G.R. No. L-14859. March 31, 1962
MACARIO KING, ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
became the owner of the business establishment known as “Import Meat
and Produce” a grocery wholesale and retail business, previously owned
by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. In the business 15 persons were
employed 12 of whom are Filipinos and the other 3 Chinese. The three
Chinese were old employees of the previous owner, the Philippine Cold
Stores, Inc., one having been employed as purchaser and the other two
as salesmen.
Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he
sought permission from the President of the Philippines to retain the
services of the three Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A of
Commonwealth Act 108, coursing his letter thru the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry. This official recommended to the President the
disapproval of King’s request on the ground that aliens may not be
appointed to operate or administer a retail business under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 1180 which requires that its capital be wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, the only exception thereto being the
employment of technical personnel which may be allowed after securing
to that effect an authorization from the President. The President
approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
since the positions of purchaser and salesmen occupied by the three
Chinese employees are not technical positions within the meaning of
Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134.
As a result of such adverse ruling, Macario King and his three
Chinese employees filed a petition for declaratory relief, injunction
and mandamus on August 25,1958 against the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry and the Executive Secretary before the Court of First Instance
of Manila praying that they be given relief because they are “uncertain
and in doubt as to their rights and duties under Republic Act No. 1180
and Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134, in
view of the aforesaid rulings of the Department of Commerce and
Industry and of the Executive Secretary.” They alleged that said
rulings are illegal in view of the respective situations and positions
of petitioners in the retail establishment, the purposes and language
of the laws above-mentioned, and. the constitutional guarantee of the
rights of an employer to employ and of an employee to work accorded to
citizens and aliens alike. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte upon petitioners’ filing a bond in the amount of P5.000.00.
Respondents filed an answer setting up certain affirmative and
special defenses tending to show that the petition does not allege
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. With regard to the
declaratory relief, respondents claim that such remedy is not available
to petitioners because they have already committed a breach of the
statute which is apparent on the face of the petition, meaning that the
employment of the three Chinese as salesmen and purchaser in the store
of Macario King is a violation of Section 1 of the Retail Trade Act
which provides that only citizens of the Philippines can engage in
retail trade, as well as of Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which
prohibits Chinese citizens to intervene in the management, operation,
administration or control of such business, whether as an officer,
employee or laborer with or without remuneration. Respondents further
claim that the three Chinese employees are not technical men who are
exempted from the operation of the law, and even if they are, they need
the authorization of the President which they failed to obtain in their
case.
With regard to the petition for preliminary injunction, respondents
contend that the requisites for its issuance have not been satisfied.
And with regard to the petition for mandamus, respondents alleged that
petitioners have failed to show that respondents have unlawfully
neglected any duty which they are called upon to perform and which
would make them liable for such relief. Hence, respondents prayed that
the petition be dismissed and that the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the court ex parte be lifted.
To this answer, petitioners filed a reply, which was followed by a
rejoinder and sur-rejoinder, with a detailed discussion of the
arguments advanced in support thereof. And because the motion to
dismiss filed by respondents had been denied for lack of merit, trial
proceeded, after | which the lower court entered judgment holding “that
petitioner Macario King may employ any person, although not a citizen
of the Philippines or of the United States of America, including the
three petitioners herein as purchaser and salesmen, in any position in
his retail business not involving participation, or intervention in the
management, operation, administration or control of said business; that
petitioners Lim Pin, Chang Pak and Ng See Keng are entitled to continue
as purchaser and salesmen, respectively, in Macario King’s Import Meat
and Produce or in any other retail establishment; that the writ of
preliminary injunction issued against respondents ordering them to
desist from interfering by criminal and/or administrative action with
the rights of the petitioners as above defined, is hereby declared
final; and, finally respondents are hereby ordered to allow and permit
petitioners to enjoy and exercise their rights in the manner and to the
extent aforestated.” Respondents took the present appeal before this
Court.
The center of controversy between petitioners-appellees and
respondents-appellants hinges on the interpretation to be given to
Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180, in relation to Section 2-A,
Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134. For ready
reference we quote the pertinent provisions:
“Section 1. No person who is not a citizen of the
Philippines, and no association, partnership, or corporation the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: x x x” (Italics supplied)“Sec.
