NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. NWSA SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority versus NWSA Supervisors Association

The Case

This is a petition brought by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the NWSA Supervisors Association and the Court of Industrial Relations, asking the Supreme Court to set aside an award of the Industrial Court that granted three demands of the supervisors' union: a staggered general salary increase, a correction of the effective dates of two promotional appointments, and commutable transportation allowances for the Authority's lawyers. The case matters far less for the merits of those labor demands than for what it teaches about procedure: the appeal was filed out of time, so the Court treated the petition as a special civil action for certiorari and confronted squarely the question of whether the negligence of a government law office can excuse a late motion for reconsideration. It is a leading reminder that the reglementary periods of the Industrial Court are jurisdictional and that the finality of judgments does not bend to the workload of counsel.

Procedural History

The NWSA Supervisors Association filed a case before the Court of Industrial Relations, which rendered a decision on November 22, 1968 granting three of the Association's demands. The Authority, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, failed to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period and instead filed one on the fifth day from receipt, accompanied by a verified petition for relief from judgment. The Industrial Court sustained the Association's position that the appeal was late and that its decision had already become final and executory. The Authority then came to the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Because the appeal was in fact filed out of time, the Supreme Court treated the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. The Court initially denied the Association's motion to dismiss the petition, but only to allow a fuller discussion of the excuse offered for the tardiness, and not as a final resolution of the ground of dismissal.

Facts

On a Friday, November 22, 1968, at 4:50 in the afternoon, a bailiff of the Industrial Court served a copy of the decision on the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. The following Saturday and Sunday were non-working days for government offices. On Monday, November 25, the Government Corporate Counsel, who had to read and initial all court pleadings, decisions, and orders, was out of town on official business and could not act on the decision left on his table.

On Tuesday, November 26, the record clerk delivered the decision to the secretary of the attorney in charge of the case so that a motion for reconsideration could be prepared. The secretary, however, was suffering from high fever and headache. She reported for work in the morning, received the copy of the decision, went home, placed it inside her drawer, and forgot to put it on her lawyer's table. It was only on the morning of November 27 that she delivered the decision to the attorney, who told her that the last day to file the motion for reconsideration had been November 26.

It was undisputed that under the rules of the Industrial Court then in force, a party aggrieved by a decision had to file its motion for reconsideration, as an indispensable prerequisite of its right to appeal, within four days from notice of the decision. The Authority's motion for reconsideration was filed on the fifth day, with a verified petition for relief from judgment. The Court also noted a discrepancy: the petition and brief gave the impression that it was the receiving clerk, not the stenographer-secretary, who had been sick.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations had already become final and executory because the motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the four-day reglementary period.
• Whether or not the illness of the secretary and the absence of the Government Corporate Counsel and the attorney in charge constitute excusable neglect entitling the Authority to relief from judgment.

Applicable Provisions

The Court applied the rules of the Industrial Court then in force, which fixed the period for reconsideration and made compliance an indispensable prerequisite of the right to appeal. The Court summarized the requirement in these words:

It is undisputed that under the rules of the Industrial Court in force during the material dates of this case, a party aggrieved by a decision thereof must file its motion for reconsideration, as an indispensable prerequisite of its right to appeal, within four (4) days from notice of the decision.

This rule is the pivot of the case, because the Authority's motion was filed on the fifth day, one day beyond the period, and the Court held the requirement jurisdictional.

In explaining the settled jurisprudence on the consequences of a late motion, the Court quoted its earlier ruling in a companion line of cases, which itself quoted the Industrial Court's rules on motions for reconsideration and supporting arguments:

Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that the movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and or the supporting arguments, as the case may be.

These provisions bear on the case because they show that the rules themselves attach the sanction of dismissal to non-compliance, which the Court treated as fatal and jurisdictional.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the decision of the Industrial Court had indeed become final and executory. The requirement of a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period is jurisdictional, and failure to comply with it is fatal. The Court relied on its own settled jurisprudence that a motion for reconsideration filed out of time leaves the decision final, and that a decision subject of a motion denied for late supporting arguments becomes final and unappealable. Since the Authority's motion was filed on the fifth day, one day late, the decision could no longer be disturbed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the circumstances relied upon did not constitute excusable neglect. It found the excuse of a clerk or secretary misplacing or forgetting a court process to be, in the words it quoted from an earlier decision, the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements. The Court stressed that it does not matter that a government corporation's financial liability is involved. It recalled a prior case in which the Solicitor General's receiving clerk misplaced a notice and the Government stood to pay over two million pesos, and the Court still refused to treat the neglect as excusable. The Court added that the absence of the Corporate Counsel, the non-working weekend, and the attorney's court hearing actually added to, rather than detracted from, the demonstrated lack of diligence of the office. It expected all concerned to adopt adequate measures so that court processes are promptly attended to even on non-working days and in the absence of the head of office or the assigned attorney, especially since public funds and properties were at stake.

Doctrine

First, under the rules of the Industrial Court then in force, a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable prerequisite of the right to appeal and must be filed within four days from notice of the decision; the requirement is jurisdictional, and failure to comply with it is fatal, rendering the decision final and executory.

Second, the negligence of a clerk or secretary in handling a court process, such as forgetting to deliver a decision to the assigned attorney, is not excusable neglect and will not justify relief from judgment; this holds even where the litigant is a government corporation and public funds are at stake.

Third, the absence of the head of office, non-working days, and the court hearings of the assigned attorney do not excuse tardiness; counsel bears the duty to adopt adequate measures so that court processes are promptly and properly attended to.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations of November 22, 1968 was declared final and executory, with no costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a motion for reconsideration filed out of time renders the judgment final and executory, and the neglect of a clerk or secretary is not excusable neglect. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional nature of reglementary periods and the strict standard applied even to government counsel handling public funds.