GAS CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE ACTING MINISTER OF LABOR AMADO G. INCIONG, THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE …

The crucial issue in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding against the then Acting Minister of Labor Amado
G. Inciong as principal respondent^[1]
is the alleged denial of procedural due process.  As alleged in the petition:  “The records of the case will bear fact
that the defendant in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-6421-76 herein petitioner was
deprived of its day in court.  The
Honorable Labor Arbiter had violated the rights of the petitioner to the due
process of law.  In this case, a decision
was rendered in favor of one
Fernando Santos, without the latter having submitted any position paper,
document, or presented any witnesses. 
This decision is without any factual and legal basis.”^[2]
The Labor Arbiter, then, so it was contended, “should have required
Fernando Santos to present its evidence so the petitioner could fully prepare
for its defense.  Yet, the Honorable
Labor Arbiter opined that he should be reinstated and given its pay.  All of these were done despite the timely
objections of petitioner’s counsel and a motion to dismiss the case for lack of
interest and non-appearance.  In this
manner the petitioner was deprived of its right to due process because it was
not able to present its evidence and cross-examine Fernando Santos.  The decision in favor of Fernando Santos
actually came as a surprise for one cannot help but wonder where the Honorable
Arbiter adduced its evidence in favor of Fernando Santos.”^[3]
When, subsequently, such decision was affirmed by respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, as well as respondent Acting Minister of Labor Inciong, this petition was filed.

This Court in a resolution of February 2, 1979 required respondents to comment.  The then Acting Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza, complying with the above resolution, submitted the Comment considered
as the answer.  The point raised was
squarely met in these words:  “There
is no merit to this contention.  To begin
with, it is not true as claimed by petitioner that private respondent Fernando
Santos did not adduce any evidence by reason of which, it (petitioner) was not
able to present its evidence.  The record
readily shows that Fernando Santos submitted to respondent labor arbiter at the
scheduled hearing of the case on October 5, 1976, his affidavit with several
annexes * * * refuting the charges imputed to him by petitioner which affidavit
and its annexes, doubtless, constitute the evidence for said private
respondent.  Petitioner in turn submitted
at an earlier date its position paper along with several papers or documents as
annexes * * * which it obviously intended as its evidence in the case.  Assuming, however, for the sake of argument
that respondent Fernando Santos did not present any evidence, this by no means
renders the decision of respondent labor arbiter directing the reinstatement of
said private respondent without basis as erroneously contended by petitioner.  It should be noted that the reinstatement of
Fernando Santos is but a consequence of the denial of petitioner’s application
for clearance to terminate private respondents’ employment.  Considering that petitioner failed to
substantiate its application in question or to otherwise establish the,
existence of a legal or justifiable cause to terminate said respondents’ employment,
perforce, the latter is entitled to reinstatement regardless of whether or not
he presented any evidence.”^[4]
The matter was pursued further in the Comment thus:  “Petitioner furthermore may not, simply
on the ground that Fernando Santos allegedly did not present any evidence,
validly complain that it was not able to present its evidence and thereby, was
deprived of its right to due process. 
The presentation of petitioner’s evidence certainly was not in any way
dependent on the presentation of Fernando Santos’ evidence and the former could
have doubtless easily presented its evidence on the various occasions that the
case was scheduled for hearing.  Since
petitioner had undeniably ample opportunity to present its evidence, it has
only itself to blame if it allegedly was not able to present its
evidence.”^[5]
Nor did the Comment stop there. 
“Neither is petitioner’s right to due process in the least impaired
by its alleged inability to cross-examine respondent Fernando Santos.  The record shows that petitioner had ample
opportunity to cross-examine said private respondent – first, when the latter
submitted his affidavit and the annexes thereof, to respondent labor arbiter on
October 5, 1976, and at least on two occasions thereafter – at the scheduled
hearing of the case on December 9, 1976, and on January 11, 1977, at which both
contending parties were present.  Since
it did not avail of this opportunity, petitioner must be deemed to have waived
any right to cross-examine Fernando Santos.”^[6]

How the due process question arose may be discerned from the
petition.  Private respondents Jesus
Valdez and Fernando Santos filed a complaint with the then Department of Labor
charging petitioner corporation with illegal dismissal.^[7]
On April 29, 1977, the
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision reinstating them.^[8]
There was an appeal by petitioner to the National Labor Relations Commission
which on December 6, 1977
sustained the Labor Arbiter.^[9]
Petitioner on March 14, 1978
elevated the matter to the Office of the Minister of Labor.  It contended anew that it was denied due
process, but the same adverse fate was in store.^[10] Respondent Acting Minister of Labor
denied the appeal on June 9, 1978.^[11]
There was a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail.^[12]

This petition, as mentioned at the outset, lacks merit.

