YOUNG MEN LABOR UNION STEVEDORES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On April
25, 1961,
Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. (NALCO) entered into a
contract with both Young Men Labor Union Stevedores (YMLUS) and Victory
Stevedoring and Labor Union (VISLU) whereby the two union bound themselves to undertake on a 50-50 basis the
stevedoring or loading jobs of the NALCO’s export
products from the Port of Nasipit, Agusan. Said agreement was concluded in a conference called
for such purpose in the presence of the Philippine constabulary officials
stationed at Butuan City, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, the Justice of the Peace and Chief of Police of
Nasipit, Agusan, and the
officials and representatives of NALCO and the two unions.

On July 20, 1961, the YMLUS sent
a letter to NALCO demanding the withdrawal of the loading jobs from the VISLU on
the ground that the registration permit granted to the latter by the Department
of Labor had been cancelled, and when VISLU was notified by the NALCO of such
demand, it refused to abandon the 50% loading job granted to it under the
agreement on the ground that the order of cancellation had not yet become final.
On August 2, 1961, the YMLUS sent a notice of picketing to NALCO in which the
‘former threatened to carry out “our picket line beginning August 9, 1961 to
continue uninterrupted until you make up your mind to stop the loading and
unloading of cargoes by the defunct VISLU or reassign the same to us, the
YMLUS.”

On August 9, 1961, the NALCO
filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations which, as amended,
prayed among others, that pending final determination of the case the court
issue an order enjoining both unions to observe the status quo; and, after due hearing, to
decide which of the two unions should be given the stevedoring job in
controversy or whether the 50-50 arrangement which was arrived at on April 25,
1961 should be followed and complied with by the parties.

On August 23, 1961, after a
series of bloody incidents resulting from the picketing by the members of the
YMLUS and retaliation from the members of the VISLU, the NALCO filed a petition
before the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, (1) to issue a
temporary Restraining order against the officials, members and agents of the
YMLUS, ordering them to refrain from blocking, obstructing, stopping, coercing,
intimidating, or in any banner preventing the loading or unloading operations
then assigned to the VISLU; (2) issue a similar temporary restraining order to
the officers, members, and agents of the VISLU ordering them to desist in
retaliating from the coercive acts of the YMLUS by any violent means; and (3)
after due hearing, to issue an order making the two abovementioned injunctions
permanent as to both unions.

At this stage of the proceedings
both unions filed separate motion to dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to act on the controversy.
Subsequently, however, both unions withdrew their respective motions to dismiss
and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the industrial court. On May
16, 1962, Judge Arsenio Martinez, to whom the case was
assigned, rendered a decision enjoining the parties to continue observing the
50-50 basis agreement entered into between them until it shall have been decided
in a certification election to be undertaken by the Department of Labor which of
the two unions should have direct relationship, thru collective bargaining, with
the NALCO. The YMLUS and the NALCO filed each a motion for reconsideration only
insofar as the decision ordered the holding of a certification election, and
when both motions were denied by the court en banc, the YMLUS interposed the
present petition for review.

In assailing the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations, petitioner anchors his argument primarily on
the doctrine enunciated by this Court in the case of Paflu vs.
Tan, 99 Phil., 854, wherein this Court enumerated the cases over which said
court can exercise jurisdiction. While said case does not include a controversy
of this nature among those enumerated therein, it does not follow that the
industrial court is bereft of jurisdiction over it for the same involves a
certification election. It is clear from the provisions of Republic Act No. 875
that matters pertaining to certification election involving
two or more unions is one that is addressed to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations [Section 12 (b), Republic Act 875]. Moreover,
petitioner is now estopped to question the
jurisdiction of the lower court for it is undisputed that it withdrew its motion
to dismiss raising that issue and voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction and
presented its evidence. And so it has been held that “One who subjects himself
to the jurisdiction of a court, even where he would not otherwise be subject to
suit becomes subject to any valid claim asserted against him directly relating
to the subject matter of his voluntarily initiated proceeding. * * * To permit
one to invoke the exercise of jurisdiction within the general powers of the
court and then to reverse its order upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction
would, be to allow one to trifle with courts. The principle is one of estopple in the interest of a sound administration of the
laws * * * closes the mouth of the complainant” (Perkins vs. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, et al., 93 Phil. 1034).

We find no error in the order
issued by respondent court requiring the Department of Labor to hold a
certification election to determine which of the two unions should be the one to
undertake the stevedoring job of the company. This is sanctioned by Section 12
(b) of Republic Act 875.
Moreover, this is the only expedient way by which the rivalry between the two
unions may be solved to avoid friction and other unfortunate incidents. And
considering that certification proceedings are investigatory in nature which had
been entrusted exclusively to the Court of Industrial Relations, we do not feel
justified to interfere, Unless a grave abuse of
discretion is shown. Such is not the case here.

“Considering that certification
proceedings are investigatory in nature, since-

‘the object of the proceedings is
not the decision of any alleged commission of wrong nor asserted deprivation of
rights but is merely that determination of proper bargaining units and the
ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the
selection of a bargaining representative, determination of the proceedings does
not entail the entry of remedial orders or redress of rights, but culmination
solely in an official designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the
employees’ expressed choice of bargaining agent.’ (Rothenberg
on Labor Relations, pp. 514-515; Labor Laws by Francisco, 3rd ed., Vol.
I, p. 458);

taking into account that the
conduct of such proceedings has been entrusted specifically to the Court of
Industrial Relations (R. A. 875 sec. 12) and that they should be expedited as
much as possible, this Court should not interfere with the discretion and
judgment of that specialized tribunal in connection with such proceedings, at
least in the absence of clear and patent abuse that in this case has not been
shown to exist.’ (Benguet Consolidated, Inc., et al.
vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association, et al., L-11029
& L-11065, May 23, 1958)

The claim that respondent court
prohibited petitioner from exercising its constitutional right to picket is not
correct. What the court prohibited was the commission of illegal acts in
connection with picketing which under our jurisprudence can be lawfully done. As
a matter of fact, the picketing has resulted in many bloody incidents because of
the acts of retaliation on the part of the other rival
union.

Finally, respondent court did not
hold that petitioner is only entitled to 50% of the stevedoring work. What it
declared was that the 50-50 arrangement concluded between the parties should
continue until the result of the certification election shall have become final
and executory and a collective bargaining contract
entered into between the parties. This step is proper considering the situation
then obtaining.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
affirmed. Costs against
petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.