FELICISIMA SANTIAGO, ON BEHALF OF ELPIDIO S. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Felicisima Santiago applies for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the
Director of Prisons on behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, who is at present confined at
the Iwahig (Palawan) Penal Colony.

The return of the Solicitor General sets out the salient facts of the
prisoner’s incarceration. We choose to rely on these facts rather than on those
averred in the petition because they are more complete and, being based on
official records, carry the presumption of accuracy.

According to the return, Elpidio S. Cruz is under the custody of the
respondent Director of Prisons by virtue of the following orders of
commitment:

(a) Recommitment order dated June 3, 1943 of the Commissioner of
Justice, appointed during the Japanese occupation, for the unexpired portion of
the prisoner’s maximum aggregate sentence imposed in cases Nos. 55880, 55365 and
10905 of the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Rizal, in which cases he had
been previously granted parole by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June
26, 1941. This unexpired portion was five years two months and one day;

(b) Commitment order in criminal case No. 1216 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila for estafa, the sentence in which was four months’
imprisonment and an indemnity of P250 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;

(c) Commitment order in criminal case No. 1342 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila for estafa, the sentence in which was one year of
imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P250, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and

(d) Commitment order in criminal case No. III-01015 of the Municipal
Court of the City of Manila for estafa in which the defendant was
sentenced to four months and one day of imprisonment and to pay P125 indemnity,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The petitioner alleges that the prisoner is detained by virtue of the
last-mentioned three convictions for estafa—criminal cases III-01015,
1216 and 1342—and it is the legality of the punishment imposed in one of these
cases that she assails. She identifies this1 case as No. 1216, though in
reality, as stated in the respondent’s return, it was in case No. 1342 wherein
one year imprisonment was meted out. She contends that this sentence was
pronounced without the court’s jurisdiction and “constitutes a violation of law
and should be corrected in an habeas corpus proceeding.” Her argument is that in
sentencing Cruz to one year and one day of imprisonment (one year) in case No.
1216 (1342) the court regarded his conviction in the other two cases as an
aggravating circumstance, whereas the three cases, according to her, were tried
and decided by the same court and for purposes of law should have been
considered as only one.

It is apparent that the petitioner was unaware of Cruz’s recommitment for
violation of the conditions of the parole in the three cases for falsification
of official document and yiolation of article 172 in relation to article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code. If there had not been against Cruz other cases than
those mentioned in the petition, his terms of imprisonment would have been
served long before today regardless of the extent of the punishment complained
of. But with the unexpired portion of the three initial sentences added to the
sentences imposed in the more recent cases, the prisoner had a total of six
years, ten months and two days to extinguish, exclusive of subsidiary
imprisonment. And having commenced to serve these sentences on March 27, 1943,
according to the records of the Bureau of Prisons, he had served a total of
three years seven months and three days up to October 30, 1946, exclusive of
good conduct time allowance. Even if he be granted credit for good conduct time
allowance, which on that date would have been nine months and three days, he
would have served so far only four years, four months and six days, leaving a
period of one year, five months and twenty-six days still to be served out.

Nevertheless, this does not make the validity of the impugned punishment a
moot question, (even though the objection, as will presently be shown, does not
constitute a good ground for allowance of habeas corpus). Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, in providing a method for successive service of two or more
sentences, directs that “in the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed.” Applying this method in the present
case, at least part of the sentence under attack still remains to be
executed.

We will then now address ourselves directly to the legality of the sentence
in case No. 1342.

The petitioner’s contention that the lower court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and in violation of law when it pronounced this sentence, is
predicated on the theory that case No. 1216 (1342) and its two companion cases
were only one. The petitioner does not elaborate on this theory and we can only
surmise what she is driving at. Nor has she furnished us with copies of the
decisions rendered in these cases or stated the facts1 of said cases and the
circumstances surrounding the defendants’ conviction therein. Without such data
there is no means of verifying the existence of the alleged error.

