G.R. No. L-41107. February 28, 1979
AMANDA L. VDA. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELO ABAGA, MARGARITA D. JOSE, MARTINA D. JOSE, QUIRINO D. JOSE, TEOFILO D. JOSE, ET AL., RESPOND…
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 47331-R entitled “Amanda L.
vda. de dela Cruz, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, versus Marcelo Abaga,
Margarita D. Jose, et al., defendants.” The questioned decision ordered
the setting aside of the decision rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations
in CAR Case No. 115-TP-59 and 116-TP-59 and proceedings subsequent thereto
insofar as it affected the deceased defendant Felix Jose or his heirs, the
private respondents in this petition.
As narrated by the Court of Appeals in its decision, it appears
that plaintiffs (herein petitioners) filed an action for ejectment and
collection of unpaid rentals against Felix Jose and 114 other tenants on
November 23, 1959 in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Tayug, Pangasinan. Their complaint alleged that Felix Jose is a
tenant over a 4.5 ha. landholding in plaintiffs’ hacienda in Tayug, Pangasinan,
paying a fixed rental of 850 kilos of palay per hectare per agricultural year;
that he failed to pay in full his rentals and despite plaintiffs’ repeated
demands, Felix Jose refused to vacate the landholding and to pay his
obligation.[1]
ln a joint answer filed through their counsel, Atty. Fausto G. Cabotaje, defendant
Felix Jose and his 114 co-defendants denied the material averments of the
complaint, alleging payment of all the rentals of their respective
landholdings. Thereafter, trial was commenced. However, as found by the Court of Appeals,
“before termination thereof, or on June 5, 1961, Felix Jose died at the
Eastern Pangasinan Provincial General Hospital in Tayug, Pangasinan (Record,
Vol. 1, p. 509). It appears that Jose’s
demise, no substitution of defendant was effected.”[2]
Then on March 29, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment
against Felix Jose together with the other defendants holding him liable to
plaintiffs for 6.432 kilos of palay as unpaid rentals. Some of his co-defendants then brought the
case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari where it was docketed as G.
R. No. L-19930-19935. However, the
petition was dismissed on November 30, 1962 due to the petitioners’ failure to
file their brief (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 2-8). Thereafter, on plaintiffs’ motion, the Court of Agrarian Relations
issued an order of execution (Appendix B of Appellant’s Brief, pp.
54-60). On May 3, 1963, a writ of
execution to effect ejectment was entered (Appendix C, Appellants’ Brief, pp.
60-69). To satisfy the award of damages
under the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the conjugal properties
of the deceased Felix Jose and his wife were sold at public auction. A certificate of sale dated July 31, 1969
was later issued in favor of plaintiff Amanda L. vda. de dela Cruz as highest
bidder. The sheriff’s final deed of
sale followed on August 17, 1970.
On October 27, 1970, the heirs of the deceased defendant, through
their new counsel, Atty. Juan V. Landingin, filed a motion to substitute the
deceased and to set aside as null and void the decisions, orders, writ of
execution and sale at public auction made and entered against the latter. The trial court allowed the substitution
“for the purposes of whatever proceedings may still be allowed in this
case” (p. 23, rollo) but denied the motion to set aside the decision,
orders, writ of execution and the public auction sale. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. The substituted defendants then
appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising mainly the question of the validity
of the lower court’s decision on the ground that despite it’s awareness of the
death of said defendant, no substitution was ordered before decision was
rendered on March 29, 1962.
The Court of Appeals found the appeal meritorious. Against its decision, a motion for reconsideration
was filed but was denied. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari, alleging mainly that the Court of Appeals
erred:[3]
1.
“in entertaining an appeal from the order of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, in reversing the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations of March 29, 1962, setting aside the same and the auction sale of
July 2, 1969, the certificate of sale dated July 31, 1969, and the final deed
of sale of August 17, 1970,” with respect to Felix Jose, considering that
a period of more than eight (8) years had elapsed from the rendition of the
decision of the trial court to the filing of the motion for substitution;
2.
“in not considering the decision of the Supreme Court in
cases G.R. Nos. L-19930-19935 as having the effect of res judicata, based not
only on the general application of the rule but on the basis of the agreement
of the parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations that the cases be heard
jointly and one decision for all the cases is sufficient;
3.
“in finding that the trial was still going on and not yet
terminated when Felix Jose died on June 5, 1961, and that the continuance of
the trial after the death of defendant, without such party having been
substituted in accordance with the aforesaid Rule amounts to lack of
jurisdiction.”
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found that the defendant
Felix Jose died before the termination of the trial, contrary to petitioner’s
claim that when said defendant died, the trial was already terminated (p. 11,
rollo) and hence, there was no denial of due process. Whether defendant died before or after termination of trial is
not all that important because one thing is certain: that he died before the
rendition of judgment. This fact was
known to the Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Appellant’s Brief, pp.
48-49), who in his decision placed the word “dead” in parenthesis
beside the name of Felix Jose (Appendix A, Appellants’ Brief, p. 49). The Court of Appeals took this into
consideration when it held that the decision of said court was a “patent
nullity” insofar as Felix Jose was concerned. As stated by the Appellate Court, no substitution of the deceased
was ordered by the trial court, in disregard of the provisions of Rule 3, Sec.
