LUIS G. ABLAZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. AMANCIO SYCIP AND CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

An action for replevin initiated by plaintiff Luis G. Ablaza against
defendants Amancio Sycip and the Centra) Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. in the
Manila Municipal Court, for the recovery of an automobile in aid to a chattel
mortgage foreclosure therein. Pending determination of the case in said court,
the defendant retained possession of the automobile upon the filing by him, on
September 22, 1953, of a redelivery bond which the insurance company executed
with the following undertaking, to wit:

“Now, therefore, we Amancio Sycip as principal and the Central Surety Company
of Manila, as surety, in consideration of the above and of the return of said
property to said defendant, hereby bind ourselves, jointly and severally, in the
sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P3,000.00), Philippine Currency, .which is
double the value of the property stated in the affidavit of the plaintiffs, for
the delivery thereof if such delivery is adjudged, and for the payment of such
sum to him as may be recovered against the defendant and the costs of the
action.”

Judgment was rendered by the Municipal Court in favor of the plaintiff. On
appeal, the trial court likewise rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“In View whereof, judgment is rendered condemning defendant to surrender the
automobile to plaintiff to enable the latter to-have the same delivered to the
Sheriff for foreclosure under the Chattel Mortgage Law; defendant is further
condemned to pay P300.00 to the plaintiff for attorney’s fees, and to pay the
costs.”

Further appeal was perfected by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, but on
October 19, 1954, the appeal was dismissed and the records of the case were
remanded to the trial court for entry of final judgment and execution
thereof.

A writ of execution was issued by the trial court and the Sheriff of Manila
seized the automobile which was sold at public auction on April 16, 1955, at the
devalued price of P381.00. For the first time on June 18, 1955, long after the
entry of final judgment and issuance in fact of execution, the
plaintiff-appellee applied with the trial court for the recovery of damages
against the defendants Sycip and the surety company on their bond in the
liquidated sum of P500.00. Over the objections of defendants on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, the trial court in an order dated July 18, 1955, directed
the defendants-

“Jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P500.00 for the
deterioration of the automobile in question besides the sum of P300.00 for
attorney’s fees and the costs; the latter two sums to be collected by execution
at once; the first to be collected by execution if the bondsman or defendant
does not appeal from this order in time.”

As defendant’s motions for reconsideration dated July 26, 1955, and August 4,
1955, were resolved adversely, the defendants appealed but defendant Sycip’s
appeal was dismissed, due to his failure to file the required appeal bond on
time. Appellant surety company claims, under a lone assignment of error, that
the trial court erred in issuing the order of July 18, 1955 awarding the
plaintiff with damages for deterioration of the automobile, after entry of final
judgment in the principal case.

At the threshold of this opinion, it should be recalled that the judgment of
the trial court in the main action had become definitive, final judgment had
been entered, a writ of execution of said judgment was issued and such judgment
was in fact executed long before the incident involved in the case at bar had
arisen.

In support of its theme, the appellant argues: (1) that the trial court had
no longer jurisdiction in law to entertain and grant the application for damages
against the redelivery bond; (2) that the award of damages made by the trial
court was a modification of the original judgment and not a necessary corollary
thereto, and consequently not permissible for the court to do, and (3) that
granting appellee was entitled to damages because damages due to the
deterioration of the automobile is a condition which may be implied in a
redelivery bond in replevin cases (Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., vs. Bona,
et al., 44 Phil., 378, cited by the appellee), still he should not be awarded
any, in view of his failure to comply with the procedural requisites of Section
10, Rule 62, in connection with Sec. 20 of Rule 59. (C. Cajefe, etc.
vs. Hon. F. Fernandez, 109 Phil., 745; 61 Off. Gaz., [9] 1183; Alliance
Insurance Co. vs. Piccio, 105 Phil., 1196).

A final judgment or order can no longer be altered or amended, and the court
loses its jurisdiction thereover save to order its execution (Rili, et al.
vs. Chunaco, et al., 98 Phil., 505; 52 Off. Gaz., [5] 1428), and to
correct clerical errors (Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 42
Phil., 557). The trial court, however, and with it, the appellee, relied
strongly on section 5(g), Rule 124, which states that it is the inherent power
of a court “to amend and control its processes or orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice”. But as declared in the Veluz case,
(supra), such amendment or correction may be made while the judgment or
order is still under the control of the court and that after such judgment or
order becomes final “it can not be altered, amended or modified in the slightest
degree.”

The appellee contends that the award of damages for the deterioration of the
automobile in the sum of P500.00 did not modify the original judgment. We do not
share this view. The change was not merely a clerical error. It is material and
substantial, because it affects the merits of the judgment. In the original
judgment, it was defendant Sycip alone who was condemned to surrender the
automobile, and to pay the sum of P200.00 for attorney’s fees. The appealed
order joined the appellant surety company as a solidary obligor, in the payment
of P500.00, which was not adjudged in the original judgment. The relief so
granted was entirely new one, and substantially affected the parties of the
case; on the part of the plaintiff, it sought to increase his claim; on the part
of the defendant Sycip, it “added another obligation and on the part of the
surety company, it created a liability. The original judgment directs the return
of the automobile, which was done. And it was not just an atonement of a
clerical mistake that, aside from the surrender of the vehicle, the trial court
should now condemn defendant Sycip and the appellant surety company to pay
damages which were not claimed pspexjous to the rendition of such j udgment.
Verily, the order in question was a wide departure from the original judgment
and a material amplification of the same.

It should be noted that by the explicit terms of the order, the trial court
expressly admitted a substantial change in the original judgment in stating that
“the latter two sums to be collected by execution at once; the first to be
collected by execution if the bondsmen or defendant does not appeal from the
order in time”. (Italics supplied). If the appellee’s contention that the
order did not modify or change the original judgment were true, it was not
explained why the order itself opened the avenues to an appeal therefrom, when
the original judgment had long been admittedly become final and executory, such
that the relief granted could be executed at once. When the order reopened the
judgment to make it the proper subject of an appeal anew, the trial judge was
convinced that the award of the P500.00 damages or fees for the deterioration of
the automobile, was a substantial change or amplification of the original
judgment, notwithstanding his honor’s statement to the contrary.

Having reached the conclusion that the lower court had already lost its
jurisdiction over the case when it issued its order of July 18, 1955, it is
deemed unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised herein.

The order of July 18, 1955, appealed from is reversed and set aside, and
another entered, declaring said order null and void. Without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.

Order reversed and set aside.