P. G. TOMAS & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND JOLLY ALMIN, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition to review the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated February 12, 1964
as well as its resolution dated April
20, 1964, the decisive issue is one of jurisdiction.

On September 20, 1961 Jolly
Almin, respondent here, and Marcos Vasquez,
both former employees of the P. G. Tomas
& Co., Inc., filed separate
petitions with the Court of Industrial Relations for reinstatement with backwages, recovery of salary differentials under the
Minimum Wage Law, and attorney’s fees. 
In his petition – Case No. 1590-V – Jolly Almin
alleged that he worked for herein petitioner as laborer from April 1, 1957
until August 9, 1961,when he was abruptly dismissed without cause; that he
worked six days a week and was paid a daily wage of P2.00 from April 1, 1957 to
June 30, 1957; P2.50 from July 1, 1957 to September 30, 1957; P3.00 from
October 1, 1957 to March 31, 1958; P3.50 from April 1, 1958 to September 30,
1958; P4.00 from October 1, 1958 to May 31, 1959; and P4.25 from June 1, 1959
to August 9, 1959.  The petition filed by
Marcos Vasquez – Case No. 1589–V contained similar allegations.

On October 16, 1961
P. G. Tomas & Co. moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that each of the petitions involved only one work and that the alleged dispute was not causing and was not
likely to cause a strike or lockout.

Upon opposition of the
claimants the Court denied the motion to dismiss.  A subsequent motion for reconsidera­tion was
likewise denied.

Separate answers to the petition were then filed, alleging that the claimants were hired only in 1958 and that they voluntarily resigned on August 9, 1959.

After hearing, the C.I.R. rendered a joint decision on February
12, 1964, denying reinstatement with backwages
on ground that no union activity
was involved in the dismissals, but ordering, for reasons of equity and
justice, P. G. Tomas & Co. to pay two months separation pay to the
claimants.  The claim for differential pay was denied be­cause the subject-matter thereof was
below the statutory minimum wage and therefore
outside the jurisdiction
of the Court.^[1]

P. G. Tomas & Co.
thereupon filed a motion for reconsideration
of that portion of the decision granting two months separation pay to each of
the claimants.

The C.I.R., after
considering the two cases sepa­rately
en banc, arrived at a tie vote.  In both cases Judge Jose Bautista
(who penned the separate resolutions) and Judge Emiliano
Tabigne voted to deny the motion for
reconsideration.  Judge Amando Bugayong dissented, with
Judge Arsenio Martinez concurring in the dissent, on
the ground that since the C.I.R. had no jurisdiction over the main petition it
also had no jurisdiction to grant sepa­ration pay.  Judge Ansberto Paredes abstained from
voting.

Upon the request of the
C.I.R., the Secretary of Justice designated Judges Federico Alikpala
and Francisco Geronimo of the Court of First Instance to sit temporarily in the
C.I.R. in order to break the tie in the two cases.  Case
No. 1589-V of claimant Marcos
Vasquez was assigned to Judge Federico Alikpala, who
concurred in the dissenting opinion of Judge Amando Bugayong, holding that the C.I.R. had no jurisdiction over
the petition and in effect granting the motion for reconsideration.  But Judge Francisco Geronimo, who was given
Case No. 1590–V, voted to deny the motion for reconsideration therein.  In due time P. G. Tomas & Co. filed this
appeal only with respect to Case No. 1590-V.

Petitioner, citing the
case of Philippine
Association of Free Labor
Unions versus Tan,^[2] maintains that the C.I.R. has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition as well as to grant separation pay.

The jurisdiction of the
court must of course appear first of all in the petition or complaint.  The pertinent allegation in the petition of
Jolly Almin states
that he was abruptly dismissed from employment without any valid cause and that
from April 1, 1957
to September 30, 1958 he was receiving wages below the minimum allowed by law.  His prayer, as already observed, is for
reinstatement with backwages, salary differentials
and attorney’s fees.

