TEODORICA REINARES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. JOSE ARRASTIA AND LIBERTY T, HIZON, DEFENDANTS. LIBERTY T. HIZON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Plaintiff Teodorica Reinare’s and defendant Jose Arrastia, are
husband and wife. On June 25, 1958, defendant husband sold to defendant
Liberty T. Hizon, different parcels of sugar lands, belonging to the
conjugal partnership. On June 18, 1959, alleging lack of consent, fraud
and prejudice to her conjugal share, plaintiff, instituted an action
against her husband and Hizon, averring:—

“7. That after the annotation of this notice on
said TCT Nos. 3760 and 4067, the plaintiff received a letter from the
defendant Liberty T. Hizon dated June 25, 1958, stating that she
(defendant Liberty T. Hizon) has purchased the above-described conjugal
property from the defendant Jose Arrastia for the sum of P32,300.00 in
addition to her assumption of a mortgage indebtedness of the vendor in
the amount of P108,925.30 or a total of P141,225.30; and that she
(Liberty T. Hizon) was ready to deliver 1/2 of the cash purchase price
upon the plaintiff giving her marital consent; that as per the letter
dated 25 June 1958, the sale of the above-described parcels of land by
Jose Arrastia to Liberty T. Hizon is evidenced by that document known
as Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage dated January 25, 1958, and
acknowledged before Notary Public Reginaldo V. Eddalin (Doc. No. 833,
Page No. 68, Book No. XIII, Series of 1958; a copy of which letter and
Deed of Sale are hereto attached as Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively,
and made integral parts of this complaint;

“8. That
the above-described properties covered by TCT 3760 and 4067 and now TCT
7630 and TCT 7631, respectively in the name of Liberty T. Hizon are the
sole and only properties of the conjugal partnership between the
plaintiff Teodorica Reinares and the defendant Jose Arrastia; that on
the other hand said defendants at the time of the execution of said
deed of sale, did not, and does not own, have any property or assets of
whatever nature in his name;

“9. That the total purchase
price for which the above-described conjugal properties were sold by
defendant Jose Arrastia to Liberty T. Hizon is grossly inadequate and
prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff in the said conjugal
properties;

* * * * * * *

“11. That the defendant Jose Arrastia
has no property, real or personal, which may be charged for the damages
caused the plaintiff by reason of the illegal sale made by him to
Liberty T. Hizon upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership property;
that the sale of the subject parcels of land are therefore, prejudicial
to the rights of the plaintiff therein, since the sale includes the
whole share of the plaintiff in the conjugal properties, which as
mentioned above is composed solely of the parcel of land, subject
matter of this complaint.

“12. That the defendant Liberty T.
Hizon is purchasing the above-described properties notwithstanding her
prior actual knowledge of the fact that the plaintiff would not consent
to the sale of said conjugal properties for the reasons aforestated,
acted in bad faith, with malice, and in wanton disregard of the
conjugal rights and interest of plaintiff in said properties because of
the exceedingly low price accepted by Jose Arrastia;

“13.
That since said sale was made in fraud of the conjugal rights and
participation of the plaintiff in said conjugal rights and
participation of the plaintiff in said conjugal properties, it is
therefore, void; * * *”.

In her prayer, she asked, (1) the sale made by her husband to Hizon
be declared null and void; (2) delivery of the properties to her; (3)
damages in the sum of P13,000.00; (4) costs of the suit.

Under date of July 14, 1959, defendant Hizon moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action against her.
In support of the said motion, it was argued that even granting
(without admitting) the truth of the allegations in the complaint,
there is no cause of action because (1) the consent of the wife is not
necessary for alienations made by the husband of properties acquired
before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Art. 166); (2) the
authority of the husband to alienate conjugal property is full,
absolute and complete (Art. 1413, old Civil Code); (3) estoppel on the
part of the plaintiff, for she had allowed her defendant husband to
mortgage the properties in question without objection. Plaintiff
presented an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, contending that while
Article 1413 of the old Civil Code gives the husband authority to
alienate conjugal properties without the consent of the wife, same
provision, however, establishes exceptions. A reply to the opposition
was filed by defendant Hizon, further pointing out that the action
referred to in article 1413 would lie only after liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, which is not the fact obtaining in the case under
consideration; and that there is no showing of the supposed prejudice,
because same can only be determined upon liquidation of the partnership.

The lower court heard the motion to dismiss in argument. Counsel
for movant-defendant manifested that for the complaint to prosper,
there must be a valid allegation of fraud, but there is none in said
complaint. Also during the hearing of the motion, it was brought out,
for the first time, that the Arrastia spouses had given one Eufemia
Rivera, an option to sell the land now in controversy, two days
immediately before the sale to Hizon was executed.

