G.R. No. L-1370. April 27, 1949
BERNARDA DE VASQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. ALFONSO DIVA, RESPONDENT.
TUASON, J.:
Vasquez, defeated defendant in a case for unlawful detainer.
It appears that Alfonso Diva brought this action in the municipal court in
June, 1945. There, the, case was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed to the
Court of First Instance. The latter court rendered judgment ejecting the
defendant from the premises in question and ordering her to pay the plaintiff
rents at the rate of P25 a month from March 11, 1945, “sin perjuicio de
cualquier accion que quiera interponer para discutir la cuestion de propiedad
sobre dicha finca.” Not satisfied with that decision, the defendant took the
case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals found as did the Court of First Instance that the
husband of the defendant, now deceased, acquired by purchase on the installment
plan in 1927 the property in litigation; that the deceased must have sold the
land and the house erected thereon, in which the defendant and her husband
lived, to Geronimo Santiago, when the latter was able to secure a Transfer
Certificate of Title thereto in his name; that on September 30, 1944, Alfonso
Diva, the plaintiff, in consideration of P10,000, bought the house and lot from
Santiago.
The defendant-appellant points out two alleged errors in the decision,
namely:
I
“That the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass upon the question of
ownership under which the contract of lease could only be hand, which is the
only cause of action that the present case was premised.II
“That the Court of Appeals cannot in effect hold that ejectment may be
ordered or decided under article 1569 of Section 3 of the Civil Code in relation
with Rule 8 Section 1 sub-section F of the Rules of Court.”
It has been seen that the Court of Appeals found that the property in
question was sold by the defendant’s husband to Geronimo Santiago and that
Santiago afterward conveyed it to the plaintiff. Although it did not make a
categorical finding on whether there was a lease contract between the plaintiff
on the one hand and the defendant and her husband on the other, we gather from
the tenor of its decision that it recognized the existence of such agreement.
This conclusion is inferrable not only from its analysis and discussion of the
evidence and the allegations but also from its affirmance of the Court of First
Instance’s decision “in all its parts,” decision wherein the latter court
expressly found that the plaintiff at the behest of the defendant and her
husband let them continue occupying the premises at a rental of P25 a month.
The relation of lessor and lessee between the plaintiff and the defendant
being established, the plaintiff has a cause of action for unlawful detainer
upon the defendants failure to pay the stipulated rents and after demand to
vacate the property. Defendant’s attempt to inject the question of ownership
into the case in the face of the plaintiff’s allegations and the proof could not
defeat the court’s jurisdiction, a lessee is not allowed to deny his lessor’s
title. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were right in
disregarding the defendants asserted ownership to the property except in so far
as it might throw light on the right of possession. The validity of the sale of
the house and lot by defendant’ husband to Santiago and by Santiago to plaintiff
may and should be litigated in an appropriate suit, as both courts
indicated.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Montemayor, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.