BENGUET EXPLORATION MINERS’ UNION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ATTY. ERUDITO E. LUNA, MED­-ARBITER DESIGNATE OF LABOR RELA…

The decisive issue raised in this certiorari proceeding by
petitioner labor union is whether the Bureau of Labor Relations, its Director,
Carmelo C. Noriel and one of its Med-Arbiters, Erudito E. Luna, being named as
respondents, possessed jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certification
election filed by private respondent Union. Moreover, a grave abuse of discretion was imputed to such respondent
officials, when instead of deciding with finality a motion to dismiss such
petition for certification, they merely
ordered that it should remain part of the records of the case to be considered
in its final disposition, a procedural due process question likewise being
raised with the assertion that such union was not duly heard. For all the rather verbose pleadings filed
by petitioner, it was unable to make a dent on the challenged actuation of
respondent public officials. It became
quite apparent with the submission of the comment of the then Acting Solicitor
General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,^[1] now a Justice of the Court of Appeals,
considered as an answer.^[2] The matter was put in its true
perspective. Nothing in the memoranda
thereafter submitted could change the picture at all. The petition cannot prosper.

The antecedent facts were set forth in the aforesaid comment of
the then Acting Solicitor General in a specific and objective manner. It deserves to be quoted in full: “1. On January 13, 1976, the National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union
(NAMAWU-MIF), filed with the Labor Relations Division, Baguio City, a ‘Petition
for Certification Election with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Restraining
Order’ alleging, among others, that it is a legitimate labor organization, that
more than 30% of the 800 employees of the Benguet Exploration, Inc. have
signified their conformity and desire to the holding of a certification
election, attaching thereto the signatures of three hundred eighteen (318)
employees; that there has been no certification election held in the company
for the last twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and that the CBA between the company and the Benguet Exploration
Miners’ Union (BXMU) had already expired * * *. 2. Said petition was
docketed as LRC Case No. 332-BC and was set for hearing on January 26, 1976,
with notices sent to all the parties concerned including the petitioner herein
* * *. However, said scheduled hearing
was reset to February 5, 1976, upon motion of petitioner herein BXMU. 3. Meanwhile, before the scheduled hearing on February 5, 1976, BXMU filed
on January 20, 1976, a motion to dismiss * * * alleging in effect lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Relations Division to entertain the
petition for certification election in view of Secretary of Labor’s Memorandum
Circular dated September 5, 1974, which provides among others that: ‘3. No certification election shall be entertained if there is a bargaining
unit in a company: a) A certified union
b) An existing collective bargaining agreement c) A bonafide union comprising
the majority voluntarily recognized and in the process of negotiating a
contract * * * claiming that since it (BXMU) is a certified union and that
there is an existing collective bargaining agreement, no petition for
certification election should be entertained. Said motion to dismiss was opposed by the petitioning union (NAMAWU-MIF)
private respondent herein alleging that said memorandum circular had been
superseded by the enactment of the New Labor Code and that as regards motions
to dismiss or other incidental motions the same should not be given due course
but shall remain as part of the records for whatever it may be worth when the
case is decided on the merits as per Sec. 5, Book V, Rule XIII; Rules and
Regulations Implementing the New Labor Code of the Philippines. 4. On January 26, 1976, respondent
Med-Arbiter issued an order as follows: ‘Pursuant to Section 5, General Provisions, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines, let the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Intervenors remain part of the records of the petition for certification
election for whatever it may be worth so that the issues tendered therein shall be resolved upon
resolution of the petition on the merits, after the evidence of the parties are
formally submitted, documentary as well as testimonial. The case should therefore be set for hearing
on February 5, 1976, at 9:00 o’clock A.M. at the Department of Labor, Baguio
city, before the undersigned and is intransferable in character 5. At the scheduled hearing of the case on
February 5, 1976, counsel for BXMU (petitioner herein) without asking for the
reconsideration of the aforequoted order of January 26, 1976, nevertheless
argued extensively the ground of his motion to dismiss and even replied to the
opposition filed by NAMAWU-MIF. After
the parties had argued and manifested their respective positions, and in order
to afford the company time within which to submit the list of employees as of
December 31, 1975, the case was reset for continuation of hearing to February
12, 1976. 6. On February 6, 1976, petitioner BXMU filed a
‘Motion for Hearing and Resolution on Motion to Dismiss,’ praying for a hearing
and resolution of its motion to dismiss, citing Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Bureau of Labor Relations. * * *. 7. Later, on February 12, 1976, BXMU filed
another pleading entitled ‘Supplemental Grounds to Motion to Dismiss, alleging
that the petition for certification election was filed out of time since the
CBA between it and the company had long expired on September 1, 1975, whereas
the petition for certification election was filed only on January 13, 1976 * *
*. 8. During the hearing of the case on February 12, 1976, as contained in the
record of the proceedings on said date * * *, petitioner herein, through
counsel, again argued at length his motion to dismiss and even pressed for a
ruling thereon claiming that the issue raised is jurisdictional. It was at this juncture that the Med-­Arbiter
stated that after the submission of the answer of the petitioner union (private
respondent herein) to the supplemental grounds to the motion to dismiss, he
will resolve the same. Upon the other
hand, respondent NAMAWU-MIF submitted during the ‘hearing an additional list
containing the signatures of 132 employees in the company likewise signifying
their desire for a certification election * * *, while the company submitted a
list of the rank and file employees totalling 776 as of December 31, 1975 * *
*. 9. On February 17, 1976, respondent NAMAWU-MIF filed an
opposition to the supplemental grounds to motion to dismiss * * * while petitioner herein, BXMU, on
the same date filed its summary of arguments on its motion to dismiss * *
*. 10. On February 20, 1976, respondent Med-Arbiter issued an order resolving,
among others, the jurisdictional issue raised in the motion to dismiss
thus: * * * The records show that the
jurisdictional requirements parti­cularly the legal personality of the
petitioner and the date when the petition for certification of election was
filed were strictly determined and therefore in order. Conse­quently, this Office acquires
jurisdiction over the case * * *’ and resetting the hearing of the case on
February 25, 1976. 11. On February 24, 1976, petitioner BXMU filed
a memorandum of appeal and during the hearing of the case on February 25, 1976,
after the parties had argued said memorandum of appeal, respondent Med­-Arbiter
issued an order for the records of the case to be forwarded to the respondent
Director of Labor Relations for decision and/or ruling on the issue raised
therein* * *. Respondent NAMAWU-MIF filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order * * * which was opposed by petitioner BXMU and on March 9, 1976, respondent issued an order denying the urgent motion and
affirming his previous order to forward the records of the case to the Director
of Labor Relations * * *. 12. Subsequently, on April 24, 1976,
respondent Director Noriel issued an order remanding the case to the
Med-Arbiter for further investigation and hearing and dismissing the appeal for
lack of merit on the basis of his findings as follows: ‘Since there has been no certification
election for the past twelve (12) months and no certified collective bargaining
agreement, the present petition for certification election could naturally
prosper.’ * * *to which order a motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but which was denied in a resolution dated June 28, 1976. * * *.”^[3]

