ROLANDO GASPAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, GERONA, TARLAC, RESPONDENT.

Gaspar versus Adaoag

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Rolando Gaspar against Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Ramos, and Pura in Tarlac. Gaspar complains that the judge rendered a decision in an election protest while he was under an order of suspension issued by the Supreme Court. The case matters because it fixes the standard of obedience that every judge owes to the orders of the Court, and it tells us whether a judge may excuse himself by claiming that he misread the order that suspended him.

Procedural History

The complaint began as an administrative matter before the Supreme Court, with the Office of the Court Administrator conducting its own review. The Office of the Court Administrator submitted a report finding that the respondent judge had violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended a fine of ten thousand pesos with a stern warning. The Court then referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Arsenio P. Adriano found that the respondent judge had wilfully violated the suspension resolution and recommended a finding of grave misconduct, with three months of suspension without pay in lieu of dismissal. The case then returned to the Supreme Court, which resolved it in this decision.

Facts

Rolando Gaspar was the elected and proclaimed chairman of Barangay Pance in Ramos, Tarlac, following the elections of the fifteenth of July 2002. Anastacio Bonifacio filed an election protest against him before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court presided over by Judge Adaoag, and the case was docketed as Election Case Number 02-07.

While that election case was pending, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a resolution dated the fourth of August 2003 suspending Judge Adaoag pending the final outcome of the criminal proceedings against him, considering that the evidence was prima facie strong, or until further orders from the Court. Despite this, the respondent judge rendered a decision on the twenty-fifth of November 2003 in the election case, holding that Bonifacio was the duly elected Punong Barangay and ordering Gaspar to vacate the position and deliver it to Bonifacio in a peaceful manner.

In his defense, the judge claimed good faith. He argued that the word "or" in the suspension resolution gave him two alternatives, and that under the first his suspension had been lifted when the criminal action against him was dismissed. He also narrated that he had written the Court on the thirteenth of October 2003 asking for clarification, and that the Court reiterated his suspension until further orders, after which he stopped his judicial functions. The investigation showed, however, that the Ombudsman's dismissal order had itself preceded and precipitated the suspension resolution, and that his payslip for the first half of October 2003 bore the notation "suspended per memo 8/4/03."

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for rendering a decision in the election case while under suspension by resolution of the Supreme Court.
• Whether or not the defense of good faith and misapprehension of the suspension resolution may excuse the respondent judge from liability.
• Whether or not the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which the complaint invokes and which the Office of the Court Administrator found violated, provides:

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

This canon bears on the case because the judge's open defiance of a suspension order created at the very least the appearance that he held himself above the Court's mandate.

The suspension resolution of the First Division of the Supreme Court dated the fourth of August 2003 provides:

SUSPEND Judge Luisito T. Adaoag pending final outcome of the criminal proceedings against him considering the evidence is prima facie strong or until further orders from this Court.

This is the very order the respondent judge was found to have violated, and its phrase "until further orders from this Court" is the language on which the ruling turns.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent judge administratively liable. It held that it is an imperative for judges to comply with resolutions issued by the Court, and that by promulgating a decision in the election case while under suspension, the judge miserably failed to render obeisance to the Court's mandate. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the defense of good faith. It quoted its earlier ruling in Alday versus Cruz:

Directives issued by this Court are not to be treated lightly, certainly not on the pretext that one has misapprehended the meaning of said directives. Effective and efficient administration of justice demands nothing than a faithful adherence to the rules and orders laid down by this Court.

The Court stressed that the judge could not hide behind good faith and misinterpretation, because the circumstances showed he was fully aware of his suspension, and because under Alday even a misapprehension will not excuse liability. It also cited Lumapas versus Tamin, where it ruled that indifference or defiance to the Court's orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension, or fine as warranted by the circumstances.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the findings of the Executive Judge but not with the recommended penalty. Adopting instead the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, and moved to temper justice with mercy because the judge had already been suspended indefinitely, the Court imposed a fine of ten thousand pesos.

Doctrine

A judge must faithfully obey the orders and resolutions of the Supreme Court, from which all other courts take their bearings. Such a resolution is not a mere request and may not be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. The defense of good faith or misapprehension of the meaning of a directive does not excuse a judge from liability for defying it. Indifference or defiance to the Court's orders may be punished with dismissal, suspension, or fine as the circumstances warrant.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Luisito T. Adaoag administratively liable and fined him ten thousand pesos, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a Supreme Court resolution is not a mere request and cannot be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Examiners use this case in judicial ethics to test whether good faith or misapprehension can excuse a judge who defies a suspension order, and the answer is no.