G.R. No. L-2088. September 09, 1948
MAGDALENO MENESES, PETRONILA MENESES AND PASCUALA BIGTING, PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, L. PASICOLAN, SHERIFF OF MANILA, FELICIDAD PATIO,…
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Certiorari and Injunction, and the answer thereto, as well as from the
statements and admissions by counsel for both parties in the course of the oral
argument, the facts in this case may briefly be stated as follows:
Before the second World War, the respondents Felicidad Patio and Brigido
Valencia were leasing part of Condesa street, Binondo, Manila, known as lot No.
11, from the City of Manila, and had constructed on it a building of strong
materials, which building was destroyed during the aerial bombing of the City in
1944. After the liberation of the City, said respondents constructed on the same
spot a make-shift structure or barong-barong using in its construction part of
the materials, especially iron roofing salvaged from their burnt house on the
lot. They lived in said house, and resumed paying rent to the city for the use
of the lot at the rate of P7 a month, since September 1, 1945. According to said
respondents, because a daughter of petitioner Magdaleno Meneses was a
god-daughter of respondent Felicidad Patio, and because Petronila Meneses, one
of the petitioners, was about to deliver, out of compassion and because of their
close relationship, the petitioners were invited and came to live with the
respondents in the latter’s barong-barong. This is indirectly denied by the
petitioners who claim that, although they are mere squatters on lot No. 11,
without any contract with the City of Manila, they, nevertheless, were the ones
who built the barong-barong in question. But it is a fact that Jthe respondents,
as plaintiffs, brought an action in the Municipal Court for detainer against the
petitioners, as defendants, and the Municipal Judge even made an ocular
inspection of the lot and the structure on it and, ,on the basis of this
inspection and the evidence laid before him, evidently found that the said
barong-barong belonged to the plaintiffs-respondents, for he rendered judgment
ordering the defendants-petitioners to vacate the said structure on lot No. 11
on Condesa Street and to pay plaintiffs P17 a month for the use and occupation
of the barong-barong and lot, from July 1947 up to the time they vacate it
completely, and costs. The sum of P17 is made up thus: P10 for the use and
occupation of the building, and P7 for the rent of the lot, which rent had been
and is being paid monthly to the City by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, according to the respondents’ answer, they have now been given a
permit by the City Engineer to construct a building of modest size on the lot in
question, which they contend, is confirmatory of the right and claim of the said
plaintiffs-respondents to said lot, and which may perhaps explain the desire of
the said plaintiffs to demolish the barong-barong already referred to to give
way to the new contemplated building; but because of the refusal of the
petitioners to leave said barong-barong, plaintiff s had to resort to the courts
through an action in detainer.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of first Instance of Manila;
but pending appeal, they failed to deposit the monthly rent of P17 fixed by the
Municipal Court, for the months of November and December, 1947.
On December 31, 1947, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a motion for the
execution of the judgment of the Municipal Court, copy of which was received by
the defendants-petitioners on January 3, 1948. Because of lack of time, the
Court of First Instance of Manila could not hear the motion until January 27,
1948. In the meantime, or on January 15 of the same year, the
petitioners-defendants deposited P51 as rents corresponding to the months of
November and December, 1947 and January, 1948. Then, after the hearing of the
motion on January 27, 1948, Judge Dinglasan issued an order for execution of the
judgment. Thereafter several motions of the petitioners for the stay of
execution were filed, but they were denied, although on February 7, 1948, Judge
Dinglasan, by order, granted the defendants a stay of execution until March 15,
but the execution was not carried out until March 22, because of an extension
granted by the sheriff himself. We understand from the statements made by both
counsel during the oral argument that the barong-barong in question, as a result
of the execution of the judgment, had already been demolished, although the
materials thereof are still deposited on the lot.
The petitioners claim that respondent Judge Dinglasan acted in excess and
abuse of his discretion in granting execution of the judgment, and so brought
the case here on certiorari with a petition for a writ of injunction, to
restrain the respondent judge “from commanding the sheriff of Manila to carry
out its order dated January 27, 1948, as well as to order the stay of execution
or rather to revoke its order dated February 7, 1948, and to allow the parties
to terminate the hearing of the case pending before it,” and also “to restrain
the sheriff of Manila to carry out the order in his hand commanding the
petitioners to vacate the barong-barong and lot in question.”
