ISABELO PINZA, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. TEOFILO ALDOVINO AND CITY COURT OF LUCENA, BRANCH II, PRESIDED BY JUDGE LEODEGARIO L. MOGOL, SUED AS SUCH IN ITS OR HIS OFFICIAL CAPACIT…

From the order of the
Court of First instance of Quezon Province (Case No. 6801) dismissing his petition for a writ of certiorari against the City Court of Lucena,
Branch II, and Teofilo Aldovino
for lack of jurisdiction, Isabelo Pinza
has appealed directly to this Court.

The original petition in the court a quo sought a declaration that the City Court
of Lucena had no jurisdiction to proceed with its Criminal Case No, 1246 charging
petitioner with perjury, and that said
court be ordered to dismiss the
case, without action on the
merits.

As bases for his action, petitioner (now appellant) Isabelo Pinza claimed that:

“1. The information filed in the said
criminal case, Annex A, is null and void, because the certifi­cation of the
Fiscal as to the holding of the corresponding preliminary investigation is not
under oath;

“2. There was no valid preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule
112, Section 14, of the New Rules of Court, because the accuse, who had not
waived his right to a preliminary investigation, was not given the chance to be
present or to be represented by counsel at the preliminary investigation and

3. There is a prejudicial
question involved in the case, which necessarily suspends further proceeding
therein, on account of the existence of a civil action (Civil Case No. 604-G)
between the accused, or the one hand, and the complaining witness Teofilo Aldavino and his wife
Milagros Nico­demus, on the other, before the Third Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, at Gumaca,
Quezon, involving Lot No. 2343-A of Catanauan, Cadastre, which is also involved in the supposed
affidavit of the accused Isabelo Pinza,
subject matter of the informa­tion in the aforesaid criminal case.”

Respondents in the court
below (appellees herein) moved to dismiss on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no supervisory
jurisdiction over the City Court of Lucena, and the motion was granted.  Hence, this appeal.

Appellant submits the
following assignment of errors:

“1. The trial court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction
over this case.

“2. The trial court erred in not declaring respondent Teofilo Aldovino guilty of
contempt of court.”

The first assignment of
error is plainly unmeritorious, and we find correct the reasoning of
the respondent Judge, Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, in his decision under appeal.  He said:

“The crime of perjury, charged in Criminal Case No. 1246 of
the court of the respondent city judge, from which the instant suit arose, is penalized
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 87, Republic Act 296, as
amended, falls within the con­current jurisdiction of the municipal or city
court and of the court of first instance. 
Since the court of the res­pondent city judge has taken cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 1246 to the exclusion of all, other courts, particularly the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, judgment in said
case will not be appealable to this Court (CFI) but
directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to the pro­visions of the last paragraph of Section 87 of Republic Act
296, to wit:

‘All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with municipal
judges of capitals and city court judge snail be tried and de­cided on the
merits by the respective munici­pal judges or city judges.  Proceedings had shall be recorded and
decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be’ (Italics supplied)
—

because

Courts of First Instance shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
cases arising in city and mu­nicipal courts, in their respective provinces,
except over appeals from cases tried by municipal judges of provincial capitals
or city judges pur­suant to the authority granted under the last para­graph of
Section 87 of this Act.  (Section 45, Rep.
Act 296, as amended by Rep. Act 2513. 
Italics supplied).

“And according to
Section 30 of the same Republic Act 296, as amended -?

‘The Court of Appeals shall have original juris­diction to issue
writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.’

 “It is clear, therefore, that the present action falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as an aid in its appellate
jurisdiction.”

Appellant relies on the
provisions of Section 4, Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court, to the effect that:

“Where petition filed.  The petition (for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus) may be filed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or
omissions of an inferior court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
a Court of First Instance having jurisdiction thereof.  It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”

Appellant’s reliance upon
the foregoing rule is misplaced.  First,
because the Rules of Court do not define the Jurisdiction of the various
Tribunals of the Philippines,
and the quoted provision evidently assumes
that such jurisdiction exists.  But, as pointed out in the appealed decision, the
Court of First Instance no
supervisory jurisdiction over the Lucena City Court,
since the decisions of the latter are directly appealable
to the Court of Appeals or to
this Supreme Court, as the circumstances
may warrant.  Secondly, the rule invoked
speaks of “acts or omissions of an inferior court”, and under the Judiciary
Act the City Court (as contrasted to an ordinary Municipal Court is not inferior
to the Court of First instance in cases within their concurrent jurisdiction,
for then the City Court acts with like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance “(Republic Act 296, section 87(c), paragraph 4).

The second assignment of
error is equally without merit. 
Appellant charges that appellee Aldovino, without being a member of the bar, filed an
answer not only for himself but also for his co-respondent, Judge Mogol of the City Court of Lucena; that this act is in contempt of
court, since it amounts to practicing Law without authority.  It is unquestionable that Aldovino,
as respondent, could file an answer for both himself and the judge, under
Section 6 of Revised Rule 5, providing that —

“it shall be  the duty of such person or persons
(interested in sustaining the proceedings) to appear or  defend, both in his or their own behalf, and
in behalf of  the court or Judge affected
by the proceedings,” (Emphasis supplied)

for the judge is merely a nominal party to the
certiorari case, and has no personal interest in the case (Tan vs. Lantin,
L-28849, Resolution of 29 July 1968)

Appellee claims that the Court of First Instance
should not have contented itself
with declaring that it had no jurisdiction but should have declared the
petition “without any merit whatsoever”.  Absent jurisdiction, it would be improper for the Court of First Instance to pass upon the merits of petitioner’s case.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is
affirmed.  Cost against appellant Isabelo
Pinza.  And it
being apparent that this appeal was taken to delay the criminal case, the
appellant shall pay, in solidum with
his counsel, Joaquin M. Trinidad,
treble costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Zaldivar,
JJ., did not take part.