G.R. No. L-6570. April 12, 1954
JUAN PLANAS AND SOFIA VERDON, PETITIONERS, VS. MADRIGAL & CO., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
orders of respondent Judge with the view to reviving or giving course
to the third party claims filed by petitioners with the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal claiming to be the owners of the houses levied in
execution and to excluding them from the list of individuals who were
ordered to vacate the land of Madrigal & Co. Inc., issued in Civil
Case No. 954 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
This petition stems from a case of forcible entry and detainer
instituted by Madrigal & Co. Inc., against Concepcion L. Planas and
Iluminado L. Planas in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case
No. 954), which culminated in a judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants, whereby the latter were ordered to vacate the
property in litigation and to pay to the former the corresponding
rentals for their occupancy of the property until it is vacated. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals and became final and
executory.
On November 28, 1952, upon petition of plaintiff, a writ of
execution was issued by the court and was given course by the clerk of
court by virtue of which the defendants were given 15 days within which
to vacate the land. Defendants having failed to do so, plaintiff filed
a motion for the issuance of a special order of demolition of the
buildings constructed thereon.
On December 16, 1952, Juan Planas filed an action in the same court
claiming to be the owner of two of the buildings, plus two other
adjacent buildings marked as annexes, contemplated to be demolished and
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ
prayed for was denied. Instead, the court granted the motion of
plaintiff for the demolition of the buildings belonging to the
defendants.
On January 23, 1953, the provincial sheriff commenced the demolition
of the buildings, whereupon Juan Planas filed on January 28, 1953 with
said sheriff a third-party claim alleging to be the owner of the four
buildings which were ordered to be demolished as belonging to
defendants, and on the same date, January 28, 1953, Sofia Verdon filed
likewise a third-party claim alleging to be the owner of the personal
property found in said buildings. At the same time, Juan Planas wrote
to the sheriff requesting him to stop the demolition of the buildings
and to require the judgment creditor to file an indemnity bond as
required by the rules. This request was transmitted by the sheriff to
counsel of the plaintiff requesting appropriate action, but instead of
heeding the request counsel filed an urgent motion to quash the
third-party claims filed by Juan Planas and Sofia Verdon. A timely
objection was interposed to this motion by the third-party claimants.
On February 5, 1953, the court granted the motion to quash and
discarded the third-party claims as well as the notice given to the
sheriff requiring the plaintiff to post an indemnity bond. The
claimants moved for the reconsideration of this order but the same was
denied.
On February 9, 1953, to follow up his claim in line with his
interest, Juan Planas filed another third-party claim with the sheriff
requesting the latter to turn over to him all the materials that were
dismantled and brought down from the houses that had been demolished,
alleging to be the owner thereof, and to require the judgment creditor
to put up the necessary indemnity bond for his protection. The sheriff
failed to act on this third-party claim. Instead, in the afternoon of
February 10, 1953, Juan Planas received a copy of an urgent motion to
quash said second third-party claim filed by counsel for the plaintiff.
Juan Planas moved for postponement of the hearing of this motion but
his motion was ignored, and on February 11, 1953, the court granted the
urgent motion and discarded the second third-party claim of Juan Planas.
On February 10, 1953, Juan Planas received a copy of an order of the
court issued of February 2, 1953 which directs that certain
individuals, including Juan Planas, vacate the land of the plaintiff
pursuant to the judgment of the court. On February 17, 1953, these
individuals, including Juan Planas, filed a joint petition for the
reconsideration of the order of February 2, 1953 but this joint
petition was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside the orders above adverted to.
The question to be determined is whether the respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the quashing and
discarding of the first and second third- party claims interposed by
petitioners on January 28, 1953, and February 9, 1953, and in ordering
petitioner Juan Planas to vacate the land of the plaintiff not being a
party to the case of forcible entry and detainer instituted by Madrigal
& Co. Inc., against Concepcion L. Planas and Iluminado Planas.
