FRANCISOO BOIX AND JOSE SILVESTRE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MELQUIADES G. ILAO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE AND MARICHU BATALLA, RESPONDENTS.

On March 29, 1962, Marichu Batalla, a lumber concessionaire in the
barrio of Lalawigan, Municipality of Mercedes in Camarines Norte, filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of that province (Civil Case
No. 1395) against Francisco Boix and his overseer Jose Silvestre,
demanding the removal of a roadblock consisting of high fence of poles,
constructed by said defendants on a road said to be existing since
pre-war days, which prevented the passage of her trucks from the
logging area to the loading point in San Miguel Bay. As it was claimed
that the obstruction by defendants of said road was causing plaintiff a
daily loss of P2,000.00, the court granted her prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on March 29, 1962, upon her filing a
bond in the sum of P5,000.00, directing the defendants Boix and
Silvestre to remove the roadblocks and to refrain from interfering with
and stopping plaintiff’s delivery or transportation of her logs.

In due time, defendants filed their answer alleging that the fence
in question was constructed by defendant Silvestre, upon order and
instruction of defendant Boix, on the latter’s land; that the log pond
claimed by plaintiff to be hers is a portion of the tract of land owned
by Boix; that plaintiff’s forest concession, on the other hand, also
abuts the shores of San Miguel Bay besides having other adequate
outlets and means by which she could transport logs from her logging
area to the beach of San Miguel Bay; that plaintiff has no right to
demand the use of the road and the log pond referred to in the
complaint, the same not being owned by her, nor are they properties of
public dominion; and that plaintiff has no cause of action against
defendants. Attached to the answer were proofs of defendant Boix’
ownership of the land on which road in question traverses. As
counterclaim, defendants demanded actual, compensatory and moral
damages and attorney’s fees. Defendants also filed a separate motion
for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground
that plaintiff’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts entitling
to the relief therein demanded or to the said writ of preliminary
injunction, considering that the complaint failed to state that
plaintiff has a right to the use of the road either as owner thereof,
or as possesor of a dominant estate with easement on the property
belonging to defendant Boix; that neither has plaintiff the right to
demand a right of way over the aforesaid parcel of land because her
timber concession abuts the shores of San Miguel Bay and there are
other outlets through which plaintiff could transport her logs from the
logging area to the public highway or the shores of San Miguel Bay. It
was claimed, therefore, that the continuation of the acts complained of
by plaintiff will not and cannot work injustice to her.

Acting on this motion to dissolve the preliminary mandatory
injunction, the respondent Judge under date of June 18, 1962, issued
the following:

“ORDER

“It appearing that the road in question is a private
road belonging to defendants and that the plaintiff has not acquired
anyright to use the same for her logging purposes; the writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex-parte against the defendants on March
29, 1962, is hereby ordered dissolved upon defendants’ filing a bond in
the amount of P10,000.00 to answer for damages the plaintiff may suffer
by reason of this dissolution.

“SO ORDERED.”

The bond was filed and the writ of injunction issued therein was actually dissolved on July 6, 1962.

On July 7, 1962, plaintiff Batalla filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of the order dissolving the writ of injunction on the
ground that she was scheduled to load 1,000,000 board feet of logs
bound for Japan on or about July 15, 1962, and should the road be
closed, plaintiff would be unable to fullfill her aforesaid commitment
which would result in irreparable damage to her.

This motion was heard on July 13, 1962, and upon determination of
the urgency of plaintiff’s need to load on or before July 18, 1962, the
logs already felled and cut from her concession, the court ordered on
the same day the revival or reinstatement of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (of March 29, 1962), enjoining defendants and
their representatives from interfering with plaintiff’s transportation
of her logs, and ordering them (defendants) to remove the roadblock
serving as obstruction on the road in question.

It is against this second order of the lower court that the
defendants, now petitioners here, have filed the instant petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify said order of July 13, 1962. And, as
prayed for by petitioners, this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondents to refrain from removing the fence and
having free access to the road in dispute. Copy of our writ was
actually received for respondent Marichu Batalla on July 20.

Under the circumstances above narrated, it is evident that the only
purpose of this proceeding is to secure the nullification and
dissolution of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
dissolved and later revived by the lower court, to enable respondent
Batalla to make use of the road in order that she may fulfill her
business commitments. We are not here, therefore, to rule upon the
right of respondent Batalla to use the road, nor on the propriety and
sufficiency of the means employed by petitioners for the alleged
protection of their property right, but only to determine whether the
respondent court abused its discretion in issuing the order of July 13,
1962, reviving the dissolved writ of preliminary injunction issued on
March 29, 1962.

It may be observed that the original order of March 29, 1962,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction that restrained petitioners
from obstructing the passage of Batalla’s trucks, was based on the
allegation in the complaint of the existence of plaintiff’s right to
the use of the road. In its order of June 18, 1962 dissolving the writ
of injunction, the lower court found otherwise and declared the said
road as “belonging to defendants and that plaintiff has not acquired
any right to use the same for her logging purposes.” Later however, or
on July 13, 1962, the lower court, without setting aside this order of
June 18, 1962, expressly declaring the road as belonging to defendants
and that plaintiff has not acquired any right to use the same, the
respondent judge revived the injunction on the mere representation of
plaintiff that she had to load and ship her lumber on July 18, 1962.
This, we believe, constitutes no sufficient justification for her use
of petitioner Boix’ road, against the latter’s will. Upon the facts
before the court at the time, it was irregular and improper and was a
grave abuse of discretion to issue or revive the mandatory injunction
compelling respondent Boix to permit the use of his private road by the
plaintiff who up to that time the court has declared not to have
acquired any right to use the same.

Counsel for petitioners, in his motion of August 15, 1962, called
the attention of this Court to the fact that from August 7 to 14, 1962,
and notwithstanding the injunction issued by this Court, of which
respondent Batalla had prior notice, trucks loaded with logs belonging
to her forced their way through the road in question. Respondent
Batalla, on the other hand, while admitting ownership of the trucks and
logs transported across petitioner’s land, claims that during the
period when the alleged contemptuous acts were committed, she was in
Manila and had no opportunity to know the same much less give
instruction to do said acts. Under the circumstances, respondent is
hereby only given warning that a repetition of similar or other acts in
violation of lawful orders or processes of this Court shall be dealt
with more severely.

Wherefore, the order of the respondent court of July 13, 1962 is
hereby set aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by this Court, is made permanent. With costs against respondent
Batalla. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.