interests.
While it is true that private respondent is a natural person, her interest in the case does not spring from such fact. The Department Order is not one of application to all natural persons. In the first place, said Department Order may only affect those in the compulsory third-party liability (CTPL) non-life insurance business.
xxx
xxx private respondent is an insurance agent of Security Pacific Assurance Corporation.
On the other hand, Security Pacific Assurance Corporation is one of the members of PIRA, the association of non-life insurance companies, which initiated the action for the nullification of the same Department Order assailed in private respondent’s petition. And, as already stated, that case is still pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, Makati City.
Significantly, PIRA, in its petition, alleged that ‘it is suing in a representative capacity for the benefit and on behalf of its members who are adversely affected by the Order and who are the real parties in interest.‘
In view of the foregoing, there is a substantial identity of parties in the two cases above-mentioned. xxx private respondent is an insurance agent of an insurance company which is a member of the association that filed an action for the nullification of the same Department Order in the RTC of Makati City.
xxx
Finally, in view of the above disquisition, there is a clear violation of the rule against forum shopping. xxx
As already argued above, all the elements of litis pendentia are present in this case.
Furthermore, a final judgment rendered by the RTC-Makati City in the PIRA case or by the Honorable Court, for that matter, in the other pending case of Alliance vs. DOTC, et.al. CA-G.R, SP No. 104211, nullifying the assailed Department Order would have the effect of res judicata as regards the validity of that Department Order not only with the parties in those cases but also with private respondent in her case before respondent judge. Hence, with the elements of forum shopping clearly present, the case below should have been summarily dismissed.“[60] (Emphasis Supplied)
Such arguments raised by petitioners DOTC and LTO however, had already been resolved by the Court of Appeals (Former Special Fifth Division) in the GSIS Petition[61], as follows:
“Private respondent Belinda Martizano xxx filed a Petition for Injunction against the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Stradcom Corporation and Insurance Commission (IC), seeking to enjoin the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 2007-28 xxx.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on ground of litis pendentia xxx. It alleged that the petition for injunction filed by Martizano xxx is the fifth of the six similar petitions filed before various courts to assail the validity pf DOTC D.O. 2007-28. xxx Four of these are active cases and still pending final resolution.
xxx
Martizano opposed the motion to dismiss, alleging that there is no commonality of interests between her and the plaintiffs in the other cases. She is not related to any of the other parties who are assailing the same D.O. 2007-28. xxx
In its assailed Order dated August 14, 2008, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that not all the elements of litis pendentia are present, particularly the identity of parties. xxx
xxx
The first requisite, identity of parties or at least such that represent the same interest in both actions, is present. The identity of parties needed to satisfy the requirement is only an identity of interest and not a literal identity of parties.
Identity of interest can also be determined by the identity of the relief sought because absolute identity of parties is not required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such is deemed sufficient. Hence, the second requisite is also present.
While, at first glance, Martizano appears to be asserting her right as an independent insurance agent and is neither acting in the same capacity or is privy with the parties in the other actions, still identity of parties may be determined by the identity of the reliefs sought, as discussed earlier. The reliefs sought by all the parties are actually the same and by seeking to enjoin the department order or to have the same declared invalid, all the parties in the other petitions thus shared an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
xxx
The third requisite for litis pendentia is likewise present since judgment on the validity or invalidity of the subject department order would bar the other courts from making a contrary ruling under the principle of res judicata. Res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies once decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine, would be endless.
Having found the elements of litis pendentia to be present, a discussion of the other issues is no longer necessary.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals’ (Former Special Fifth Division) Decision dated June 25, 2009 in the GSIS Petition[62] ruled that all the elements of litis pendentia were present in private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[63] below and the other similar Petitions which also assailed D.O. No. 2007-28. Thus, the Court of Appeals (Former Special Fifth Division) “annulled and set aside”[64] respondent court’s Order[65] dated August 14, 2008, and consequently dismissed private respondent Martizano’s Petition for Injunction[66] below on the ground of litis pendentia.