2-A. Any person, corporation, or association which, having in its name
or under its control, a right, franchise, privilege, property or
business, the exercise or enjoyment of which is expressly reserved by
the Constitution or the laws to citizens of the Philippines, or of any
other specific country, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
permits or allows the use, exploitation or enjoyment thereof by a
person, corporation or association not possessing the requisites
prescribed by the Constitution or the laws of the Philippines; or
leases, or in any other way transfers or conveys said right, franchise,
privilege, property or business to a person, corporation or association
not otherwise qualified under the Constitution, or the provisions of
the existing laws; or in any manner permits or allows any person, not
possessing the qualifications required by the Constitution or existing
laws to acquire, use, exploit or enjoy a right, franchise, privilege,
property or business, the exercise and enjoyment of which are expressly
reserved by the Constitution or existing laws to citizens of the
Philippines or of any other specific country, to intervene in the
management, operation, administration or control thereof, whether as an
officer, .employee or laborer therein, with or without remuneration
except technical personnel whose employment may be specifically
authorized, by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
the Department Head concerned.x x x.” (Italics supplied)
With regard to the Retail Trade Law, this Court had already occasion
to rule on its constitutionality. We held that the same is valid and
that its purpose is to completely nationalize the retail trade in the
Philippines. In other words, its primordial purpose is to confine the
privilege to engage in retail trade to Filipino citizens by prohibiting
any person who is not a Filipino citizen or any entity whose capital is
not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging, directly
or indirectly, in the retail business. The nationalization of retail
trade is, therefore, complete in the sense that it must be wholly owned
by a Filipino citizen or Filipino controlled entity in order that it
may be licensed to operate. The law seeks a complete ban to aliens who
may not engage in it directly or indirectly. And the reasons behind
such ban are the pernicious and intolerable practices of alien
retailers who in the past have either individually or in organized
groups contrived in many dubious ways to control the trade and |g
dominate the distribution of goods vital to the life of our people
thereby resulting not only in the increasing dominance of alien control
in retail trade but at times in the strangle hold on our economic life.
These reasons were well expressed by Mr. Justice Labrador in the
following wise:
“But the dangers arising from alien participation in
the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there
is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and
thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such
complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of
prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made
available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles
they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of
dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national retailers and of the producers and consumers alike, can be
placed completely at their mercy. x x x“x x x Grave abuses
have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a
fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there
exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for
our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market
of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial
scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions;
that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has
had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the
public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that
they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and
essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law
(See. 9, Republic Act No, 1168), authorizing their immediate and
automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the
operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to
boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to
their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws,
smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and
export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have
engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a
matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by
the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives,
action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence
of many of the above practices.“The circumstances above set
forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the
big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of
danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in
this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among
nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities
and big centers of population. They own no allegiance or loyalty to the
State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or
emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become
the potential enemy of the State.” (Lao H. Ichong vs. Hernandez, et
al., G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The purpose of the enactment of the Retail Trade Law, therefore, is
clear. As expressed by this Court, it is to translate the general
preoccupation of the Filipinos against the threat and danger to our
national economy caused by alien dominance and control of the retail
business by weeding out such threat and danger and thus prevent aliens
from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. But in so doing the
legislature did not intend to deprive aliens of their means of
livelihood. This is clearly pointed out in the explanatory note of the
law:
“This bill proposes to regulate the retail business.
Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are those
who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion
to our free institutions and who have no permanent state in our
people’s welfare, we are not really the masters of our own country. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy
of other people.“In seeking to accomplish the foregoing
purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to
take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our
national life and endanger our national security, it respects existing
rights.”