It seems certain, however, that the trial court had jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant and of the offense, that the sentence in question was
within the limits provided by law for the crime, and that the defendant was not
denied any fundamental or constitutional rights. Broadly speaking, only
deprivation of these rights, lack of jurisdiction of the Court to impose the
sentence, or excessive penalty affords ground for relief by habeas corpus. (39
C. J. S., 444.) Upon the petitioner’s own showing, the alleged error, granting
that it was committed, was a mere error of law or of fact or both, since it goes
exclusively to the propriety or correctness of the appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the consequent application of the
maximum penalty. There is no claim that the penalty in question is outside the
prescribed bounds. As has been said, it does not go beyond the legal range.
Judged by the amount involved, the offense was punishable under article 315,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from four months
and one day to two years and four months.

From all these considerations the conclusion must be that the writ prayed for
cannot issue.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that habeas
corpus will not lie to correct errors of fact or law. (Slade Perkins vs.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55
Phil., 304; Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121;
McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U. S., 99; 41 Phil., 971.) When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its
judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of
error; and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous,
provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment
or issued such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, supra.) Mere errors in point of law, however serious, committed
by a criminal court in the exercise of jurisdiction over a case properly subject
to its cognizance, can not be reviewed by habeas corpus. (McMicking vs.
Schields, supra).

The petition is denied without costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.,
concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla
concurred in this decision.

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PERFECTO, J.:

Prisoner Elpidio S. Cruz has been confined in prison since March 27, 1943,
and since then up to October 30, 1946, the date of respondent’s return, he has
been deprived of his personal freedom for a total of 3 years, 7 months and 3
days.
of law, however serious, committed by a criminal court in

He is serving sentence under commitments in three criminal cases. The total
imprisonment imposed in all of them amounts to 1 year, 8 months and 1 day. It
is, therefore, evident that up to October 30, 1946, date of respondent’s return,
said prisoner has been illegally deprived of his liberty for almost two years,
that is, 1 year, 11 months and 2 days. At the promulgation of the decision in
this case, said prisoner shall appear as having been illegally deprived of his
liberty much more than two years.

The majority justifies the continued confinement of Elpidio S. Cruz because
on June 3, 1943, the Commissioner of Justice of the Executive Commission under
the Japanese regime recommitted him to serve the unexpired portion of the
maximum aggregate sentence imposed in three other cases. Said unexpired portion
was 5 years, 2 months and 1 day.

Said recommitment, having been issued under the authority of the Japanese
imperial forces of occupation, is null and void and should not be given any
effect, according to the theory we have expressed in our dissenting opinion in
the Co Kim Cham case (75 Phil., 113), which may be read for further elaboration
of the theory.

We also dissent from the following pronouncements in the majority
decision:

“It seems certain, however, that the trial court had jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant and of the offense, that the sentence in question was
within the limits provided by law for the crime, and that the defendant was not
denied any fundamental or constitutional rights. Broadly speaking1, only
deprivation of these rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the
sentence, or excessive penalty affords ground for relief by habeas corpus, (39
C. J. S., 444.)

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“In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that habeas
corpus will not lie to correct errors of fact or law. (Slade Perkins vs.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55
Phil., 304; Trono Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121;
McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U. S., 99; 41 Phil., 971.) When a court has
jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its
judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of
error; and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous,
provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment
or issued such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, supra.) Mere errors in point of law, however serious, committed
by a criminal court in the exercise of jurisdiction over a case properly subject
to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. (McMicking vs.
Schields, supra.)”

The pronouncements and the authorities invoked in support therein are all
premised on a wrong idea of the nature of the writ of habeas corpus. The writ is
the extraordinary remedy resorted to in order to give redress to all cases of
illegal deprivation of liberty, and the limitations advanced in the majority’s
pronouncememnts have the effect of changing the true nature of the writ.

For
all the foregoing, we vote that the petition be granted and prisoner Elpidio S.
Cruz be immediately released.

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HILADO, J.:

I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Perfecto, only adding by reference my own reasons in support of my dissenting
opinion in the Co Kim Cham case (75 Phil., 113) mentioned therein, both from the
main decision and from the resolution on the motion for reconsideration in said
case, as well as those stated in my dissenting and concurring opinions in allied
cases not here necessary specifically to mention.