1. The vigor with which counsel
for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural
due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari
and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the office of the
Solicitor General.  It is undoubted that
the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or
agency.  So it was announced by Justice
Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.^[13]
That is still good law.  It follows,
therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this
petition must prosper.^[14]
It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of due process that must
be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude
as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.  So the following recent cases have uniformly held:  Maglasang v. Ople,^[15]
Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili,^[16]
Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[17]
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,^[18]
Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations,^[19]
and Montemayor v. Araneta
University Foundation.^[20]
From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that
no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified.  The opportunity to present its side of the
case was given both parties to the controversy. 
If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its
right to do so, then it has only itself to blame.  No constitutional infirmity could then be
imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.

2. There is another consideration that equally militates strongly
against the stand of petitioner.  It is
quite apparent from each petition that the alleged denial of due process by the
labor arbiter was ventilated before the National Labor Relations Commission as
well as respondent Acting Minister of Labor. 
It would follow, therefore, that in the light of the Maglasang,
Jacqueline Industries and Montemayor pronouncements,
whatever deficiency there might have been, even on the assumption that there
was any, the matter was cured by the appeals taken not only to the National
Labor Relations Commission, an adminis­trative agency of a higher rank, but to
respondent Acting Minister of Labor. 
Hence the futility of the claim that there was a denial of procedural
due process.

3. Nor did the Solicitor General ignore the facts to show that no
arbitrariness was committed when public respondents ruled as they did.
Thus:  “Finally, petitioner contends
that respondent labor arbiter erred in declaring that it has no justifiable or legal
cause in terminating the services of private respondents allegedly due to the
dismissal of the criminal complaint which it filed against them (private
respondents).  Petitioner maintains that
notwithstanding the dismissal of said criminal complaint, it can still validly
dismiss private respondents ‘for lack of confidence, misconduct, and other
justifiable causes.’  This contention is
untenable and evidently arises from a distorted appraisal or understanding of the
decision of respondent labor arbiter.  A
perusal of the questioned decision clearly shows that no such ruling or
conclusion was ever made by respondent labor arbiter.  The dismissal of said criminal complaint was
merely taken by him into account as part of the evidence exposing ‘the
methodical pattern adopted by herein petitioner ‘in seeking the termination’ of
private respondents’ ‘services at all cost(s).’ 
If petitioner’s application for termination of private respondents’
employment was denied (as it was in fact denied), it was mainly due to the fact
that it failed to present any evidence to substantiate its charges, not to
mention that the same were already settled in Case No. RO4-2-1872-76 wherein
petitioner first sought to terminate private respondents’ employment.  Needless to state, we may even go along with
petitioner in its claim to the effect that an employer has still the right to
dismiss an employee for ‘lack of confidence, misconduct, and other justifiable
causes even if the criminal case filed against the employee did not prosper.’  But, certainly, before any such dismissal may
be ordered by competent authorities, sufficient evidence proving the grounds therefor has to be presented without which, the employer’s
application for termination of employment necessarily has to be dismissed.  In the instant case, except for the aforesaid
xerox copy of a letter of one Thomas Wisniewski,
dated March 5, 1979, which
is naturally hearsay evidence, petitioner herein failed to present any
evidence, to substantiate his charges against private respondents embodied in
the two (2) memoranda of its president dated February 25, 1979. 
Accordingly, respondent public officials committed no error in denying
petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate private respondents’
employment.”^[21]

WHEREFORE, the suit for certiorari is
dismissed.  This decision is immediately executory.  Costs
against petitioner.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The other respondents are:  The Second
Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission, The Honorable Labor Arbiter Tito F. Genilo,
Jesus Valdez and Fernando Santos.

^[2]
Petition, 3-4.

^[3]
Ibid, 4.

^[4]
Comment, 8-9.

^[5]
Ibid, 9.

^[6]
Ibid, 9-10.

^[7]
Petition, par. 3.

^[8]
Ibid, par. 4 and Annex A.

^[9]
Ibid, pars. 5-7 and Annex C.

^[10]
Ibid, par. 8.

^[11]
Ibid, par. 9 and Annex E.

^[12]
Ibid, par. 9 and Annex F.

^[13]  69 Phil. 635 (1939).

^[14]
Cf. Philippine Maritime Industrial Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-37003, Oct. 23, 1974, 60 SCRA 287; Firestone Filipino Employees
Association v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, L-37952, Dec. 10, 1974, 61 SCRA 339; Scott v. Inciong, L-38868, Dec. 29, 1975, 68 SCRA 473.

^[15]
L-38813, April 29, 1975, 63
SCRA 508.

^[16]
L-39741, May 30, 1975, 64
SCRA 274.

^[17]
L-37034, August 29, 1975,
66 SCRA 397.

^[18]
L-42115, January 27, 1976,
69 SCRA 132.

^[19]
L-41288, January 31, 1977,
75 SCRA 162.

^[20]
L-44251, May 31, 1977, 77
SCRA 321.

^[21]
Comment, 14-15.

150
Clean

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