It is in the light of this view of the Retail Trade Law that the
issue was posed whether the prohibition to aliens from engaging in such
trade is intended merely to ban them from its ownership and not from
its management, control or operation. However, from the context of the
law as well as from the decision of this Court in the Ichong case, it
may be safely inferred that the nationalization of the retail trade is
merely confined to its ownership and not its management, control, or
operation. Nevertheless, this apparent Haw in the Retail Trade Law
cannot be availed of by an unscrupulous alien as a convenient pretext
to employ in the management of his business persons of his ilk to flout
the law or subvert its nationalistic purpose, for in pari materia
with such law we have the Anti-Dummy Law (Commonwealth Act No. 108, as
amended by Republic Act No. 134), which seeks “to punish acts of
evasion of the laws of nationalization of certain rights, franchises or
privileges.” Read in connection with the Retail Trade Law, the
Anti-Dummy Law would punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions
of the former law which nationalize the retail business.
The question that now arises is: Is the employment of aliens in
non-control positions in a retail establishment or trade prohibited by
the Anti-Dummy Law?
Petitioners contend that their employment is not prohibited either
by the Retail Trade Law or the Anti-Dummy Law. The three Chinese
petitioners testified that they had nothing to do with the management
and control of the business, nor do they participate in its profits
outside of their monthly salaries. They had been employed long before
the enactment of Republic Act No. 1180. They only wait for customers
and sell according to the prices appearing on the tags previously fixed
by their manager Macario King. They desire to continue in the employ of
Macario King in his business and their job is their only means of
earning support for themselves and their families. Lim Pin who is
employed as buyer declared that his duties include no more than buying
the groceries appearing in a list prepared and given to him from time
to time by Macario King and at no more than the prices indicated in
said list. Respondents did not present any evidence to contradict these
facts, as they merely relied on their motion to dismiss.
It is evident that petitioners theory is that since they do not
intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of
the retail establishment of Macario King they are not covered by the
Anti-Dummy Law. Indeed, they contend, Section 1, of Republic Act No.
1180 mirrors the legislative intent to nationalize the retail trade
merely thru the ownership by Filipinos of the business, and as stated
by this Court in the Ichong case, the ownership of the retail business
by non-citizens lies at the foundation of the prohibition, and since
there is nothing in the Retail Trade Law which prohibits a
Filipino-owned retail enterprise from employing an alien and the dummy
law merely limits the prohibition to any position that relates to
management, operation, administration or control, petitioners contend
that they may be allowed to continue in their positions without doing
violence to both the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. In other
words, they draw a line of distinction between one class of alien
employees occupying positions of control and another class occupying
non-control positions.
Respondents, on the other hand, sustain a different view. They hold
that the language of the Anti-Dummy Law bans aliens’ employment in both
control and non-control positions. They contend that the words
management, operation, administration and control, followed by and
blended with the words “whether as an officer, employee or laborer
therein”, signify the legislative intent to cover the entire scale of
personnel activity so that even laborers are excluded from employment,
the only exemption being technical personnel whose employment may be
allowed with the previous authorization of the President. This
contention, according to respondents, results from the application of
the rule known in statutory construction as redendo singula singulis.
This means that the antecedents “management, operation, administration
and control” and the consequents “officer, employee, and laborer”
should be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be
applied to the subject to which it appears by context most properly
related and to which it is most applicable (Vol. 2, Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Section 4819).
We agree to this contention of respondents not only because the
context of the law seems to be clear on what its extent and scope seem
to prohibit but also because the same is in full accord with the main
objective that permeates both the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law. The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retail trade
by denying its ownership to any alien, while the other limits its
management, operation, administration and control to Filipino citizens.
The prevailing idea is to secure both the ownership and management of
the retail business in Filipino hands. It prohibits a person not a
Filipino from engaging in retail trade directly or indirectly while it
limits the management, operation, administration and control to
Filipino citizens. These words may be technically synonymous in the
,sense that they all refer to the exercise of a directing, restraining
or governing influence over an affair or business to which they relate,
but it cannot be denied that by reading them in connection with the
positions therein enumerated one cannot draw any other conclusion than
that they cover the entire range of employment regardless of whether
they involve control or non-control activities. When the law says that
you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to management,
operation, administration and control, “whether as an officer,
employee, or laborer therein”, it only means one thing: the employment
of a person who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical
or non-control position is prohibited. The reason is obvious : to plug
any loophole or close any avenue that an unscrupulous alien may resort
to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that
while one may be employed in a non-control position who apparently is
harmless he may later turn out to be a mere tool to further the evil
designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be interpreted
in a manner that would’ stave off any attempt at circumvention of this
legislative purpose.
