REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LANDOLINO ALPUERTO, PAZ ALPUERTO, NORMA ALPUERTO, FRANCISCA ALPUERTO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS HEIRS OF …

Republic versus Alpuerto

The Case

This is the case of Republic versus Alpuerto, decided by the Supreme Court in September 1980. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, sued the heirs and successors-in-interest of one Perpetuo Alpuerto to annul and cancel the Torrens titles covering a large parcel of land in Mauban, Quezon, and to revert that land to the State. The Republic's theory was that the land was forest land, outside the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, so that the registration court never acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate it to a private person. The case matters because it fixes a rule every reviewee must carry: a certificate of title issued by an officer who had no authority over the land is void, it does not become indefeasible, and the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officials.

Procedural History

The story begins in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, sitting as a cadastral court. Perpetuo Alpuerto moved to reopen the cadastral case and to admit his answer over the lot. After trial, the court adjudicated the lot to him and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration. The Provincial Fiscal and later the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration and for new trial on the ground that the decision was obtained through fraud and that the cadastral case had been improperly reopened without notice to the Director of Lands. Those motions were denied.

The Solicitor General then filed, for the government, a complaint for annulment and cancellation of titles and for reversion, alleging that the adjudication, the decree, and the original certificate of title and all titles derived from it were null and void because the court had no jurisdiction over land that is inalienable. Several defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of a prior judgment and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion of one defendant but granted the motion of the others and dismissed the complaint. Reconsideration was denied, so the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal. After its motion for reconsideration was again denied, the Republic elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition, and the Supreme Court found the petition meritorious.

Facts

Lot 7718 of the cadastral survey of Mauban, Quezon, containing about 19,873,835 square meters, was the subject of cadastral proceedings. In May 1966, Perpetuo Alpuerto, now deceased, filed a motion to reopen the cadastral case and to admit his answer over the lot. After trial, the lower court, in a decision dated August 3, 1966, adjudicated the lot and its improvements to him and ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration. An order for the issuance of the decree followed in September 1966, and the Land Registration Commission issued the decree, which was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Quezon in November 1969. On that basis, Original Certificate of Title Number 0-13541 was issued in the name of Perpetuo Alpuerto.

Portions of the lot were then transferred to various persons, who were issued their respective transfer certificates of title. Among them were the private respondents named in the case.

Meanwhile, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon moved for reconsideration of the August 1966 decision on the ground that it was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit. Special attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor General, also for the Director of Lands, filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration and for new trial, alleging that the cadastral case had been improperly reopened and that the Director of Lands had not been notified of the hearing and was denied his day in court. These motions were denied. The government then brought its action for annulment, cancellation of titles, and reversion, insisting that the land is inalienable and that the registration court had no jurisdiction over it.

Issues

• Whether or not the registration court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Lot 7718 to Perpetuo Alpuerto, considering that the land is forest land within the jurisdiction of the Director of Forestry and not of the Director of Lands.
• Whether or not the action for annulment and cancellation of the titles is barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court under the principle of res judicata.
• Whether or not the State may still seek cancellation of the title despite the delay in raising the character of the land and despite any negligence of its officials.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act Number 141, the Public Land Act, provides:

The Public Land Act vests upon the Director of Lands, subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.

This provision defines the reach of the Director of Lands' authority, which the Court held does not extend to timber or mineral lands.

Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, provides:

The Director of Forestry is the official clothed with jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all forests and forest resources.

This provision locates jurisdiction over forest land in the Director of Forestry, which is why the Director of Lands had no power to dispose of the lot.

Section 101 of the Public Land Act is the provision the Court cites as the basis for the State's action:

The State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-in-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.

This provision supplies the remedy of cancellation that the Court allowed the Republic to pursue through an ordinary action.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the land is not within the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands but of the Director of Forestry. Although the Public Land Act vests executive control over the lands of the public domain in the Director of Lands, the same law states that timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws, and the Forestry Law vests jurisdiction over forest or timberland in the Director of Forestry. The Court relied on its earlier ruling that where the land was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of it, and the applicant acquired no right to the land. It followed that a title issued by an officer without authority is void at law, and the grantee does not, by virtue of the certificate alone, become owner of land illegally included.

On the second issue, the Court held that the action is not barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, because that court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. For a prior judgment to bar a subsequent case, four requisites must concur: it must be a final judgment; it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; it must be a judgment on the merits; and there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. The Court held that the essential requisite of jurisdiction over the subject matter was absent, so the principle of res judicata does not apply.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that the timberland character of the land was raised only belatedly, noting that the Director of Forestry was never notified of the proceedings. It added that even granting negligence on the part of the official, estoppel cannot operate against the State, for the Republic is not usually estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. The State may therefore still seek cancellation of the title, which has not become indefeasible, since prescription cannot be invoked against the State.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction over forest or timber land belongs to the Director of Forestry, not the Director of Lands; a title issued by the Director of Lands over such land is void at law, and the grantee does not become owner by virtue of the certificate alone.

Second, a certificate of title that is void for want of jurisdiction in the issuing officer may be ordered cancelled through an ordinary action, and such cancellation is not barred by the prior judgment of the registration court, because res judicata requires jurisdiction over the subject matter, which was absent.

Third, the State is not estopped by the mistake or negligence of its officials or agents, and prescription does not run against the State; the title does not become indefeasible, and the State may seek cancellation under Section 101 of the Public Land Act.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon for further proceedings.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a title issued by an officer who had no jurisdiction over the land is void, it never becomes indefeasible, and estoppel does not lie against the State. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands over forest land, the requisites of res judicata, and the rule that prescription and estoppel do not run against the government.