GEMINIANO L. GONZALES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. SATURNINA GONZALES, SPOUSES HIPOLITO SESE AND JOSEFA SANTIANO, SPOUSES ANANIAS BALILO AND HONORATA SANTIANO, GAUDENCIO SANTIANO A…

Appeal from the order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 3905 of the
Court of first Instance of Tarlac.

On July 28, 1963,
Geminiano L. Gonzales filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac (Civil Case No. 3905)
against Saturnina Gonzales, spouses Hipolito Sese and Josefa Santiano, spouses Ananias Balilo and Honorata Santiano, Gaudencio Santiano and Eladio Santiano, alleging as
follows:

“FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“2. That the plaintiff is the co-owner in fifty-fifty basis with the defendants according
to the decision dated August 27, 1960,
in civil case No. 806, which decision was appealed by the defendants to the
Court of Appeals which, on October 9,
1962, confirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.  xxx.

“3. That the following cadastral lots, on
which the plaintiff was declared co-owner, as per decision above-stated, are
the following:

‘Lot No. 570 of the Cad. Survey of Concepcion, Tarlac, with an area
of 4,886 sq. mts., covered by TCT No. 562.’

‘Northern portion of Lot No. 566 of the Cad.
Survey of Concepcion, Tarlac,
with an area of 2.3957 sq. mts., only, covered by TCT
No. 5159.

‘Lot NO. 572 of the Cad. Survey of Concepcion, Tarlac, with an area
of 4.1919 sq. mts., covered by the same TCT No. 562,
in the proportion one half (1/2) for the defendants as their share.’

“4. That the defendants are now in the possession of 3.5381 hectares
belonging to the plaintiff as per decisions above-mentioned, which could give
him the net conservative produce of twenty (20) cavans of palay every agricultural year,
excluding the expenses far seedling, harrowing, transplanting, harvesting and
tenants’ share, so, from 1952 to 1963, eleven (11) years of defendants’
occupation and possession with the prejudice of the plaintiff (sic), who should
be compensated in the amount of P2,642.00 at the market price of P12.00 per cavan of palay.

“AS HIS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES:

“1. That the plaintiff reproduces herein each and every allegation
of the first cause of action of this complaint.

“2. That the three parcels of land object of the decisions
above-cited, annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’, have the total area of 7.0762 hectares with a
sugar quota of 206 from the Central Azucarera de Tarlac.  The amount
of 103 of that sugar quota corresponds to or pertaining or it is the property
of the plaintiff as he is the declared owner of the half (1/2) of those 7.0762 hectares.  As the de­fendants took possession from 1952
up to 1963, on the land in question, and, they have profited themselves, not
only the whole land of 7.0762 hectares also the sugar quota of 206, with the
prejudice of the plaintiff (sic), for this reason, the defendants should pay P7,931.00 to said plaintiff for the use of one half (103) of
the sugar quota.  The market price of
using a sugar quota is P7.00 per quota for one agricultural year.

“3. That the defendants have refused to pay those amounts
above-mentioned to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the repeated demand made by
him through his undersigned counsel, and until now, the said defendants refuse to
pay those amounts.

“4. That the plaintiff on many occasions, as per the decisions,
annexes ‘A’ & ‘B’, has demanded from the defendants the partition and reconveyance of the half (1/2) of the land in question, the
half (1/2) of its produce and the half (1/2) of the sugar quota, but, the
defendants refused, and for this reasons, the plaintiff suffered the following damages:  (a) the amount of the produce of one half
(1/2) of the land and the half of sugar quota; and (b) moral damages of
P1,000.00; liquidated damages, P1,000.00, and attorney’s fees, P500.00.”

Plaintiff,
therefore, prayed for judgment (1) placing him in possession of one-half of the
land in question and for delivery to him of one-half of the sugar quota of said
land; (2) ordering defendants to pay the sum of P10,572.00, the value of 220 cavans of palay (he was supposed to receive in 11 years), plus
P7,931.00, as payment for the use, for 11 years, of the sugar quota allegedly
pertaining to him; (3) for other equitable reliefs,
and (4) for costs.

Defendants moved for the
dismissal of the case, on the ground that plaintiff’s causes of action were
barred by the prior judgment in
Civil Case No. 806 of the same
court, and by prescription.  Over plaintiff’s opposition, the court
granted said motion of the defendants and dismissed the complaint.  It was ruled that plaintiff’s claim to
possession of one-half of the three parcels of land described in the complaint
and to its fruits from 1952 to 1963, should have been presented in Civil Case
No. 806 where he sued for reconveyance of a half
interest of the identical lots, with damages; and plaintiff’s failure to do so
barred him from bringing another action for the said purpose.  From this order, plaintiff interposed the
present appeal.

Disputing the correctness
of the ruling of the court below, plaintiff-appellant contends that the final
decision in Civil Case No. 806 does not constitute res
judicata to the present action (Civil Case No.
3905), because the former was for reconveyance of
title or for recovery of ownership, whereas the latter case was only for
recovery of possession of the properties and of the fruits that he was not able
to receive.