In this respect, we agree with the following remark of the Solicitor
General: “Summing up, there is no point in distinguishing employments
in positions of control from employments in non-control positions
except to facilitate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. It does not
require ingenuity to realize that the law is framed up the way we find
it so that no difficulties will be encountered in its enforcement. This
is not the first time, to use the words of the United States Supreme
Court x x x that a government wants to know, without being put to a
search, that what it forbids is carried out effectively.”
There is an intimation in the decision of the trial court that if
the employment of aliens in non-control positions is prohibited as
respondents so advocate, it may impair the right of a citizen under our
Constitution to select, pick and employ any one who in his opinion may
be amenable to his business provided he is not a criminal, a communist,
or affected by a contagious disease, in the same manner as one may not
be deprived of his right to associate with people of his own choice
because those are rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. The
language of the trial, court on this matter follows:
“There is no question that a Filipino citizen has a
right under the Constitution and the laws of this Republic to engage in
any lawful business, to select, pick and employ anyone who in his
opinion may be amenable, congenial, friendly, understanding and
profitable to his business provided that they are not criminals, say
communists, or affected by some contagious disease or morally unfit.
The right to associate with our friends or people of our choice cannot
be seriously contracted in .a democratic form of government. This is
one of the most cherished privileges of a citizen. Nullify it and it
will produce a communist control of action in our free movement and
intercourse with our fellow citizens as now prevails in Russia and
other Soviet satellites. History has amply demonstrated that in
countries where personal liberties are limited, curtailed or hampered,
communism thrives; while in the lands where personal liberties are
protected, democracy lives. We need but look at the horizons and see
terrible and sinister shadows of some catastrophic events threatening
to annihilate all our hopes and love for liberty if we are to traffic
with our rights as citizens like any other ordinary commodities. It is
our sacred and bounden duty to protect individual rights so that by
their benign influence real democracy may be nurtured to full maturity.x x x x
“There
is no need of any lengthy discussion as to the rights of a Filipino
citizen to employ-any person in his business provided the latter is not
a criminal, affected with some contagious disease, or a recognized
human derelict. The right to employ is the same as the right to
associate. The right to associate is admittedly one of the most sacred
privileges of a Filipino citizen. If a Filipino citizen has the right
to employ any person in his business, has a naturalized citizen the
same rights? We hold and sustain that under the Constitution and laws
of this country, there is no difference between a natural-born citizen
and a naturalized citizen, with the possible exception, as provided by
the Constitution, that while the former can be President,
Vice-President or member of Congress, the latter cannot. But outside of
these exceptions, they have the same rights and privileges.”
It is hard to see how the nationalization of employment in the
Philippines can run counter to any provision of our Constitution
considering that its aim is not exactly to deprive a citizen of a right
that he may exercise under it but rather to promote, enhance and
protect those that are expressly accorded to a citizen such as the
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The nationalization of
an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be
branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the
Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress
and welfare of the citizens of a country. This is what we expressed in
no uncertain terms in the Ichong case when we declared constitutional
the nationalization of the retail trade. Indeed, we said there that it
is a law “clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police
power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and
security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.” True, this
fundamental policy was expressed in ‘a decision the subject of which
concerns the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act, but since the
Anti-Dummy Law is but a mere complement of the former in the sense that
it is designed to make effective its aims and purposes and both tend to
accomplish the same objective either by excluding aliens from owning
any retail trade or by banning their employment if the trade is owned
by Filipinos, and the target of both is “the removal and eradication of
the shackles of foreign economic control and domination” thru the
nationalization of the retail trade both in ownership and employment,
the pronouncement made in one regarding its constitutionality applies
equally if not with greater reason to the other both being
complementary one to the other. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in
retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its
sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of
other nationalities.