Considering that the Court of Appeals (Former Special Fifth Division) had already resolved in its Decision[67] dated June 25, 2009 the matter involving respondent court’s Order[68] dated August 14, 2008, which is the same Order assailed in the Petition[69] at bench, then, such Decision should be respected so as to prevent any conflicting decisions that might occur from any contradictory resolution here of petitioners DOTC and LTO’s assigned ground II. All of these are pursuant to the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Clark Development Corporation v. Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 150986, March 2, 2007:
“The vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a high risk of conflict between the decisions of the RTC Branches 58 and 60 regarding their respective civil cases. A decision by one branch of court will constitute res judicata in the other case pending before the other branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC Branch 60 exercised its jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, then it would have to restrain the execution proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus, interference with the proceedings in another court would ensue. Under the doctrine of noninterference, ‘a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.‘ xxx” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, after careful consideration of all the facts, arguments, and issues appearing on the records, as well as of the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and in accordance with what is best determined to be proper under the circumstances, the following disposition is made on these matters.
IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairman) and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-43
[2] Rollo, pp. 45-52
[3] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[4] Rollo, pp. 53-54
[5] “OMNIBUS MOTION” for Motion for Inhibition, Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated August 21 (sic), 2008), Motion to Suspend Proceedings, Rollo, pp. 107-130
[6] Government Service Insurance System vs The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA-G.R. SP No. 105674
[7] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[8] Rollo, p. 55
[9] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[10] Rollo, p. 57
[11] Government Service Insurance System vs The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA-G.R. SP No. 105674
[12] Rollo, p. 94
[13] Rollo, pp. 94-96
[14] Rollo, p. 133
[15] Rollo, p. 133
[16] Rollo, p. 133-137
[17] Rollo, p. 136
[18] Rollo, p. 45
[19] Rollo, pp. 97-106
[20] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[21] Rollo, p. 45
[22] Rollo, p. 45
[23] Rollo, p. 45
[24] Rollo, pp. 45-52.
[25] Rollo, pp. 45-46
[26] Rollo, pp. 45-52.
[27] Rollo, p. 45
[28] Rollo, p. 51
[29] Rollo, pp. 107-130
[30] Rollo, pp. 108-114
[31] Rollo, pp. 114-126
[32] Rollo, pp. 45-52.
[33] Rollo, pp. 126-127
[34] Rollo, pp. 108-114
[35] Rollo, pp. 114-126
[36] Rollo, pp. 107-130
[37] Rollo, pp. 53-54
[38] Rollo, pp. 2-43
[39] Rollo, p. 38
[40] Rollo, p. 14
[41] Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation, as represented by Jovito R. Salonga vs. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 264, Pasig City, et al., G.R. No. 180543, July 27, 2010
[42] Rollo, pp. 108-114
[43] Rollo, pp. 16-23
[44] Rollo, pp. 53-54
[45] Rollo, pp. 108-114
[46] Rollo, p. 23
[47] Rollo, pp. 97-106
[48] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[49] Rollo, pp. 45-52
[50] Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA G.R. SP No. 105674, June 25, 2009
[51] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[52] Rollo, pp. 97-106
[53] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[54] Rollo, pp. 45-52
[55] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[56] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[57] Rollo, p. 12
[58] Rollo, pp. 143-173
[59] Rollo, p. 27
[60] Rollo, p. 29-35
[61] Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA G.R. SP No. 105674, June 25, 2009
[62] Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA G.R. SP No. 105674, June 25, 2009
[63] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[64] Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA G.R. SP No. 105674, June 25, 2009
[65] Rollo, pp. 45-52
[66] Rollo, pp. 55-93
[67] Government Service Insurance System vs. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City and Belinda C. Martizano, CA G.R. SP No. 105674, June 25, 2009
[68] Rollo, pp. 45-52
[69] Rollo, pp. 2-43