HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HERMINIO MARAVILLA, RESPONDENT.

Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their
objection, raising the question of jurisdiction, the appellate court
took cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set aside the
appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator
of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent
facts are as follows:

On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of
the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla
who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving
spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.

On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla
(brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an
opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the at testing witnesses and of one another.

On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was
opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an
order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the
deceased, for the reason that:

“x x x all the properties subject of the will are
conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife, Digna
Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done,
the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will
belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by
the special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the
petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in tho property
subject to the Will, the Court finds It impossible for the present time
to appoint any person other than the petitioner as special
administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for
the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will arc in the name of
the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the deceased.”

On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate
of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in
the presence of the at testing witnesses and of one another.

On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed
with the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of
Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their
interests, on the ground A that the will, having been denied probate,
they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was heard on
February 20, at which hearing, respondent’s counsel orally moved for
postponement, because respondent’s principal counsel (Salonga) had not
been notified and was not present. The Court ordered presentation of
oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and
Regina and Francisco Maravilla.

On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of
appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal, from the decision denying
probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed
from said decision.

On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina, Maravilla, filed
with the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from
his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided
for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition,
respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that provision of the
Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an
inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for
his removal was filed.

On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas
filed with the court a petition for the appointment of Conchita as
special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a
similar petition on February 29.

On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing on the (1) petition
to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, (2) approval of
respondent’s record on appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita
Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint
Adelina Sajo as special co-administratrix. At said hearing, respondent
objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator, on the grounds that (a) the law allows only one
special administrator, (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court
from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, (c) such
appointment is unfair to respondent, because he owns at least 3/4 of
the whole property, conjugal in nature, which would be subjected to the
administration of a stranger, and (d) a. deadlock between two special
administrators would ruin the management of the property, including
those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez,
respondent’s counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed
full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila, and could not discharge
the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention
on Lopez part to resign from office.

After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator in an order dictated in open court, to protect
the interests of Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla.

From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special co- administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from
further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as
special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11,
1960 to make it more specific.

On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme
Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this
case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition)
prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this
petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the grounds that said the
amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the
probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court
Of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve
title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.^[1]

On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting
the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and
declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator.

Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent,
the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision
appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory
that “the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of
respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90.000.00 more or less, i.e.,
one fourth of the conjugal property” (of respondent and the deceased
Digna Maravilla) which, as per inventory submitted by respondent as
special administrator, is valued at P362.424.90. This theory is
untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar
Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate
or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where
petitioners’ motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the
ground that the amount therein involved is within the latter’s
exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending resolution. That the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said a said testate
proceeding cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein
involved are valued at P362,424.90, as per inventory of the special
administrator.

Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This
Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts,
upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse (Vda. de Roxas vs. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82
Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco vs. Chantengco, et al., L-10663,
October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an
order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect,
recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein
is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954,
50 O.G. 5321; Vaño v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954,
50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings
in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved
therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have
original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely
incidental thereto.

In the United States, the rule is that “proceedings in probate are
appealable where the amount or value involved is reducible to a
pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant’s
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on
appeal involve only the appellant’s rights or the entire administration
of the estate. x x x In a contest for administration of an estate the
amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in
controversy for purposes of appeal.” (4 C..T.S. 204). In line with this
ruling, it is to be observed that respondent’s interest as appellant
in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his
theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more
than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced
to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or
value of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than
P200.000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said proceedings falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should,
therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended.

Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the
annulment of the appointment of Eliczar Lopez as special
co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
respondent as a special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for
the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value
of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S.
204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more
than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original
jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the
amount of “P90,000.00 more or less”, as the amount involved in the
case, upon authority of the case of Vistan vs. Archbishop (73 Phil.
20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the
question of administration of the estate, nor to an order denying
probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy
consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an
analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the United
States Supreme Court held:

“Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be
distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the stockholders
of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the
fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of
the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts decreed
to some of the creditors are less than that sum” (Handly, et al. vs.
Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not
enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting,
arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never
been decided that a special proceeding is not a “civil case” (Carpenter
v. Jones 121 Cal. 362; 58 P. 842). On the other hand, it has been held
that the term “civil case” includes special proceedings (Herkimer v.
Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, 81 N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of
the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions
are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent
with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to
special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same
in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran’s Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)

The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the
separate total claims of the parties and not the combined claims
against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are
not applicable to the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the
Rules of the Court is explicit that the amount or value involved or in
controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is
here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the whole
estate, or at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a
pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more
than P200,000 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.

The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by
respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because, unlike the
instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the
estate.

While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the
probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental)
which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over “all cases in which the value in
controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests
and costs”, and that “all cases which may be erroneously brought to the
Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper
court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought
before it”.

On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as
special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need
for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special
co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such
special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not
only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration
of the need for special administrator, another one is appointed aside
from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the
community property devolves, merely to protect the interests of
petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to
probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at
all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407).

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the
amount involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate
steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving
the probate of the will (CA-G.E. No. 27478-R) to comply with the
provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal of May 16, 1961 is
set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the
trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopes a special
co-administrator. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

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^[1] Said petition to certify is still pending resolution by the Court of Appeals.