We note that the case cited by the trial court to substantiate its
conclusion that freedom to employ is guaranteed by our Constitution is
Meyer vs. Nebraska, 67 Law Ed., 1042, which is also the same case
relied upon by petitioners in support of their proposition that “the
liberty I guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to engage
in any of the common occupations of life.” We also note that this is
the same case cited by counsel for Lao Ichong to support the same
proposition in his advocacy of the unconstitutionality of the
nationalization of the Retail Trade Law which did not deserve favorable
consideration by this Court in the Ichong case. To refute counsel’s
argument that the retail trade is a common occupation the pursuit of
which cannot be impaired and consequently the right to employ therein
is guaranteed by our Constitution, suffice it to state that we brushed
aside such theory in the Ichong case in view of the monopolistic
control exercised by aliens in the retail business and their “deadly
strangle hold on the national economy endangering the national security
in times of crisis and emergency.” The circumstances surrounding the
enforcement of the Retail Trade Law being the very foundation of the
Anti-Dummy Law the same circumstances that justify the rejection of
counsel’s proposition in the Ichong case should also apply with regard
to the application of the Meyer case in the consideration of the
unconstitutionality of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The thinking of the lower court that the nationalization of
employment in retail trade produces communistic control or impairs a
right guaranteed by the Constitution to a citizen seems to have as
basis its pronouncement that “the right to employ is the same as the
right to associate.” This premise has no foundation in law for it
confuses the right of employment with the right of association embodied
in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. Section 1, paragraph 6, of
said Bill of Rights, provides that “the right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged”, and
this has as its main purpose “to encourage the formation of voluntary
associations so that thru the cooperative activities of individuals the
welfare of the nation may be advanced.”[1]
Petitioners have never been denied the right to form voluntary
associations. In fact, they can so organize to engage in any business
venture of their own choosing provided that they comply with the
limitations prescribed by our regulatory laws. These laws cannot be
assailed as abridging our Constitution because they were adopted in the
exercise of the police power of the State (Lao Ichong case, supra).
Against the charge that this nationalization movement initiated by
Congress in connection with several measures that affect the economic
life of our people places the Philippines in a unique position in the
free world, we have only to cite the cases of Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81
N.E. 149, and Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.E. 309, which this Court
considered as basic authorities for nationalization of legislative
measures in the Lao Ichong case. Similar laws had been declared
constitutional by the Supreme Court of California and the United States
Supreme Court in a series of cases involving contracts under the Alien
Land Law, and because of the similarities of the facts and laws
involved therein we can consider the decisions rendered in said on
Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., p. 647 cases of persuasive force
and effect in the determination of the present case.[2]
We wish to add one word with regard to the procedural aspect raised
in respondents’ brief. It is respondents’ theory that a complaint for
declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract or
statute has been breached. The law does not even require that there
shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a
breach of the law, or an actionable violation, to bar a complaint for
declaratory judgment (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1957 Ed., 145). The pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law
postulates that aliens cannot be employed by Filipino retailers except
for technical positions with previous authority of the President, and
it is contended that Macario King had in his employ his Chinese
co-petitioners for a period of more than 2 years in violation of
Section 2-A of Republic Act No. 134. Hence, respondents contend, due to
their breach of the law petitioners have forfeited their right to file
the present action for declaratory relief.
It appears, however, that alien petitioners were already in the
employ of the establishment known as “Import Meat and Produce”
previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. when Macario King
acquired the ownership of said establishment and because of the doubt
he entertained as regards the scope of the prohibition of the law King
wrote the President of the Philippines to request permission to
continue said petitioners in his employment, and immediately after the
request was denied, he instituted the present petition for declaratory
relief. It cannot, therefore, be said that King has already breached
the law when he filed the present action.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby
lifted, The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against
appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
[1]
Sinco on Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., p. 547.[2] Porterfield vs. U. S.
Webb, 195 Cal. 71; Carter vs. Utley, 195 Cal. 84; In re Y. Akado, 188
Cal. 739; In re Okahara, 191 Cal. 353; O’Brien vs. Webb, 263 U. S. 313,
68 L. Ed., 318; Terrace vs. Thompson, 263 V. S. 197, 68 L. Ed., 255;
Porterfield vs. Webb, 263 U. S. ‘ %. 326, 68 L. Ed., 278; Prick vs.
Webb, 326 L. Ed., 323.