On March 7, 1960, the lower court dismissed the complaint, stating—

“As regards the first basis of plaintiff’s
complaint that the properties are conjugal, in the absence of proof,
the Court can assume that these properties are conjugal, with respect
to the second basis of plaintiff’s complaint that her consent as not
obtained for the sale to the defendant Liberty T. Hizon, by her
co-defendant Jose Arrastia, this was also admitted by the pleadings of
the parties. But the question arises as to whether there is a necessity
for this consent before Jose Arrastia could sell the properties to
Liberty T. Hizon. It appears that these properties were acquired
sometime in the year 1938 by defendant Jose Arrastia and Teodorica
Reinares. Under the second paragraph of Article 166 of the new Civil
Code, the consent of the plaintiff as the wife of the defendant Jose
Arrastia in the sale of the properties is not a necessary prerequisite. There is, therefore, no necessity of securing the consent of the plaintiff before the sale by Jose Arrastia could be effected.

With respect to the third basis of her complaint that she suffered
damages and prejudice because of the inadequacy of the purchase price
of said properties, the question arise as to whether the plaintiff can
raise this issue as against the defendant Liberty T. Hizon. * * *. It
is apparent that the plaintiff in this case cannot question the sale
made by the other defendant Jose Arrastia to defendant Liberty T.
Hizon. While it is true that no evidence was submitted and it is not
apparent from the fact of the complaint, it cannot be denied that the
photostatic copy of the ‘option to sell land’ given by defendant Jose
Arrastia and plaintiff Teodorica Reinares to one Eufemia Rivera with a
total area of 94.9396 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3760 and 4067 confers on the latter authority to sell to
anyone the parcels of land covered by the present complaint. The deed
of sale executed in favor of Liberty T. Hizon by Jose Arrastia was on
June 25, 1958 or two days after the plaintiff and her husband
authorized Eufemia Rivera to sell the lands. The claim of inadequacy of
price in the complaint of the plaintiff is of course not shown to be
proven yet because there is no trial, but the signature of the
plaintiff on the option to sell land is undeniable and the price fixed
is P150,000.00 which is just about the price that the properties were
sold to defendant Liberty T. Hizon at P141,225.30.”

The above order is now before Us for review on two points of error allegedly committed by the lower court, viz:
(1) by considering matters other than those contained in the complaint;
and (2) by dismissing the complaint upon mere motion, on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action.

In the order under review, the lower court took into account a
photostatic copy of an alleged Option to Sell Land Executed by the
Arrastia spouses, to sustain the Motion to Dismiss. It will be noted
that the option was not mentioned at all in the complaint and in the
pleadings of the defendants. It was only during the hearing of the
motion to dismiss that the existence of the option was brought to the
attention of the trial court. Where the complaint is dismissed not as a
result of the trial on the merits, but merely on a motion to dismiss
filed by the defendant for failure to state a cause of action, the
sufficiency of the motion should be tested on the strength of the
allegation of facts contained in the complaint and no other (De Jesus,
et al. vs. Belarmino, et al, 95 Phil., 365; 50 Off. Gaz., 3064; Francisco vs.
Robles, G.R. No. L-5388, Feb. 15, 1954). A motion to dismiss a
complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim must be limited
to the pleadings and the court may not consider other matters outside
of the complaint (I Francisco Rules of Court, Rev. Ed., p. 451, citing
American cases). The averments that the properties are conjugal; that
her share, rights and participation in the properties are prejudiced;
and that defendant Hizon is buying the property in spite of her
knowledge that plaintiff was not consenting to its sale to her, are
deemed admitted by the presentation of the motion to dismiss. These
allegations sufficiently point out the right of action of plaintiff. If
the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which said
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendant (De
Jesus vs. Belarmino, supra). At most, in the instant
case, the option to sell land could only bolster the defense of
defendant Hizon, and should not have been taken as decisive in
determining the presence or absence of a cause of action.

Defendant lays much emphasis on article 1413 of the old Civil Code
giving the husband authority to alienate conjugal properties, without
the consent of the wife. The provisions relied upon, however, states
that “no alienation or agreement which the husband may make with
respect to such property in contravention of this Code, or in fraud of
the wife, shall prejudice her or her heirs.” Fraud was prominently
averred in the complaint and phrases conveying the same meaning and/or
amounting to fraud, were used and/or stated (pars. 11, 12 and 13 of the
complaint, supra).And since a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action impliedly admits the truth of the allegations (Liquete vs. Dario, 5 Phil., 221; Francisco vs. Robles, supra), the claim that no valid allegation of fraud is made, finds no support in the record.

Under the circumstances at bar, the ends of justice will be better
served if the plaintiff is allowed to prove her allegations in a
hearing on the merits. This will be more in consonance with the intent
and spirit of the rules.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal is hereby set aside, and another
entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further and
appropriate proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.