ONG TEK SIN, ONG TING SING TAN, AND ROSITA ONG [DE LEON], PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 16 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL…

Ong Tek Sin versus Aguirre Paderanga

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Ong Tek Sin, Ong Ting Sing Tan, and Rosita Ong against Judge Sylva G. Aguirre Paderanga, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to nullify two orders of the trial court: one dismissing their notice of appeal, and one denying their motion for reconsideration of that dismissal. The case matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the narrow ground on which a trial court may dismiss an appeal taken from its own decision. Second, it applies the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code against a lawyer acquiring property that is the object of litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession.

Procedural History

The case began in the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Don Filemon Sotto, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The estate filed an ex parte motion to approve a deed of conveyance transferring a portion of a lot to its counsel, and the trial court granted the motion in an order dated January 7, 2009. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion on February 25, 2009. The petitioners then filed a notice of appeal with a record on appeal. The estate moved to dismiss the appeal. On July 14, 2010, the trial court issued the first assailed order, dismissing the notice of appeal on grounds of litis pendencia and forum shopping. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and on November 18, 2010, the trial court issued the second assailed order, denying the motion. The petitioners then went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Facts

One of the properties in the estate proceedings was a lot in Cebu City containing six thousand one hundred sixty four square meters, more or less. The estate entered into a legal retainership agreement with Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay in 1998, and the trial court approved the agreement in an order dated December 22, 2003. On October 14, 2008, the estate and Atty. Mahinay executed a deed of conveyance transferring a portion of the lot, containing two thousand one hundred fifty seven square meters, more or less, to the lawyer as a reward for his successful efforts in defending and preserving the estate's ownership over the lot. The lot had already been subdivided into two portions, one of which was the portion conveyed.

On October 17, 2008, the estate filed a verified ex parte motion to approve the deed of conveyance. The trial court required the estate to submit a copy of the final decision on the ownership of the lot, and the estate complied. On January 7, 2009, the trial court granted the motion and approved the deed of conveyance. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, claiming that the estate filed its motion ex parte even though it knew of their interest, since they had a pending civil case for specific performance and damages against the heirs of Don Filemon Sotto. The trial court denied the motion, saying the petitioners did not yet have a clear right over the ownership of the lot, and that the deed of conveyance affected only the portion not allotted to them.

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal with a record on appeal, which the estate opposed. The trial court dismissed the appeal, holding that the petitioners were not parties in interest, that the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari and not an appeal, and that the appeal violated the rules against forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, the petitioners' civil case for specific performance was dismissed by the trial court, and their appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for having been filed out of time and for procedural flaws. Their petition for review to the Supreme Court was denied, and the denial became final and executory.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners' notice of appeal on grounds other than that the appeal was taken out of time.
• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in approving the deed of conveyance in favor of the estate's counsel, in light of the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
• Whether or not the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the final dismissal of the petitioners' civil case for specific performance.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.

This provision limits the trial court's power to dismiss an appeal to the single ground that the appeal was taken out of time.

Article 1491 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: x x x (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

This provision bars a lawyer from acquiring property that is the object of litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court exceeded its authority. Under Section 13 of Rule 41, the only ground for dismissing an appeal from the Regional Trial Court is the failure of the appellant to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period provided by the rules. The trial court has no power to disallow an appeal on any other ground, such as that it is frivolous or that the case has become moot. The authority to do so belongs only to the appellate court. Otherwise, trial courts could forestall the review or reversal of their decisions, no matter how erroneous. Since the trial court dismissed the appeal on grounds of lack of interest, wrong remedy, forum shopping, litis pendencia, and frivolity, it gravely abused its discretion.

On the second issue, the Court held that the deed of conveyance violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code. The civil case for specific performance was filed on January 4, 1999. The deed of conveyance was executed on October 14, 2008, while the appeal in that case was still pending. The lot was therefore still under litigation when the trial court approved the deed. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in approving it.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petition must nonetheless be dismissed for being moot and academic. The petitioners' civil case had been dismissed, their appeal had been dismissed, and their petition for review had been denied with finality. The petitioners no longer had any claim over the subject lot. Even if the Court were to nullify the assailed orders, it would still have to deny any appeal filed by the petitioners, because they no longer had any interest over the lot. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. The Court reiterated that courts will not consider questions in which no actual interest is involved, and that where an issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy.

Doctrine

A trial court may dismiss an appeal from its decision only on the ground that the appeal was taken out of time, as provided in Section 13 of Rule 41. It has no authority to dismiss an appeal on any other ground, such as frivolity, mootness, forum shopping, or litis pendencia; that authority belongs to the appellate court.

Under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, a lawyer cannot acquire, even through the mediation of another, property that is the object of litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession. The prohibition applies when the property is still under litigation at the time of the acquisition.

A case is moot and academic when there is no longer any justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Courts will not consider questions in which no actual substantial interest is involved.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was dismissed for being moot and academic.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a trial court may dismiss an appeal only for having been taken out of time, and that a lawyer may not acquire property that is the object of litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession. Examiners like to use this case on the limited power of the trial court to dismiss appeals under Rule 41, and on the application of Article 1491 of the Civil Code to lawyers.