BIENVENIDO MEDRANO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. FILEMON MENDOZA, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF IBAAN, BATANGAS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

A criminal complaint for crave threats alleged to have been
committed by petitioner-appellant Bienvenido Medrano
on September 30, 1963, was lodged by one Leonardo Argente
in the Municipal Court of Ibaan, Batangas,
on November 29, 1963.  Appellant Medrano
moved to quash on two grounds: (1) the complaint did not conform substantially
to the prescribed form, and (2) more than one of­fense was charged therein.

The municipal court denied appellant’s motion.  Subsequently at the latter’s instance, the
court reconsi­dered its stand and, in the order dated March 14, 1964, directed
the private prosecutor to amend the complaint within five (5) days from receipt
thereof by charging light threats only.

The private prosecutor received his copy of the above-stated
order on March 18, 1964.  However, the amended com­plaint charging
light threats was filed only on April 15, 1964, or 28 days from March 18, 1964, to be exact.

On April 23, 1964,
appellant filed a written motion to quash the amended complaint on the ground
of prescrip­tion, in reiteration of his oral motion of the same tenor made on April 16, 1964.  When the municipal court denied his motion,
appellant brought the matter to the Court of First Instance of Batangas on a petition for prohibition averring that the
refusal of the municipal court to quash the case was “in grave abuse of
discretion, in excess of and in direct violation of the legal provision
embodied Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code x x x.”

The petition was given due course, and the People of the Philippines
required to answer, which it did.  On November 2, 1964, the Court of First
Instance rendered its decision dismissing the petition.  Appellant’s motion to reconsider which
followed was also denied.

Hence, this appeal on the sole legal question
of whether prescription had set in or not.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code recites:

“The period of prescription shall com­mence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the au­thorities,
or their agents, and shall be in­terrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for an reason not imputable to him.” (Emphasis
supplied)

x    x    x

Orally threatening another in the heat of anger with some harm
constituting a crime is a light offense^[1]
which prescribes in two months or 60 days.^[2]
This period of 60 days commenced running on September 30, 1963 when the threats were allegedly made against
the offended party.  The complaint was
filed on the 60th day itself.  Subse­quently
the prosecution was ordered to amend the original complaint to one for light
threats within five days from March
18, 1964.  The five days
lapsed.  No complaint was yet filed.  Did prescription run again?

Appellant submits that it did, arguing that after the lapse of
the five days given to the prosecution within which to file the amended
complaint, the proceedings were unjustifiably stopped for reasons not
imputable to him, i.e., negligence of the prosecution.

The submission fails to convince Us.  Appellant himself caused the stoppage of the
proceedings, if any, be­cause of his motion to quash.  By this, he, in effect, asked for the
quashing of one of two offenses included in the complaint.  The municipal court in ordering an amendment
of the complaint to charge only light threats, in effect, granted the quashing
of the charge for the other offense, effective upon the filing of the amended
complaint.

Moreover, while the private prosecutor appears to have delayed in
filing the amended charge, the municipal court still accepted the same, thereby
excusing the delay.  For, as it pointed
out, the order to amend the ori­ginal complaint did not state that failure to
file the amended charge within the five-day period fixed would amount to the
dismissal of the original complaint.  The
municipal court therefore retained the discretion to ac­cept or reject the
amended charge filed after the lapse of the period provided.  Hence, the delay here cannot be said to have
resulted in unjustifiable stoppage of the proceedings for reasons not imputable
to the accused be­cause (1) it was at his own insistence that the charge had to
be changed, and (2) the municipal court, exercis­ing its discretion, excused
the delay and accepted the amended charge filed after the lapse of the five-day
pe­riod.  We see no grave abuse of
discretion in such ac­ceptance.

The result above reached is actually more favorable to appellant
for he now stands charged only for light threats.  On the other hand, if the present charge for
light threats is considered prescribed, he could still be legally charged with
grave threats or even grave coercion,^[3]
offenses the prescriptive period for which would not yet have lapsed, even if
the same is deemed to have run again.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is, as it is hereby,
affirmed.  Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Art. 285, par. 2, in relation to Art. 9, Revised Penal
Code.

^[2]
Art. 90, Revised Penal Code.

^[3]
The original complaint alleged that appellant “willful­ly, unlawfully and
feloniously stopped the jeepney the undersigned was
driving x x x and then he
grab­bed (hinalit at ginabot)
the streamer of Pepe Fortos
then carried by my jeepney, and after throwing it
away in uncontrolled anger, exclaimed; ‘kayo ay pag­babarilin‘
ko.  x x x“