ANONYMOUS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JULIETO N. BAJAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 2, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SURIGAO CITY, SURIGAO DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT.

Anonymous versus Judge Bajan

The Case

This is an administrative case against a retired presiding judge of a municipal trial court in cities, brought on the strength of two anonymous letter-complaints from litigants who concealed their identities out of fear of reprisal. The complainants alleged that the judge started hearings hours late, smoked and slept during trial, and heard cases that had been raffled to other courts. The case matters for two reasons. First, it settles that a judge's retirement does not strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to declare him guilty and to penalize him. Second, it is a compact review of the offenses under the Revised Rule 140 — violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, habitual tardiness, simple misconduct, and gross insubordination — and of the Court's power over the venue of cases, which belongs to the Supreme Court alone.

Procedural History

The two anonymous complaints reached the Office of the Chief Justice and the Office of the Executive Judge of the municipal trial court in cities of Surigao City. The Office of the Court Administrator referred them to two executive judges for discreet investigation and report. Both executive judges confirmed the allegations after verifying them with court personnel, litigants, and lawyers. The Office of the Court Administrator then required the judge to file a more comprehensive comment, and he failed to comply despite repeated directives. The matter was later referred to the Office of the General Counsel of the Judicial Integrity Board, which recommended that he be found liable for several offenses. The Judicial Integrity Board itself recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the judge be found guilty of six offenses, each carrying a fine. The case was resolved by the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, and the Court partly adopted the findings of the Board, with modifications as to the offenses and the penalties.

Facts

The respondent, Judge Julieto N. Bajan, was the Presiding Judge of Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. He was also designated Acting Presiding Judge of the municipal circuit trial court of Placer-Bacuag, and later of the municipal circuit trial court of Tubod-Alegria. Two undated anonymous letters, written by litigants who hid their identities for fear of reprisal, accused him of delaying the disposition of cases. They alleged that trial would begin at half past eleven in the morning instead of half past eight, that parties waited more than two hours only to have the hearing postponed, that he smoked and slept during trial, and that he heard in his sala in Surigao City cases that had been raffled to the municipal circuit trial court of Placer-Bacuag.

The executive judges investigated and confirmed the allegations. They found that he arrived late and held hearings from about eleven to one o'clock; that he smoked in open court while holding hearings until November 2012 and continued to smoke in his chambers; that he did not report daily when he had no schedules in other courts; and that he slept during a trial, so that the lawyers had to leave. They found no apparent or serious delay in acting on court matters, noting that he sat only as an acting presiding judge and held hearings two days a week. They did confirm that he had heard one case from Placer-Bacuag and one from Sison-Tagana-an.

When required to comment, the judge asked that the complaint be dismissed as harassment, focusing on its procedural flaws rather than its substance. The Office of the Court Administrator required a more comprehensive comment, and he failed to comply twice. The Judicial Integrity Board likewise directed him to file a verified comment and warned that failure would be a waiver of his participation, and he again failed to comply. He retired on May 23, 2023, while the case was pending.

Issues

• Whether or not the judge may still be held administratively liable and penalized despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
• Whether or not he is guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars for smoking during court hearings and for hearing cases not raffled to his sala.
• Whether or not he is guilty of habitual tardiness.
• Whether or not he is guilty of simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for sleeping during a court hearing.
• Whether or not he is guilty of simple neglect of duty for delay in resolving cases and incidents.
• Whether or not he is guilty of gross insubordination for failing to comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board to file comment.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

This is the constitutional source of the Court's power over the assignment of judges, which the Court invoked when it held that only it may order a change of venue or place of trial.

Section 6 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This is the basis of the Court's authority to discipline judges and court personnel, and of the binding force of the directives issued by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board.

Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

This is the standard the judge violated when he fell asleep during trial, putting the image of the Judiciary into disrepute.

OCA Circular No. 90-2004 provides, in its relevant portions:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with Section 5(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, vesting this Court with the power to assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require, and with Section 6 of the same article mandating that this court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof, cases assigned to judges who have been transferred, detailed, or assigned to any branch within or outside the judicial region of the same court or promoted to a higher court shall be managed and decided under the following guidelines: x x x 2. Except as herein provided, all cases shall remain in the branch to which these have been raffled or assigned. Only cases that have been submitted for decision or those past the trial stage, i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion of the judge to which these are raffled/assigned shall be resolved or disposed by him/her in accordance with the guidelines herein set forth.

This circular confines cases to the branch to which they were raffled, and the judge violated it when he heard cases from other courts in his sala.