Nothing can be clearer then than that this petition, as noted at
the outset, must be dismissed.

1. For all the strenuous effort exerted by petitioner to make out
a case for lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent officials,” it
cannot be gainsaid that the law mandates the contrary. It speaks in a categorical manner. Thus: “Any petition for certification election filed by any legitimate
labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least 30% of
all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory
for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of deter­mining
the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and
certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
the employees in the unit.”^[4]
Instead of respondent public officials being devoid of competence, what cannot
be disputed is that for them to refuse to heed the above provision would be
sheer dereliction of duty. What is
more, it would set at naught the clear policy of the law, which is to leave to
the workers themselves the determination
of their exclusive bargaining representative through a balloting wherein
everyone may express his preference. In
the language of a recent decision, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
v. Bureau of Labor Relations:^[5] “Petitioner thus appears to be woefully
lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the
collective bargaining process. It is
the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can
truly represent the working force. It
is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression
in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their
choice, is controlling. No better
device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties
to a business enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of
self-rule.”^[6]
Such an approach has invariably been followed in subsequent decisions.^[7]
Petitioner’s insistence therefore on a memorandum circular of September 5,
1974, which could at the most lend deceptive plausibility to his plea, is
futile and unavailing. As pointed out
in the memorandum of the then Acting Solicitor General Gutierrez: “Said memorandum circular which, in
effect, prevents the holding of certification elections, under the conditions
therein specified was issued merely as a provisional guideline during such
period when the New Labor Code had not yet come into effect. This is apparent from the explanatory
provisions of the Circular itself which reads: In order to pave the way for the smooth implementation of the Labor Code
relative to the restructuring of the labor movement, the following guidelines
on union registration and certification election are hereby issued effective
immediately.’ Hence, when the New Labor
Code became effective on November 1, 1974, said Memorandum Circular became
obsolete specially so since the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the
explicit provisions of the New Labor Code on the subject. Thus, while under said memorandum circular
the mere existence of a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a bar to
the holding of a certification election, under the New Labor Code, however
(Art. 231 and 256), only a ‘certified’ CBA can bar the same. More, again under said memorandum circular,
the existence of a certified union would prevent a certification election no
matter how long ago said union was so certified, but under the present Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, the only limitation therein
provided is that ‘no certification election can be held oftener than once every
twelve months from the date of last election.’ Rule V, Section 3, Book V) Further, if we were to enforce the
prohibition in said circular, it would be violative of the provisions of
Article 257 of the Labor Code which ordains that a certification election is mandatory
if the petition is supported by the written consent of at least 30% of all the
employees in the collective bargaining unit.”^[8]