17, Rules of Court which read thus:
SEC. 17. Death of a party. – After a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the
legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered
as costs. The heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian
ad litem for the minor heirs.
In Caseñas vs. Rosales (19 SCRA 466). Caisip vs. Cabangon (109) Phil. 154)
and Bonilla vs. Barcena (71 SCRA 495), this Court held that in case of
the death of a party and due notice is given to the trial court, it is the duty
of the court to order the legal representative of the deceased to appear for
him, in the manner outlined in the aforementioned Rule. Considering that the complaint was for
ejectment of the tenants, (defendant, being one of them) the provisions of said
section and the rulings in the aforementioned cases are indeed applicable to
the present case, where the action or the claim is not extinguished on account
of Section 9, RA 1199, (now RA 6389, Code of Agrarian Reforms) which provides
in effect that in case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural
lessee, the leasehold shall continue between the lessor and the persons enumerated
in said Section which include the descendants of the deceased. But as noted by the Court of Appeals[4]:
“it appears that no legal representative was ever summoned to appear in
court; that no legal representative appeared to be substituted; and that the plaintiffs
did not procure the appointment of such legal representatives.” As a
result, the “continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a
party thereto dies, without such having been validly substituted in accordance
with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction.”[5]
The same ruling was given in the earlier case of Ferreria vs. Gonzales
(104 Phil 143), where this Court set aside the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations because “no valid substitution was effected,
consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the
purpose of making the decision binding upon her either personally or as legal
representative of the estate of her deceased mother.” Assuming that
jurisdiction was ever acquired at the outset over defendant Felix Jose, it was:
“inevitably impaired on the death of
the protestee pending the proceedings below such that unless and until a legal
representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial
court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or
binding effect on any party, in representation of the deceased, without
trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very
essence of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process.”[6]
The need therefore for substitution is based on the right of a
party to due process. Summing up then
the previous ruling of this Court in the afore-cited cases, and noting that
Rule 3, Sec. 17, Revised Rules of Court uses the word “shall”, one
infers that substitution is indeed a mandatory requirement in actions surviving
the deceased. It has been held that in
“statutes relating to procedure … every act which is jurisdictional, or
of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit
of the party affected, is mandatory.”[7]
The petitioners, however, take the contrary view, pointing to the case of Lota
vs. Tolentino (90 Phil. 831) to argue that the said section involves only a
procedural requirement (Petitioners’ Brief, p. 16). A reading of the said case shows that the nature of the action
filed by the plaintiff was purely personal since it was for accounting and
liquidation of the partnership, and on defendant’s death, the claim was
extinguished.
In any case, substitution should be ordered even after judgment
has been rendered since proceedings may still be taken–as was done in this
case — like an execution; and the legal representative must appear to protect
the interests of the deceased and in all such proceedings.[8]
In this instance, however, the Court of Appeals found that there is “no
showing that the appellants were notified of the decision dated March 29, 1962
or of the auction sale held thereafter.”[9]
Petitioners take issue with the Appellate Court on this point. But since the present petition is for review
on certiorari, where “only questions of law may be raised,” (R. 45,
Sec. 2, Revised Rules of Court), this Court has held in a number of cases that
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are; in general, final and conclusive
(Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737; Ramirez Te. Corp. vs. Bank of America,
32 SCRA 191; Castro vs. Tamporong, 78 Phil. 804, to name a few), except when:[10]
1.
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
2.
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
3.
there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4.
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5.
the Court of Appeals is making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both
appellant and appellee.
None of the above exceptions however
applies to the case at bar, so there is no reason to disturb the findings of
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners also contend that since two of the private
respondents were co-respondents with their father in the complaint before the
Court of Agrarian Relations, petitioners “believe that they were supposed
to have represented their father in the appeal to the Supreme Court.
“Likewise, they maintain that the decision of the Court in the said appeal
operated as res judicata on all matters which might have been
litigated and decided before the judgment became final (pp. 7-9, rollo).
With reference to the first objection, it is worthy to note that
the herein private respondents were sued in their individual capacity for their
separate and respective obligations. The dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court for failure of the
petitioners to file their brief or memorandum within the prescribed period
could not, therefore, bar the heirs of the deceased from questioning all the
proceedings, particularly if the fact is considered that there could not have
been a final judgment on the merits since in the first place, jurisdiction over
the deceased defendant was lacking in the lower court, as heretofore
shown. Accordingly there can be no res
judicata as contended by petitioner.[11]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We hereby affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Pp. 20-23, Rollo.
[2]
Appendix A, Petitioners’ Brief, pp. 19-20.
[3]
Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 2-4.
[4]
P. 26, Rollo.
[5]
Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 496-497.
[6]
Vda. de de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 540.
[7]
Ibid., p. 542, citing Gonzaga, Statutes & Their Construction, p.
98.
[8]
Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. Vol. I, p. 208.
[9]
Brief for Petitioners, Appendix A, p. 24.
[10]
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 331.
[11]
The second requisite of res judicata is that the Court rendering
the final judgment or order must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties. See Dacosin vs.
Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 89; Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 73 SCRA 507; Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank vs. Pfleider, 65 SCRA 13.