There is a long line of decisions of this Court holding that the provisions
of Rule 72, Section 8, regarding the immediate execution of a judgment in
forcible entry or detainer cases are, unless pending appeal, payment is made
regularly on or before the 10th day of each month for rent corresponding to the
preceding month, mandatory ( Cunanan, et al. vs. Rodas,[1] L-1400, L-1406 and L-1407, promulgated on
July 30, 1947, and the authorities cited therein; and Ysmael vs. Honorable Court
of Appeals,[2] L-1302, July 31, 1947 and
authorities cited therein). In the case of Arcega vs. Dizon,[3] L-195, February 20, 1946, the same court,
citing the case of Lapuz vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga (46 Phil., 77,
79) even held that the lower court lacks authority to extend the period within
which the rents should be paid from time to time in order to stay execution. If
the lower court, where hearing of an appeal in a case of ejectment is pending,
may not extend the period within which to make the payment required by law in
order to stay execution, then it is clear that said provisions of the Rules of
Court are mandatory, and that the respondent Judge in the present case may not
and cannot stay execution of the decision of the Municipal Court, after the
petitioners had failed to pay the rents as required by law.
In the present case, this failure to pay the rents for the months of November
and December, 1947 was wilful and deliberate because, as the
defendants-petitioners maintain, the barong-barong in question belonged to them
and, therefore, they were not under obligation to pay for the use of the same.
The trouble with this claim is that the same does not appear to have been
established or substantiated in the Municipal Court, which court, on the other
hand evidently found the barong-barong to belong to the plaintiffs-respondents,
and after making an ocular inspection of the same found that P10 a month was
reasonable rent or compensation for the use of the same by the defendants, plus
P7 which the plaintiffs had been paying as monthly rent of the lot to the city.
It is obvious that we cannot determine the payment or nonpayment of rent by
petitioners-appellants pending appeal in order to stay execution upon the mere
claim of ownership of the building by petitioners, yet to be established and
proven during the trial. For purposes of payment of the rents pending appeal, we
must rely upon and be governed by the decision of the municipal court.
Of course the execution of the judgment does not affect or interfere with the
course of the appeal. There the petitioners-defendants may yet prove during the
trial that they have, a right to the lot where the barong-barong formerly stood,
although this is rather problematical for the reason that, according to the
facts as well as the assertions of the counsel in the course of the oral
argument, the plaintiffs-respondents are and had been renting this lot from the
City of Manila even before the war and have even obtained a permit from the City
Engineer to build a more substantial house in place of the barong-barong, while
the petitioners-defendants limit their claim to being merely squatters, although
the first ones to come on the lot in question after liberation.
The petitioners further contend that the Municipal Court committed error in
awarding the sum of P17.00, as rent, for the reason that the petitioners in
their complaint did not ask for rent. We are in no position to verify this claim
for the reason that the copy of the complaint in the Municipal Court does not
form part of the record. As a matter of fact none of the pleadings in the
Municipal Court, as well as in the Court of First Instance, including the
decision of the municipal court and the motions filed in the Court of First
Instance and the orders issued by the respondent judge, was brought up to this
Court for reference. That is the reason why we had occasion to state in the
beginning of this decision that the facts are meagre, and we had to rely in
great measure upon the allegations contained in the petition and the answer
thereto, as well as the statements and assertions made by both counsel during
the oral argument. The answer of the respondents to the petition states that
although the plaintiffs in the Municipal Court did not ask for rent in their
complaint, they have, nevertheless, filed a claim for damages as part of the
relief prayed for. It will be observed that Rule 72, section 1, regarding the
institution of proceedings in forcible entry and detainer cases, provides that
an action may be brought for the restitution of such possession together with
damages and costs. The word damages reasonably refers to the “arrears in rent,
or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises”
provided for in section 6 of the same Rule 72, and it is the same rent of P17
awarded by the Municipal Court in its decision in this case. The clause “for the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises” defines the extent of the “damages” to which the
plaintiff is entitled, (Moran Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 253, based on the case
of Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng, 2 Phil., 622, 626.)
It is, therefore, clear that the Municipal Court was warranted in awarding
P17 as rent, or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
barong-barong and the lot on which it stood, although the petitioners in their
complaint only asked for damages.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the action and order of Judge
Dinglasan in giving due course to the execution of the judgment appealed from
were both legal and authorized by law. As to the petition for a writ of
injunction, it is obvious that it is unwarranted. There is no longer anything
that may be restrained. The respondent judge has already ordered execution of
the judgment and the sheriff of Manila has already carried out the order and
demolished the barong-barong. The petition for the writ of certiorari is
dismissed and the petition for the writ of injunction is denied, with costs
against the petitioners.
Parás, Actg. C. J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto,
Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
[1]78 Phil., 800.
[2]78 Phil., 831.
[3]76 Phil., 164.