VILLAMOR & VICTOLERO CONSTRUCTION CO., RHEENA BERNADETTE C. VILLAMOR, AND, ERWIN V. VICTOLERO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LOURDES J. ESPINOSA, FEDERICO Y. ALIKPALA, RICARDO B. SAN JU…
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Villamor and Victolero Construction versus Espinosa
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought by Villamor and Victolero Construction Company, a partnership, together with Rheena Bernadette Villamor and Erwin Victolero, against the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission and its officers, and against Sogo Realty and Development Corporation as private respondent. Sogo sued the partnership before the Commission for breach of contract and damages over defective road works in its subdivision project, and the Commission refused to dismiss the complaint, holding that it had jurisdiction because of a handwritten arbitration note signed on the partnership's behalf. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court insisting that no valid arbitration agreement ever existed. The case matters because it fixes the rule that the Commission's jurisdiction rests on a genuine arbitration agreement, and that a person who is not a partner cannot bind a partnership to arbitrate without authority.
Procedural History
Sogo Realty filed its complaint with application for interim measures before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. The petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the Construction Agreement contained no arbitration clause and that no one had consented to arbitration. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and directed the petitioners to file their answer. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the Commission likewise denied, again directing them to answer. The petitioners then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and the Court granted the petition.
Facts
On the first of December 2009, Sogo Realty, as owner and developer of a subdivision project in Tanza, Cavite, entered into a Construction Agreement with the partnership as contractor. The scope of work included land development, road works, and road preparation. Under the agreement, the contractor guaranteed all works for one year from final acceptance, and if it failed to rectify defects within seven calendar days of notice, the owner could have the work done by another and charge the cost to the contractor.
After the road works were completed, but within the one-year guarantee period, the roads began to show large cracks and to break apart. Sogo called the defects to the partnership's attention, the latest through a letter dated the twenty-second of September 2011. The parties agreed in writing to conduct tests, but the partnership did not appear at the testing. Tests conducted in October 2011 showed defects in the road works and in the materials used. Sogo then demanded in writing that the partnership remove the defective structures and reconstruct them, and the partnership received that demand but took no action.
Sogo alleged that the parties had agreed to arbitrate, pointing to a handwritten note on the September 2011 letter reading that the signer agreed to submit the matter to arbitration in case the parties did not agree to the report, signed by Lawrence Napoleon Villamor, the partnership's Estimation and Marketing Manager and the husband of one of the partners. The petitioners denied any consent, saying Villamor signed only to acknowledge receipt and was never authorized to bind the partnership to arbitration. The Commission nonetheless found the note genuine and the authority of Villamor presumed, prompting this petition.
Issues
- Whether or not the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission acquired jurisdiction over the complaint despite the absence of an arbitration clause in the Construction Agreement.
- Whether or not the handwritten arbitration note signed by Villamor constituted a valid submission to arbitration binding on the partnership.
- Whether or not Villamor was clothed with actual or apparent authority to submit the partnership's claim or liability to arbitration.
Applicable Provisions
Section 2.3 of the Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provides:
SECTION 2.3 Condition for exercise of jurisdiction - For the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must be bound by an arbitration agreement in their contract or subsequently agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
This is the jurisdictional test the Court applies, and it fails here because there is neither a clause nor a valid subsequent submission.
Section 2.4.1 of the same Rules provides:
SECTION 2.4.1. The Arbitral Tribunal shall have full authority to resolve all issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the dispute is not a construction dispute, or that the Respondent was represented by one without capacity to enter into a binding arbitration agreement, or that said agreement or submission is not valid for some other reasons, or does not cover the particular dispute sought to be arbitrated, or other issues of interpretation or nonfulfillment of pre-conditions to arbitration that are raised therein.
This confirms that representation by one without capacity to enter into a binding arbitration agreement is a jurisdictional defect.
Section 4.1.2 of the same Rules provides:
SECTION 4.1.2. An arbitration agreement or a submission to arbitration shall be in writing, but it need not be signed by the parties, as long as the intent is clear that the parties agree to submit a present or future controversy arising from a construction contract to arbitration.
This governs the form of a submission, which the Court assumes arguable here but finds defeated by lack of authority.
Article 1818 of the Civil Code provides:
Except when authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned the business, one or more but less than all the partners have no authority to submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration.
This is the core rule: submission of a partnership claim or liability to arbitration requires authorization by the other partners.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides:
A special power of attorney is necessary to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired.
This requires a special power of attorney for the act of submitting questions to arbitration, which was never shown.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the Commission had no jurisdiction. The Construction Agreement contained no arbitration clause, so jurisdiction could arise only from a subsequent submission, and none was validly made. The Court quoted the jurisdictional condition and concluded that in the absence of both a clause and a binding submission, the complaint could not proceed.
On the second issue, the Court held that the arbitration note did not bind the partnership. Villamor was not a partner; he was merely the Estimation and Marketing Manager, and the fact that he was the husband of a partner gave him no personality as a partner. The Court stressed that powers not specifically delegated in a partnership agreement are presumed withheld, and that submission of a partnership claim or liability to arbitration is among the acts outside a partner's implied power. It then quoted Article 1818 and Article 1878, and found no showing that Villamor had been granted the power to represent the petitioners in arbitration.
On the third issue, the Court rejected the Commission's reliance on apparent authority. Under that doctrine, the question is whether the principal, by his own voluntary act, placed the agent in a situation where a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages, would be justified in presuming authority. Sogo, a corporation acting through its board, officers, and agents, was itself conversant with business usages and could with ordinary care have determined whether Villamor was clothed with authority. It could not therefore be said that Sogo was justified in presuming that Villamor could arbitrate on the partnership's behalf. Having been represented by one without capacity to enter into a binding arbitration agreement, and with no arbitration clause in the contract, the Commission had no jurisdiction, and its orders were nullified under Rule 65.
Doctrine
First, the Commission's jurisdiction requires that the parties be bound by an arbitration agreement in their contract or subsequently agree to submit to voluntary arbitration; absent either, the Commission has no jurisdiction.
Second, under Article 1818 of the Civil Code, one or more but less than all the partners have no authority to submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration unless authorized by the other partners, and powers not specifically delegated are presumed withheld.
Third, under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to submit questions to arbitration.
Fourth, apparent authority cannot supply the defect where the party dealing with the agent is itself a corporation conversant with business usages and could have verified the agent's authority with ordinary care and prudence.
Disposition
The petition was granted, and the two orders of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission were declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a partnership cannot be bound to arbitrate by a non-partner acting without a special power of attorney, and apparent authority will not cure it against a party who could easily have verified. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional requisites of construction arbitration and the limits of a partner's and an agent's authority under Articles 1818 and 1878 of the Civil Code.