2. The prop sought to be put on the allegation of lack of
jurisdiction failing, petitioner would try to impart a semblance of
plausibility to its suit by conjuring a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent public officials. Here
again, it did, not succeed. No fault
can be imputed to respondent Med­-Arbiter if instead of ruling definitely on
the motion to dismiss a petition for certification election, he ordered that it
should remain part of the records of the case to be thereafter considered in
its final disposition. Petitioner
himself could not deny that such a procedure
is in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code of
the Philippines. The specific provision
reads: “In, all proceedings at all levels, motions
for dismissal or any other incidental motions shall not be given due course,
but shall remain as part of the records for whatever they may be worth when the
case is decided on the merit.”^[9] Such
a norm is precisely in accordance with the basic policy of the present Labor
Code, namely, to minimize the possibility of parties raising technical objections that may not be out of place in
judicial proceedings. The laudable
purpose is to assure an expeditious determination of the controversy. Moreover, even as to court cases, petitioner
could not be unaware that under the Rules of Court, the judge, after hearing a
motion to dismiss, “may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of
pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the
trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.”^[10] On the alleged lack of a hearing, the
memorandum of the Solicitor General again is quite revealing of the true state
of affairs: “As heretofore
narrated in the statement of facts, petitioner herein in no less than three (3)
hearings argued extensively the grounds of its motion to dismiss, its
supplemental grounds to motion to dismiss and even its memorandum of
appeal. For that matter, during the
hearing of the case on February 12, 1976, petitioner’s counsel even insisted
for a ruling on the jurisdictional issue raised in its motion. This issue was indeed resolved by the
Med-Arbiter in his February 20, 1976 order * * * wherein he stated: The records show that the jurisdictional
requirements particularly the legal personality of the petitioner and the date
when the petition for certification of election was filed were strictly
determined and therefore in order. Consequently, this Office acquires jurisdiction over the case.’ This finding was reviewed and upheld by the
respondent Director of Labor Relations.”^[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. This decision is immediately
executory.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Ramon A. Barcelona.

^[2]
That is likewise the case with the comment of private respondent union.

^[3]
Comment, 1-7.

^[4]
Article 257 of the present Labor Code, Presidential Decree No. 442 (1974).

^[5]
L-42115, January 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 132.

^[6]
Ibid, 139.

^[7]
Cf. Federacion Obrera v. Noriel, L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; Foamtex Labor Union-Tupas v. Noriel,
L-42349, Aug. 17, 1976, 72 SCRA 371; U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers
Union v. Noriel, L-44350, Nov. 25, 1976; Philippine Labor Alliance
Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, L-41288, Jan. 31, 1977.

^[8]
Memorandum, 8-10.

^[9]
Book V, Rule XV, Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (1975).

^[10]
Rule 16, Section 3 of the Rules of Court Cf. Asejo v. Leonoso, 78 Phil.
467 (1947) and Escaler v. Panganiban, L-23457, December 16, 1968, 26
SCRA 379.

^[11]
Memorandum, 10-11.