NUMENCIANO BRACA AND PRIMITIVA C. BRACA, PETITIONERS, VS. BIENVENIDO TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, AND THE PHILIPPINE SURPLUS COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

In civil case No. 1007 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
the petitioners, on December 10, 1948, obtained a judgment for P2,281.20 against
the respondent Philippine Surplus Company under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
on account of the accidental death of their son vhich occurred in the
performance of his duty as an employee of said company. The latter received copy
of the decision on December 21, 1948.

On January 10, 1949, i.e., after the lapse of 15 days allowed by
section 17 of Rule 41 for the perfection of an appeal in workmen’s compensation
cases, the respondent company filed a motion to set aside the judgment and to
reopen the case on the ground that it had failed to receive the notice of the
trial because its manager was then in Baguio. The court denied said motion on
January 15, 1949, and on February 4 the respondent company filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment, which was disallowed by the court on the ground that
it was presented out of time. A motion for reconsideration of the order
disallowing the appeal was subsequently filed and likewise denied by the
court.

On May 31, 1949, the Philippine Surplus Company filed civil case No. 841 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, seeking relief under section 2 of Rule 38
from said judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and
praying for a writ of preliminary Injunction to restrain the sheriff of Rizal
City from complying with the writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. The respondent judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, ordering the sheriff to abstain from
executing the judgment in question during the pendency of the petition for
relief from said judgment.

The present petition for prohibition was presented in this court to prohibit
the respondent judge from hearing said petition for relief under section 2 of
Rule 38 on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
thereof.

Section 2 of Rule 38 provides:

“When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken,
against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same
cause^[1] praying that the judgment,
order, or proceeding be set aside.”

Section 3 provides that the petition must be filed within sixty days after
the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six months after such
judgment was entered; and must be accompanied by affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense,
as the case may be, which he may prove if his petition be granted.

Section 4 provides that if the petition is sufficient in form and substance
to justify such process, the court in which it is filed, or a judge thereof,
shall issue an order requiring those against whom the petition is filed to
answer it within fifteen days from the receipt thereof.

Section 6 provides that if tae petition is sufficient in form and substance
to justify such process, the court in which it is filed, or a judge thereof,
shall issue an order requiring those against whom the petition is filed to
answer it within fifteen days from the receipt thereof. Section 6 provides that
once the answer is filed, or the time for its filing has expired, the court
shall hear the case, and if after such hearing the court finds the allegations
of the petition are not true, the petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds
said allegations to be true, it shall order the judgment complained of to be set
aside, upon such terms as may be just, and shall try the principal case upon
its merits.

Section 7 provides that where the judgment set aside is that of a Court of
First Instance, such court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if
a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions of Rule 38 that the petition for
relief from a judgment of the Court of First Instance must be filed in the same
court that rendered the judgment and in the same cause wherein the judgment was
rendered; and that if the court finds the allegations of the petition to be
true, it shall set aside the judgment and try the principal ease upon its merits
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

It results therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Rizal has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for relief from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental not only because section 2 of Rule
38 expressly requires that such petition be filed in the latter court and in the
same case but also because, although the principal case could have been
originally brought either in the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the
defendant has its domicile, or in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental where the plaintiffs reside, once the latter court had taken
cognizance of said case, it acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
former. To permit the Court of First Instance of Rizal to set aside the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in civil case No.
1007 and to try said case upon its merits, would produce the anomalous effect of
depriving the latter court of the jurisdiction which it had already acquired
over the case and of transferring that case to another court of the same
category at the instance of the losing party.

“Equitable relief from a judgment may be granted by the court which rendered
the judgment, where such court exercises jurisdiction both at law and in equity.
Indeed, it has been held that such relief may not be granted by another court
possessing the same jurisdiction as the court which rendered the judgment, or by
another court possessing general equity jurisdiction.” (31 Am. Jur., Judgments,
sec. 628, p. 213.)

As a matter of fact, the respondent company had exhausted all its remedies in
the proper court, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which had
denied its motion of January 4, 1949, to set aside the judgment and to reopen
the case, for lack of merit.

Let the writ of prohibition be issued as prayed for. The order of the
respondent judge of May 31, 1949 granting the writ of preliminary injunction
against the sheriff of Rizal City is hereby annulled. The respondent Philippine
Surplus Company shall pay the costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and
Torres, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

Mr. Justice Padilla
voted to grant.

---

[1] NOTE.—The phrase “and in the same cause”
appearing in the official edition of the Rules of Court has been inadvertently
omitted in Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court.