🎧 Case Brief Lecture

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE OMPAD, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, PASTOR LABUTIN, DOMINGO LABUTIN, AND SANTIAGO RAYNADA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. L-23513. January 31, 1969 January 31, 1969

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People versus Labutin

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted several men for the killing of the common-law spouses Simplicio Tapulado and Dominga del Monte in a farmhouse in Samar. Three of the accused, Pastor Labutin, his son Domingo Labutin, and Santiago Raynada, stood trial and were convicted of double murder. The case matters for two enduring lessons: first, that a conspiracy is bounded by its object, so that a co-conspirator answers only for the killing that was agreed upon and not for a separate killing done outside the plan; and second, that alibi crumbles against positive identification by credible eyewitnesses.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Samar, which found all three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder. Pastor Labutin was sentenced to death, while Domingo Labutin and Santiago Raynada were each sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties, joint and several indemnity to the heirs of both victims, and costs. The shotgun used was confiscated for delivery to the Constabulary. The appellants elevated the case to the Supreme Court by appeal, and the Supreme Court reviewed the record and rendered its decision.

Facts

About eight o'clock in the evening of May 7, 1962, in sitio Inalaran, barrio San Isidro, Santa Rita, Samar, Simplicio Tapulado and his common-law wife Dominga del Monte were about to retire with the other occupants of their small farmhouse when a voice called for Simplicio to open up. The caller identified himself as Vicente Ompad. Simplicio pushed open the hinged shutter that served as the front door, and Vicente Ompad immediately shot him. Simplicio fell dead on the spot, and eight bullet wounds were later found on his body upon exhumation. As Dominga rose and was about to light the table lamp, Angel Libre, standing beside Vicente Ompad, fired another shot. Hit on the left chest, Dominga tried to run to the inner room but fell dead after a few steps.

Pablo del Monte, Dominga's seventeen-year-old son, rushed to the kitchen and slid to the ground by the kitchen post. From there he clearly saw Pastor Labutin and Santiago Raynada standing on opposite sides at the shed facing the stairs, Domingo Labutin stationed near the stairway, and Lucio Samar posted beneath the second window. After the killings, Pastor Labutin was heard to remark that Simplicio would not grab land anymore, and he ordered his son Domingo and Lucio Samar to untie Simplicio's pig, which the group took with them. Maxima Tapulado, who had arrived a week earlier to visit, corroborated the account and identified the appellants.

Lucio Samar, discharged from the information and used as state witness, testified that the plan to kill Simplicio took shape during a drinking session that afternoon, when Pastor Labutin urged Vicente Ompad to kill Simplicio, and that Pastor supplied the ammunition. The killings came to the attention of the authorities only through Sergeant Exequiel Loreno, who learned of them on May 15, 1962, and whose investigation led Pablo and Maxima to name the perpetrators. The three appellants raised alibi, each claiming to have been elsewhere on the night in question.

Issues

  • Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of double murder and imposing a single penalty for both killings upon each of them.
  • Whether or not the appellants are liable for the death of Dominga del Monte, or only for the death of Simplicio Tapulado.
  • Whether or not the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation, and dwelling were properly appreciated.
  • Whether or not the discharge of Lucio Samar to make him a state witness was reversible error.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the rule on the liability of co-conspirators, which the Court states as follows:

The rule is that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy.

This rule governs whether the appellants answer for the separate killing of Dominga del Monte.

The decision also applies the rule on dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, stated thus:

For this circumstance to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetuate the assault from without.

This rule makes dwelling available even though the triggerman fired from outside the farmhouse.

On the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness, the Court adopts the following:

In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged defendant.

This disposes of the appellants' objection to Lucio Samar's discharge.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in treating the killings as a single crime of double murder and imposing one penalty for both. Each killing constituted a separate offense, and the two victims were killed not by the same shots but by separate shots fired by two different persons using two different firearms.

On the second issue, the Court held that only the death of Simplicio Tapulado should be attributed to the appellants, because by the prosecution's own evidence the conspiracy was against Simplicio alone. Pastor Labutin told his companions that Simplicio was the victim, nothing was said about Dominga, and Pastor's parting remark showed his ire was directed solely against Simplicio. Applying the rule that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy, the Court held that only Angel Libre should be held responsible for Dominga's death.

On the third issue, the Court held that the killing of Simplicio was characterized by treachery, as it was too sudden and unexpected for him to defend himself, and was therefore murder. The Court rejected nighttime and abuse of superior strength, finding no evidence that darkness was purposely sought, since Vicente Ompad identified himself and his companions, and no showing that superior strength was availed of or enhanced the crime. Evident premeditation was correctly appreciated against Pastor Labutin alone, since barely two hours separated his proposal from the shooting, too short for cool reflection by the other two, who were also intoxicated. Dwelling was taken into account against all, because the victim was attacked inside his own house although the assailant fired from without. The penalty for murder being reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the death penalty was correct for Pastor Labutin, but for lack of sufficient votes it was reduced to reclusion perpetua. For Domingo Labutin and Santiago Raynada, dwelling alone, even if offset by intoxication, justified the penalty imposed. The Court also found the alibis weak and unworthy of credence against positive identification by unimpeached eyewitnesses.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that any error in discharging Lucio Samar was not reversible, as it did not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.

Doctrine

A conspiracy is bounded by its object. Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts outside the scope of the plan and not the necessary and logical consequence of the crime agreed upon, only the actual perpetrator is liable. Hence, where the plan was to kill one person only, a co-conspirator is not liable for the separate killing of another by a different triggerman. Alibi, being easy to fabricate, crumbles against positive identification by credible eyewitnesses who knew the culprits. Dwelling is appreciated where the victim is attacked inside his own house, even if the assailant fired from outside. Evident premeditation requires sufficient time for cool reflection, and cannot be appreciated where the interval was too short and the accused were intoxicated.

Disposition

The judgment was affirmed as to the penalties imposed on Domingo Labutin and Santiago Raynada, modified by reducing Pastor Labutin's penalty to reclusion perpetua, and further modified by increasing the indemnity to twelve thousand pesos payable to the heirs of Simplicio Tapulado, with costs against the appellants.

Remember This

Memorize the line that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy, so that a killing outside the plan binds only its actual perpetrator. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy liability for separate killings, the appreciation of dwelling and evident premeditation, and the weight of alibi against positive identification.