Apropos the aforesaid
prayer, two factors must be considered: 
First, this case comes within the purview of the Termination Pay Law
(R.A. No. 1052) under which the dismissal without just cause of an employee,
whose employment has no definite period, would not entitle him to reinstatement
but only to separation pay.^[3] Thus
a prayer for reinstatement is a useless plea if the petition does not show on
its face that the right to be reinstated exists, and would not be a material
consideration for purposes of vesting jurisdiction in the Industrial Court.  Second,
the claim for salary differentials refers to wages below the statutory mini­mum
and therefore constitutes a violation of the Minimum Wage Law which pertains to
the jurisdiction of regular courts, as distinguished from a claim
for salary differentials above the statutory minimum.

In the case of Magdalena
Estate, Inc. versus Bangilan, 7 SCRA 655, 657,
this Court said:

“Is an action (1) for recovery
of underpayment under the Minimum Wage Law, and (2) for the recovery of
separation pay under Republic Act 1052, as amended by Republic Act 1787, within
the juris­diction of the Court of Industrial Rela­tions?  With respect to the first item, we are of the
opinion that the proper court before which the claim should be presented is the
Court of First Instance and not the Industrial Court, particularly where, as in
this case, there is no labor dispute involved and the claim pertains
exclusively to the past and has nothing to do with current wages.

x x
x x x
x

“With respect to the claim for a separation or terminal pay by
respondent Maximino Bautista, the same is not within
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court
either.  It was so ruled in the case of
Hacienda Luisita Estate v. Artemio
Alberto, et al., G. R. No. L-12133, Oct.
31, 1958, where we said:

“Alberto’s petition, after relating the dates of employment
and separation, merely complained that ‘they were re­moved summarily or
separated without jus­tifiable cause.’ It described no other concurring or
qualifying incidents or data in connection with the removal.  The controversy was therefore, a matter not
within the scope of the power of the Industrial Court.”

Regardless of the
question of jurisdiction, the petitioner disputes the right of respondent Almin to the separation pay awarded to him.  The ground for such award, as stated in the
decision of respondent court, is that “while it is the prerogative of an
employer to terminate the employment of employees, especially where there is no
definite agreement as to their tenure, yet for reasons of equity and justice,
such prerogative could not be exercised by any employer as to ignore or
deprive what little right is left to its employees of this category, such as
prior notice provided by law.”

The foregoing statement is correct as a general rule, and in fact
is in accordance with Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No.
1787.  However, the uncontradicted
evidence shows that respondent Almin voluntarily
resigned from his employment.  His letter
resignation, dated August 12, 1961,
and marked as Exhibit 1, was written after he was implicated by one of his
co-workers in the theft of some equipment
belong­ing to the employer.  The argument
on this point in the brief for the petitioner has not been rebutted, respon­dent
Almin having filed no brief in reply.

In view of the foregoing considerations the judgment appealed from is reversed,
and the complaint dis­missed, without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., no part.

Teehankee, J., in the result.

^[1]
SEC. 16.  Jurisdiction of the
Courts.  – a) The
Court of First Instance shall
have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this Act; action by the Secretary or by the employees affected to
recover underpayment may be brought
in any competent Court, which shall render its decision on such cases within fifteen days from the time the case
has been submitted for decision; in appropriate instances, appeal from the
decision of these courts on any action under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.

(b)  In the event that a dispute case before the
Court of Industrial Relations involves as the sole issue or as one of the issues a dispute as to minimum wages
above the applicable statutory minimum,
and the Secretary of Labor has issued no wage order for the industry or
locality applicable to the
enterprise, the Court of Industrial Relations may hear and decide such wage issue: 
Provided, however, That the Secretary of Labor shall not undertake to
fix the minimum wage for an industry or branch thereof which involves only a
single enterprise, or a single employer. 
x x x.

^[2]
99 Phil. 854

^[3]
R.A. No. 1052, Sec. 1. “In cases of
employment without a definite period in a commercial, industrial or agricultural
establishment or enterprises, neither the employer nor the employee shall
terminate the employment without serving notice on the other at least one month
in advance.

 “The employee, upon whom no such notice
was served, shall be entitled to one month’s compensation from the date of the
termination of his employment.”