The duty of the sheriff in connection with the execution and
satisfaction of a judgment of the court is governed by Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. With regard to the proceedings to be followed where the
property levied in execution is claimed by a third person, section 15
provides that if such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property unless the judgment
creditor, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond
in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. If the
third-party claim is sufficient, the sheriff, upon receiving it, is not
bound to proceed with the levy of the property, unless he is given by
the judgment creditor an indemnity bond against the claim (Mangaoang
vs. The Provincial Sheriff, 91 Phil., 368). Of course, the sheriff may
proceed with the levy even without the indemnity bond, but in such case
he will answer for any damages with his own personal funds. (Waite i.
Peterson, et al., 8 Phil., 449; Alzua, et al. vs. Johnson, 21
Phil., 308; Consulta No. 441 de los abogados de Smith, Bell & Co.,
48 Phil., 565.) And the rule also provides that nothing therein
contained shall prevent a third person from vindicating his claim to
the property by any proper action (Section 15, Rule 39).
In the present case, the provincial sheriff departed from the
regular procedure prescribed by the rules. He chose to succeed with the
levy even without the indemnity bond in view of the urgent motion to
quash filed by the judgment creditor in the main case. It should be
remembered that the court, after proper hearing, wherein the parties
were allowed to submit documentary evidence, found the third party
claims to be without merit and ordered that they be discarded and
quashed. Indeed, the court found that Juan Planas, the third party
claimant, is the son of defendants Concepcion L. Planas and Iluminado
L. Planas, and a stockholder of a firm of which Concepcion L. Planas
was the principal stockholder. It also found that since the filing of
the ejectment case against the spouses Planas up to December 29, 1952,
the four houses claimed by Juan Planas were registered in the name of
his mother, Concepcion L. Planas, in the assessment rolls of Pasay
City, were transferred to Juan Planas. On the other hand, the answer
submitted by spouses Planas in the ejectment case contains a clear
averment that the four houses now in dispute were constructed and were
the property of said spouses. Likewise, the letter of Atty. Arcadio
Ejercito, counsel of Concepcion J. Planas sent to the provincial
sheriff in connection with the demolition of the four buildings in
question, contains an averment which indicates that said buildings
belonged to said defendant. This circumstantial evidence must have
engendered in the mind of the court the conviction that the claim of
ownership put up by Juan Planas at so late an hour is but an eleventh
hour attempt to thwart and frustrate the execution of the judgment
rendered in the ejectment case.
We hold that the action taken by the respondent Judge on this matter
is justified. At any rate, the right of Juan Planas to the property is
not completely lost, for the rule reserves to him the right to
vindicate his claim in a proper action (Section 15, Rule 39). This he
did by bringing an action in court asserting his ownership over the
property. This action is still pending and will be decided in due time
(Civil Case No. 1961).
Anent the order of respondent Judge dated February 2, 1953 which
directs that Jose Isla, Carlos Neri, Jose T. Josue, Juan Planas and the
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vacate the land of plaintiff pursuant to the
judgments of the court in the ejectment case, which order is now
attacked as illegal because they were not parties to that case, the
record shows that, before issuing said order, the court conducted a
summary hearing to determine the nature of the possession of the
property claimed by Juan Planas and other occupants, and that at that
hearing respondent Judge summoned all of them to appear to show cause
why they should not be ejected from the premises. And after the hearing
was over, respondent Judge found that Juan Planas and the other
occupants were mere transferees or possessors pendente lite
of the property in question. Respondent Judge found that if they had
any right at all to occupy the property, that right is merely
subsidiary to that of defendant Concepcion L. Planas. As such, they are
bound by the judgment rendered against the latter in consonance with
the doctrine laid down in the cases of Brodett vs. De la Rosa,[1] 44 Off. Gaz., No. 3, pp. 874-875, and Gozon vs. De la Rosa,[2]
44 Off. Gaz., pp. 1227-1228. Of course, these are questions of fact, as
to which there may be controversy, but the proper place where this
should be threshed out is not in this proceedings, but in an ordinary
action. For the present, we are satisfied that the respondent Judge has
acted on the matter in the exercise of his sound discretion.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, and Diokno, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.
[1] 77 Phil., 752. [2]77 Phil., 919.