VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURERS’ CO., INC., PETITIONERS, VS. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, SALA I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, PROVINCIAL SHERIF…

In Civil Case No. 3125 of the Davao court of first Instance, judgment was
rendered requiring Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers’ Co., Inc., to pay to
Francisco Ang, Pablo Albios, Avelina Chaves and the heirs of Carlos Chaves, the
total sum of P29,683.32 as damages arising from a collision of two trucks, one
of them owned by said corporation, whose driver, Perfecto Veras, was found to be
guilty of homicide and physical injuries thru reckless negligence in a previous
criminal proceeding. He bumped against the truck of Ang, killed Carlos Chaves
and injured Albios (Avelina is the widow of Carlos).

The judgment rested on the corporation’s subsidiary liability as employer,
the driver having been shown to be insolvents.

Copy of the judgment was received by said corporation on March 30, 1960; and
on the same date, the above named awardees filed a motion for immediate
execution of the judgment pending appeal, after serving on the Valderrama
Corporation copy of such motion, which fixed the next day for its hearing. That
day, the corporation opposed the motion for non-compliance with the
three-day-notice requirement, and that, anyway, the motion was groundless and
premature.

The respondent Judge Cusi, Jr., granted the motion, holding that any apjteal
by the corporation would obviously be for the mere purpose of delay, inasmuch as
its defense against the claims for damages consisted of “a mere denial
unaccompanied by any facts which would be admissible in evidence at a
hearing.”

Wherefore, the corporation instituted this proceeding. And it having alleged
that pursuant to the order of execution the sheriff had levied on certain logs
ready for exportation which were worth P42,000.00, we issued upon its request, a
writ of preliminary injunction.

The respondents answered alleging that the order of execution pending appeal
had been issued for good cause; that the three-day period may be waived under
certain circumstances in the court’s discretion; and that, anyway, the
corporation had an adequate remedy in law, namely, to file a supersedeas bond
under Section 2, Rule 39, which for convenience, is hereby quoted:

“Sec. 2. Execution discretionary.—Before the expiration of the time to
appeal, execution may issue, in the discretion of the court, on motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good1 reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the
special order shall be included therein. Execution issued before the expiration
of the time to appeal may be stayed upon the approval by the court of a
sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned for the
performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case it be affirmed wholly
or in part.”

It is admitted that in the court below, herein petitioner never offered to
file a supersedeas bond. Here it alleges it is solvent, and apparently, it would
not be difficult for it to file such bond. On the other hand, we do not perceive
a clear abuse of discretion in the circumstances because (without prejudging the
case), we notice that the lower court in its decision said that the corporation
“presented only Exh. A, affidavit of Francisco Ang, which proves nothing.^[1]

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby dismissed with the understanding that
petitioner will be given 10 days from the time this decision becomes final
within which to file a supersedeas bond. Otherwise, the order of execution shall
be carried out.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.