JOSE W. DIOKNO, BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., AND LORENZO M. TAÑADA, PETITIONERS, VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND RAFAEL G. ZAGALA, IN HIS…

Diokno versus Enrile

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus brought by Jose W. Diokno, Benigno S. Aquino, Junior, and Lorenzo M. Tañada against Juan Ponce Enrile, in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, and Brigadier General Rafael G. Zagala, then the commanding officer at Fort Bonifacio. The petitioners asked the Court to compel the respondents to allow Attorney Tañada to visit and confer privately with his clients, Diokno and Aquino, who were then under detention. The case matters because it squarely raised the constitutional right to counsel of persons in preventive detention, and the confidentiality that must surround a lawyer's consultation with a client, even in times of emergency.

Procedural History

The petitioners went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for mandamus, an original action, since the relief sought was the performance of a duty allegedly owed to them by the respondents. The respondents filed an answer reiterating the stand of the Secretary of National Defense and annexing a copy of General Order Number 16, together with the implementing rules limiting visits to detainees to the immediate members of their families. The case was then heard, and with the submission of memoranda, it was submitted for decision.

Facts

Petitioners Diokno and Aquino were both under detention. Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, a highly respected member of the Philippine Bar and a former Senator, acted as their counsel. He sought to visit and confer with his clients, but his efforts failed despite requests made to respondent Brigadier General Zagala, who had custody of Diokno and Aquino.

Following the suggestion of respondent Zagala, Attorney Tañada wrote a letter to respondent Secretary Enrile, reiterating the previous requests and asking for a final word. He also asked that, should the visit be allowed, he be permitted to confer with his clients in private, without the presence of any officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or any third person, and without any listening devices or similar instruments. He explained that the presence of such persons would nullify the confidential nature of consultations between lawyer and client, as it would prevent them from fully communicating with each other.

The request was denied. The reason given was that it was the considered view of the Office and of the Armed Forces authorities that it would be to the best interests of everyone concerned if contacts such as the one requested were minimized pending final disposition of the cases. In their answer, the respondents invoked General Order Number 16, which authorized the Secretary of National Defense to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of detainees, and the implementing rule limiting visits of detainees to the immediate members of their families, with visits by others requiring the approval of the Secretary. The denial, they submitted, was in accord with that order and rule.

Issues

• Whether or not the denial of the request of counsel to visit and confer privately with his detained clients violated the constitutional right to counsel, as reinforced by statute.
• Whether or not the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of National Defense limiting visits to detainees to the immediate members of their families are valid, as reasonable and not arbitrary, and do not render nugatory the right to counsel.
• Whether or not the petition for mandamus should be resolved on the constitutional question raised, in light of the subsequent release of the detained petitioners.

Applicable Provisions

Article Four, Section Nineteen of the Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

This is the constitutional right to counsel on which the petition is primarily based.

Section 1 of Republic Act Number 857 provides:

Any public officer or employee who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent an attorney entitled to practice in the courts of the Philippines from visiting and conferring privately with a person arrested, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, said visit and conferences being requested by the person arrested or by another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

This statute reinforces the constitutional right and penalizes its obstruction, including the prevention of private consultation between lawyer and client.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court was clearly of one mind that the right to counsel is never more important than during emergency periods, whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended or martial law is declared. The Court stressed that it is of the essence to avoid possible injustice, and that the power of preventive detention being recognized, the opportunity for a detained person to consult counsel must be left unimpeded so that he may be informed of his legal rights under the circumstances.

On the second issue, the Court equally recognized that rules and regulations, if reasonable in character and not arbitrary, may be issued by the Secretary, acting for the President, as long as they do not render nugatory the right to counsel. Necessarily implicit in that right is the need for confidentiality and secrecy.

On the third issue, the Court noted that petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released on September 11, 1974, and petitioner Benigno S. Aquino, Junior, was released from custody on May 8, 1980, to enable him to proceed to the Baylor Medical Center in Dallas, Texas, for medical treatment. His continued stay abroad resulted in a petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf by his mother being dismissed for being moot and academic. With these developments, the Court found it quite apparent why there was no need to rule on the constitutional question raised.

Doctrine

The right to counsel is never more important than during emergency periods, whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended or martial law is declared. The opportunity for a detained person to consult counsel must be left unimpeded so that he may be informed of his legal rights, and necessarily implicit in the right to counsel is the need for confidentiality and secrecy in the consultation.

Rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of National Defense, acting for the President, may be valid if reasonable in character and not arbitrary, provided they do not render nugatory the right to counsel.

When the detained petitioners have been released and the relief sought has become moot and academic, the Court will dismiss the petition without ruling on the constitutional question raised.

Disposition

The petition for mandamus was dismissed for being moot and academic, without a ruling on the constitutional question.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the right to counsel is never more important than during emergency periods, and confidentiality is implicit in it. Examiners like to use this case to test the interplay between the State's power of preventive detention and the detainee's right to counsel, and the rule that a petition becomes moot upon the release of the detainee.