OCA Circular No. 250-15 provides, on session hours:

B. Strict Observance of Session Hours. x x x 2. The hours in the morning and afternoon shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, unless already done, in which case the afternoon hours shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circulars in specified cases. 3. Except those requiring immediate action, all motions should be scheduled for hearing on Friday, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the next business day. The unauthorized practice of some judges of entertaining motions or setting them for hearing on any other day or time must be avoided. An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he or she incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, 10 times a month for at least two months in a semester or for at least two consecutive months during the year.

This circular fixes the session hours and defines habitual tardiness, which the judge incurred by beginning sessions between eleven and half past eleven in the morning.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that it retains jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction has attached, it is not lost by the mere fact that the public official was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. Cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against the officer at the time he was still in the public service, nor does it render the case moot and academic. Hence, the judge's retirement did not warrant dismissal.

On the second issue, the Court found him liable for two separate violations of the Court's circulars. On smoking, Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008 and Office Order No. 06-2009 prohibit smoking in all interior areas of court buildings and the areas immediately adjacent to them, allowing it only in designated places. He openly smoked during trial and in chambers, and court staff complained to no avail. On hearing cases from other courts, the Court stressed that only the Supreme Court can order a change of venue or place of trial, and that venue is essentially for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. By hearing cases from another branch, he affected the orderly dispensation of justice, caused inconvenience to litigants, jeopardized the safekeeping of court records and evidence, and arrogated to himself authority that only the High Court possesses.

On the third issue, the Court found him habitually tardy. Public office is a public trust, and court officials must strictly observe official time. The investigating judges reported that he began sessions between eleven and half past eleven in the morning, to the detriment of the public who arrived as early as half past eight. His excuse that the work of a judge is mental and is brought into his sleep and dreams was unacceptable. Circulars prescribing hours of work are not empty pronouncements; they promote efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and a judge who is not punctual sets a bad example to the Bar and creates dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.

On the fourth issue, the Court found him guilty of simple misconduct. Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior connected with the performance of official functions. Gross misconduct requires corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, and none of these was manifest. Any scandalous behavior that may erode the people's esteem for the Judiciary is tantamount to simple misconduct. Falling asleep during trial, leaving the lawyers no option but to step out of the courtroom, was unbecoming for a magistrate and violated Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the fifth issue, the Court found no basis to hold him guilty of simple neglect of duty. Neither investigating judge confirmed the charge of delay, and one of them related that he had found no apparent or serious delays in the disposition of pending cases.

On the sixth issue, the Court found him guilty of gross insubordination, a serious charge. Directives of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board are issued in the exercise of the Court's administrative supervision and are not mere requests; they must be complied with promptly and completely. Insubordination and gross insubordination are the inexplicable and unjustified refusal to obey an order that a superior is entitled to give and have obeyed, importing a willful or intentional disregard of lawful and reasonable instructions. Over ten years passed since he was first instructed to submit a more comprehensive comment, and he ignored the directives of both the Office of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board. The Court cannot discharge its constitutional mandate of overseeing judges if the judge concerned does not even recognize its administrative authority.

Doctrine

First, jurisdiction over an administrative case against a public officer attaches upon the filing of the complaint during his incumbency, and is not lost by his subsequent resignation, death or retirement. The case is neither dismissed nor rendered moot by his separation from office.

Second, only the Supreme Court may order a change of venue or place of trial. A judge who hears and transfers cases raffled to other courts, without authority, violates OCA Circular No. 90-2004 and usurps an authority that belongs to the High Court alone.

Third, judges and court personnel must strictly observe the prescribed session hours. Habitual tardiness is a less serious charge, and the circulars on office hours are not empty pronouncements but instruments for the efficient administration of justice.

Fourth, any scandalous behavior that erodes the people's esteem for the Judiciary is simple misconduct, penalized under the Revised Rule 140, and violates the duty of propriety under Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Fifth, the repeated and unjustified failure to comply with directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board to file comment is gross insubordination, a serious charge, because those directives are issued under the Court's constitutional power of administrative supervision.

Disposition

The Court found the retired judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, habitual tardiness, simple misconduct, and gross insubordination, and imposed the corresponding fines, payable out of his retirement benefits, while absolving him of simple neglect of duty.

Remember This

Memorize this line: retirement does not erase administrative liability, and only the Supreme Court may move a case to another venue. Examiners use this case to test the effect of retirement on administrative jurisdiction, the classification of offenses under the Revised Rule 140, and the duty of judges to obey directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and the Judicial Integrity Board.