OCTAVIO INFANTADO, PETITIONER, VS. FELIPE LIWANAG & THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Infantado versus Liwanag

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Octavio Infantado against Felipe Liwanag and the Court of Appeals. Infantado had been the defendant in a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Manila, where the complaint of Liwanag, the plaintiff there, was dismissed. Liwanag appealed, and the question before the Supreme Court is not the merits of that civil case at all, but whether the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction to reinstate an appeal it had earlier dismissed and then to decide the case. The case matters because it fixes the rule that the mere lapse of the period to file an appellant's brief does not automatically dismiss an appeal or strip the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Procedural History

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint of Felipe Liwanag. Liwanag appealed to the Court of Appeals. The forty-five day period for him to file his brief expired on July 26, 1963, without a brief and without any motion for extension. On August 23, 1963, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to file the brief. Liwanag received notice of that resolution on August 26, 1963, and the next day, August 27, 1963, he filed a motion for reconsideration, praying at the same time for twenty-five days within which to file his brief. Infantado opposed the motion on September 2, 1963. On September 4, 1963, the Court of Appeals granted the motion, reinstated the appeal, and gave Liwanag twenty-five days counted from August 27, 1963. Liwanag filed his printed brief dated August 30, 1963, and Infantado filed his own brief as appellee dated October 20, 1963, without raising any question about the reinstatement. On September 11, 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court. Infantado moved for reconsideration on October 2, 1964, on the ground that the appellate court had lost jurisdiction, and when that motion was denied he came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.

Facts

Felipe Liwanag sued Octavio Infantado in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the trial court dismissed his complaint. Liwanag appealed to the Court of Appeals but let the forty-five day period for filing his brief lapse on July 26, 1963, without filing a brief and without asking for an extension.

On August 23, 1963, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Liwanag received notice on August 26, 1963, and on August 27, 1963, he filed a motion for reconsideration and asked for twenty-five days to file his brief. The record does not show the ground of that motion. Over Infantado's opposition, the Court of Appeals on September 4, 1963, granted the motion, reinstated the appeal, and gave Liwanag twenty-five days from August 27, 1963.

Liwanag filed his brief, Infantado filed his own brief without objecting to the reinstatement, and on September 11, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the merits. Only then did Infantado raise the jurisdictional objection, first in a motion for reconsideration and then before the Supreme Court, insisting that the appellate court had lost jurisdiction because the appellant's period had already expired when he filed his brief.

Issues

• Whether or not the mere lapse of the period to file the appellant's brief automatically results in the dismissal of the appeal and the loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court over the appeal.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it reconsidered its resolution dismissing the appeal and granted the respondent a period of twenty-five days within which to file his brief.
• Whether or not the petitioner, who waited until the case was decided against him on the merits before raising the objection, may still question the reinstatement of the appeal.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the settled procedure for dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief, under which the appellate court must still act before the appeal is lost. The Court explains the sequence in its own words:

After the expiration of the period to file appellant's brief, there is still need for the appellate court to act -- that is, to order the dismissal of the appeal upon motion by the appellee, or to order the dismissal motu propio.

This is the core of the ruling, because it shows that the lapse of the period does not by itself end the appeal.

The Court then states the remedy open to the party affected by the dismissal:

After the dismissal of the appeal by the court the party adversely affected by the dismissal still has a period of fifteen days from notice of the order of dismissal within which to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court can still reinstate the appeal if the motion for reconsideration is timely filed.

This measures the timeliness of Liwanag's motion, which was filed the day after he received notice.

Finally, the Court invokes the inherent power of the courts to amend their own orders, citing Rule 135, paragraph (g), of the Rules of Court:

It is within the inherent power and discretion of the Court of Appeals to amend whatever order it had made in order to render substantial justice.

This supplies the authority for the reinstatement and for the grant of a new period to file the brief.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals did not lose jurisdiction. The mere lapse of the period to file the appellant's brief does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal and the loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court over the appeal. After the period expires, the appellate court must still act, either to dismiss upon motion of the appellee or to dismiss on its own initiative, and even after dismissal the party adversely affected has fifteen days from notice to move for reconsideration, during which the court may still reinstate the appeal.

On the second issue, the Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Liwanag received the resolution of dismissal on August 26, 1963, and filed his motion for reconsideration on August 27, 1963, so the motion was timely and the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction to reconsider and to grant, if justifiable, the twenty-five day period. The Court presumed that the appellate court found the motion meritorious and that there was justification for the grant, and it refused to control that discretion, holding that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion when it reinstated the appeal and granted the period to file the brief.

On the third issue, the Court noted that the petitioner never questioned the correctness of the decision on the merits. If he had any objection to the reinstatement, he should have raised it in a petition for certiorari right after the Court of Appeals reconsidered its resolution and granted the new period. Instead he let the respondent file his brief, filed his own brief in answer, and waited until the case was decided against him on the merits before raising the objection.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the mere lapse of the period to file the appellant's brief does not automatically dismiss the appeal or divest the appellate court of jurisdiction; the court must still act, upon motion of the appellee or on its own initiative. Second, after the appeal is dismissed, the party adversely affected has fifteen days from notice of the order of dismissal within which to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court may reinstate the appeal if that motion is timely filed. Third, it is within the inherent power and discretion of the appellate court to amend its own orders in order to render substantial justice, and the Supreme Court will not control that discretion absent grave abuse. Fourth, an objection to the reinstatement of an appeal must be raised promptly, by certiorari, and not held back until after judgment on the merits.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, without costs, upholding the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and its decision reversing the trial court.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the mere lapse of the period to file the appellant's brief does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal and the loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court. Examiners use this case on the point that the appellate court must still act to dismiss, and that a timely motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from notice allows reinstatement of the appeal.