This contention can not be sustained; it can not be rightly main­tained
that the matter of possession was not
adjudged in the earlier
decision, nor that the demand for possession of the
properties could not have been raised in Civil Case No. 806.  It may be pointed out that while it is true that the decision rendered in said Civil Case No. 806
referred to the action therein as one “for reconveyance
of one-half of Lots Nos. 570, 572 and 566″ and for damages, allegedly
arising from the defendants’ refusal to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiff, it is equally a fact that the dispositive portion of the same decision provided as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision in this case:  (a) declaring the plaintiff and defendants as
co-owners of the following parcels of land:  (1) Lot NO. 570 of the cadastral survey of Concepcion, Tarlac, with an area of 4,886 sq. meters covered by T.C.T.
No. 562; (2) northern portion of Lot No. 566 of the cadastral survey of Concepcion, Tarlac, with an area
of 23,957 sq. meters only, covered by
T.C.T. NO. 5159; and (3) Lot No. 572 of the cadastral survey
of Concepcion, Tarlac, with
an area of 41,919 sq. meters covered by the same T.C.T. No. 562, in the
proportion of 1/2 share for the plaintiff and 1/2 for the defendants in
each of said parcel of land; (b)
ordering the plaintiff and defendants to submit to this Court within 15 days
from receipt of this decision,
an agreement of partition of the parcels of land abovementioned, in the proportions above stated, or, in case
they disagree, to submit to this Court within the period of 10 days from the lapse of the period fixed for the presentation of the agreement, the
names of two disinterested persons to act as Commissioners and to effect said
division in accordance with this judgment, subject to the approval of this
Court, the expenses of division to be borne equally by both parties; (c)
ordering the defendants to execute -within 10 days from the final approval of
the partition – the corresponding deed of reconveyance
of said 1/2 on each of said parcels of land, in favor of the plaintiff, and in
accordance with said partition, otherwise the Clerk of Court would execute said
deed of reconveyance at the cost of the defendants according to Section 10, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court; (d) ordering the defendants to vacate
the specific portion that
may be finally assigned to the
plaintiff in said partition; (e) dismissing the counterclaim; and (f) condemning the defendants
to pay the costs of this suit.”^[1]
(Underlining supplied.)

It appears, therefore,
that not only is there no necessity for the filing of a separate action to
enable plaintiff-appellant to take possession of the portion that will
appertain to him – for this is already provided for in the decision in Civil
Case No. 806 – but also, that the recognition of appellant’s right to
possession would really follow as the logical consequence of the judicial
declaration of his ownership of the properties involved in this
controversy.  As this Court has said in
another case^[2] —

‘”The fact that Civil
Case No. 4275, filed by appellee was for recovery of
possession of the lot, whereas Civil Case No. 7801, brought by
appellants was for reconveyance or recovery of
ownership of the same property, does not remove the present proceeding from the
operation of the principle of bar by former judgment.  As specifically stated in the decision in
Civil Case No. 4275, now final and
executory, the right of therein plaintiff (appellee herein) to possession of the lot was based on a
title issued to the latter in accordance with the Torrens System.  In other words, the recognition of the
incidental right to possession of the property is predicated upon the court’s
recognition of appellee’s right of ownership
thereof.  And, a change in the form
of action or in the relief sought, does not remove a proper case from the application of res
adjudicata. (Clemente vs. H. E.
Heacock Co., L-23212, May 18, 1967; Francisco
vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 43).” Aguila vs. J. M.
TUAson & Co., jam. cit.)

Furthermore, it is
evident from the averments of the complaint quoted earlier in this opinion,
that the basis of appellant’s causes of action in Civil Case No. 3905 is his
ownership of an undetermined one-half portion of the three lots, which
ownership was precisely litigated upon in Civil Case NO. 806. Clearly, the
matter of recovery of the fruits accruing to that portion of the property
claimed by appellant, during the period that he was deprived of the possession
thereof, should have been properly pleaded in that case.  And appellant’s failure to raise that issue
in Civil Case No. 806, thereby resulting in the non-inclusion of any provision
in the decision rendered therein as to the fruits or rentals that appellant was
not able to receive, abates the ventilation of the same matter in this proceeding. 
The rule is well-settled that, as between the parties, a former judgment
would bar the presentation in another action, not only of the matters expressly
adjudged in the first case, but of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case.  (Aguila et al. vs.
J. M. TUason & Co., Inc., supra; Urtula vs. Republic, L-22061, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 S.C.R.A.
477; 1968A PHILD 364.)

The same reasoning applies
to the sugar quota appertaining to the land, since such quota is in law an
improvement attached to the land itself (Act 4166, sec. 9; Suarez vs. Mt. Aravat Sugar Co., Inc. [96 Phil. 707, 714] Resol. of April 11, 1956; Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.
1098).

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Germiniano
Gonzalez vs. Saturnina
Gonzalez et al., CA-G. R. No. 28556-R, Oct. 6, 1962 (Rec. on appeal, p. 21).

^[2]
Aguila et al. vs. J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc., L-24223, Feb. 22, 1968; 22 S.C.R.A. 690, 694;
1968A PHILD 570.