MIGUEL OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. LIBERATO S. DOMINGO, VICENTE E. GALANOG, CITY JUDGE OF DAVAO CITY AND ATTY. ALFREDO ABEJA, CHIEF, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS.

An original action for prohibition.

Petitioner instituted this action on June 7, 1967 to enjoin
enforcement by the Quezon City sheriff of the writ of
execution issued by respondent city court of Davao
City pursuant to its final judgment dated January 14, 1967, in Civil Case No.
901-A thereof for illegal detainer entitled “Liberato S. Domingo, plaintiff vs. Miguel Ocampo, defendant” ordering petitioner to vacate the
leased property consisting of a 1,000-square meter parcel of land located along
España Extension, Quezon
City, as well as to restore possession thereof to private respondent Domingo as
the lessor-owner thereof and to pay said respondent
the unpaid stipulated rentals of P200.00 monthly from Septem­ber 16, 1965.

On petitioner’s verified allegations that “petitioner was
very much surprised upon receipt of the said writ of execution for the reason
that he was not served any summons or a copy of the complaint filed against him
nor a copy of the decision and therefore, the respondent Judge, has acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;”^[1]
and “granting without admitting that respondent Liberato
S. Domingo filed a complaint against petitioner herein before the City Court of
Davao City for ‘Forcible Entry Into and Detain­er of Land or Buildings,’ venue was improperly laid
as the land in question is situated at España
Extension, Quezon City and not in Davao
City”,^[2]
the Court required respondent to answer the petition and issued a restraining
order against en­forcement of the questioned writ of execution.

The answer and annexed documents filed by respondent, however,
totally disproved petitioner’s allegations. 
Petitioner had been personally served on December 17, 1966, by the Que­zon City sheriff with
respondent court’s summons and copy of the complaint.^[3]
Petitioner had duly filed his answer dated December 21, 1966 to the complaint, signing the same on
his own behalf and interposing no defense but pleading that he “has not
intentionally or deliberately failed or refused to pay the rentals.^[4]
The duly notarized lease agreement between the parties expressly stipulated
that “(V)enue in case of litigation shall be in Davao City, Philippines.”^[5]
Petitioner failed to appear before respondent court, in person or through
counsel, at the scheduled hearing on January
9, 1967, and after recep­tion of respondent’s evidence, rendered
its judgment of Jan­uary 14, 1967,
against petitioner.^[6]
Copy of respondent court’s decision was duly served on petitioner by registered
airmail special delivery on January
20, 1967, and personally acknowledged by him on the registry return
receipt.^[7]

At the hearing of the petition before the Court on Aug­ust 30,
1967, at which petitioner’s counsel failed to appear due to alleged illness and
was instead given a period of ten days to submit a memorandum (which he did not
avail of), it was further brought out by respondent, through counsel, that when
the Quezon City sheriff served on petitioner on May
20, 1967, the writ of execution, petitioner requested deferment thereof until
June 10, 1967, promising to vacate the premises as well as to pay all rentals
due to respondent by said date, which promise he wrote down on the reverse side
of the writ of exe­cution.^[8]

The petition must be dismissed. 
While Rule 4, section 1 provides that “forcible entry and detainer actions regarding real property shall be brought
in the municipality or city in which the subject matter thereof is
situated”, it is a dogma of procedural law that venue, in inferior courts
as well as in the courts of first instance, may be waived expressly or implied­ly.  Where the defendant fails to challenge timely
the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by section 4 of the same rule, and
allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal
or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue,
which is deemed waived.^[9]
The analogy of actions for recovery of real property located in one province
being validly instituted and tried in another province where plaintiff resides,
when defendant has waived the venue fixed by law, is clearly applicable to the
present case.^[10]

Even if it were to be assumed that the parties’ covenant in the
lease agreement fixing the venue in Davao City in
case of litigation could be validly repudiated by the defendant on the theory
that the provisions of Rule 4, section 1 above-quoted should be considered as
mandatory – a contention which petitioner does not make – petitioner, in the
light of his actions hereinabove recited, of filing his answer to the
complaint, requesting deferment of execution and formally undertaking to vacate
the property by June 10, 1967, would be estopped now
from making such a volte face, since he
“cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine
of estoppel.”^[11]

A final note of advertence. 
The facts of record make out the petition to be a sham petition whereby
petitioner fla­grantly misled the Court into acting on his petition and issuing
a restraining order on the basis of his false representation that he had not
been summoned and was completely unaware of the respondent court’s judgment
against him.  Petitioner should reflect
on the grave consequences of his contumacious act and on the criminal liability
that he may incur for willful commission of falsehood.  Petitioner’s counsel, too, has failed to live
up to his exacting responsibility as an officer of the court to exert the
utmost diligence that the petition prepared by him state the facts truthfully
and accurately, as well as to deal with the courts in all good faithland candor,^[12]
in that he failed, upon receipt of respondent’s documented answer, to file the
necessary rectification of the false allegations in his petition and enable the
Court to dismiss forthwith the petition. 
The Court cannot but express severe condemnation, as it has in the past,^[13]
for such deceptive tactics which delay due execu­tion of a just and lawful
verdict and waste the time that the courts need for the study and resolution of
meritorious cases.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed, with treble costs.  The Court’s restraining order of June 15, 1967, is dissolved and
enforcement of respondent court’s writ of execution may pro­ceed upon
promulgation of this decision.

Furthermore, petitioner and his counsel are ordered to show cause
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why they should not be punished for
contempt of court for having filed a sham petition, and his counsel is required
within the same period to show cause why disci­plinary action should not be
taken against him.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, par. 4.

^[2]
Idem, par. 5.

^[3]
Annex B, Answer.

^[4]
Annex C, Answer.

^[5]
Annex A, of Complaint, Rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[6] Annex
D, Answer.

^[7]
Annex E, Answer.

^[8] Rollo, p. 37.

^[9] See
Juanillo vs. de la Rama,
74 Phil. 43 (1942).

^[10]
See 1 Moran’s Comments, p. 231, and cases cited.

^[11]
People vs. Arcilla, 1 SCRA 699, cited in Crisos­tomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54 (Mar.
25, 1970).  See also Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (Apr. 15, 1968).

^[12]
See BLTB Co. vs. Cadiao, 22 SCRA 987 (March 12, 1968) and Cruz vs.
GSIS, 27 SCRA 174 (February 28, 1969).

^[13] Uypuangco vs. Equitable Bank, 27 SCRA 1271 (April 30, 1969) and Pajares vs. Abad Santos,
30 SCRA 748, (November 29, 1969).