IN RE:  PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION LEON TE POOT ALSO KNOWN AS TE BON BENG, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

Appeal by the Republic from the judgment of the Court of First
instance of Davao
granting the petition of Leon Te Poot, a Chinese, for
naturalization as a ci­tizen of the Philippines.

Our study of the record in the light of the errors assigned in appellants brief shows that the contentions of appellant are
tenable in view of the following considerations:

1. The lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in
view of petitioner-appellee’s failure to file a
declaration of intention.  Petitioner-appellee did not file a declaration of intention, and con­tended
that he was exempt therefrom on the grounds that he
was born in the Philippines
and that he completed his primary and secondary education in schools recog­nized
by the Philippine government.  At the
trial petitioner-appellee presented a certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso
(formerly Siga­boy), Davao,
stating that the record of births, covering June 28, 1933, the alleged date of
birth of Leon Te Poot, had been lost before the
war.  In lieu of birth certificate,
petitioner-appellee presented his Alien Certificate
of Registration and his Certificate of Re­sidence, both of which show that he
was born on June 28, 1933,
in Sigaboy, Davao.  These documents are, however, hearsay evidence;
hence, not satisfactory to prove the fact of petitioner-appellee’s
birth in the Philippines.  (Alfonso Po Chu King vs. Republic, L-20810, May 16, 1967; De
Lara vs. Republic, L-18203-04, May 29, 1964.) The evi­dence
presented by one claiming exemption from the filing of a declaration of
intention must be clear and convincing.  (Ong Apacible vs.
Republic, L-16987, June 21, 1966.) It is easy to understand why
petitioner-appellee’s parents, or either of them,
were not presented as witnesses, for they could have been cross-examined on
this important point by the counsel for the Republic.

To prove compliance with the educational require­ments,
petitioner-appellee presented his high school diploma
from the Mindanao Colleges.  He also
presented a certificate from the Principal of the Davao Chinese
High School to the effect that he
studied in that school from Grade One to the First Year of high school; that
said school was recognized by the Philippine government; and that Philippine
civics, history and government were taught therein.  This certificate is hearsay evidence,
considering that the Principal who made it was never pre­sented as a witness in
court, thus depriving the State of the opportunity to cross-examine him.  (Uy Boco vs. Repub­lic, 85 Phil., 320.) While it is true
that Miguel de Cas­tro, one of petitioner-appellee’s
character witnesses, dec­lared in court that his son, a Filipino, had been a
class­mate of petitioner-appellee in the Davao Chinese High School, and that there were some
Filipinos enrolled therein, it does not appear that the said school was
“regularly attended by a sizable number of Filipino students from whom
applicant could have imbibed Filipino customs and traditions.” (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, L-20151, March 31, 1965.)

Petitioner-appellee having failed to
file a declara­tion of intention although he was not exempt therefrom,
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his petition.  (Yap vs. Republic, L-12939,
July 31, 1951.)

2. Petitioner-appellee has not conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner. 
He admitted using two names:  Leon
Te Poot and Te Bon Beng.  In his Alien Certificate of Registration and
in his Certificate of Residence issued by the Bureau of Immigration,
petitioner-appellee’s name is “Leon Te Poot“; and it is not shown therein-that he is also
known by another name.  His Certificate
of Nationality and his income tax returns for 1960 and 1961 are also in the
name of “Leon Te Poot” only; they do not
show any other name by which he is known. 
In all his school records petitioner-appellee’s
name is “Te Bon Beng“; and it does not
appear therein that he was known also by another name while he was a
student.  Petitioner appellee
contends that his alias “Te Bon Beng” was
given to him by his parents when he was a child, hence, his use also of said
name was justified, citing People vs. Uy Jui Pio (55 Off, Gaz., No. 40, p. 8463). 
In Kock Tee Yap vs. Republic, L-20992,
May 14, 1966, where, as in the present case, the applicant used different names
on different oc­casions without mentioning the other names by which he was also
known, and where he claimed that one of his names was given to him by his
parents when he was a child, this Court held that the ruling in the Uy Jui Pio case was not applic­able, because there, the
petitioner always used the name by which he was generally known along with his
real name,” namely, “Uy Jui
Pio, alias Juanito Uy.”

By using different names on different occasions with­out judicial
authority, thus violating the Anti-Alias Law (Comm. Act No. 142), petitioner-appellee has failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner.  (Kock Tee Yap vs. Republic, supra.)

3. Petitioner-appellee cannot be deemed
to have a lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation for purposes of naturalization.  According to petitioner-appellee,
he started working for his father in January, 1960, receiv­ing a monthly salary
of P200, which was increased to P250 in January, 1961, and to P300 in March of
the same year.  He claimed that aside
from the salary, his father furnished him free board and lodging.  The alleged salary of peti­tioner-appellee was not supported by any payroll, time re­cord or
book of account.  The absence of these or
similar documents (Yap vs. Republic, L-19832, August 23, 1966), considered
with the circumstance that petitioner-appellee’s
alleged employer was his own father, makes the claim of employment
suspicious.  (Chug Siong Hua vs. Republic,
L-21400, May 31, 1966; Ngo vs. Republic, L-25805, February 27, 1969).

Moreover, an applicant’s qualifications for naturali­zation must
be determined as of the date of the filing of the application (0 Ku Phuan vs. Republic, L-23406, August 31, 1967), and increases in earnings after
such filing cannot be taken into consideration. 
(Tan vs. Republic, L-22077, February 18, 1967) Considering,
therefore, Leon Te Poot filed his petition on
February 2, 1961 the privileges of free board and lodging, his alleged in­come
of P250 per month cannot be considered lucrative even though he is single, (Sia Paw vs. Republic, L-24782, No­vember 17, 1967; Sy vs. Republic, L-19581, April 29,1966; Uy vs. Republic, L-20208, June 30, 1965.)

4.  Petitioner-appellee’s character witnesses are not competent to vouch
for his good character and behaviour.  This point was not raised by the Solicitor
General; how­ever, it may be considered in this appeal.  (Dy
vs. Republic, L-20348, December 24, 1965.) According to
petitioner-appellee, he was born in Sigaboy, Davao,
on June 28, 1933.  One of his character witnesses, Bansalan Mayor Ramon de los Cientos, testified that he had known peti­tioner-appellee slime 1954. 
The rule is that where the applicant for naturalization was born in the
Philippines, his character witnesses must be competent to vouch for his
character and behavior from the time the applicant was born up to the date of
the filing of his application.  (Wong Chui vs. Republic, L-23855, April 24, 1967; King vs.
Republic, L-19082, September 29, 1966; Ng vs. Republic, L-21179, January
22, 1966.) It appearing Mat witness De los Cientos came to know petitioner-appellee
only when the latter was 21 years old, and in the case of witness De Castro,
only when petitioner-appellee was 19 years old; that,
moreover, during the period 1954-1958, witness De los
Cientos‘ knowledge of petitioner-appellee
was admittedly limited to the few times that he went to Davao
City to visit his family and to the few times that peti­tioner-appellee went to his house; and that witness De Castro was
necessarily incompetent to declare, as he did declare, that “petitioner
conducted himself In a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines, “it is clear that both
witnesses were not competent to testify on petitioner-appellees
good moral character and behavior during his entire period of residence in the
Philippines.  (Yap vs.
Republic, L-19832, August 23, 1966.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is
reversed and the instant petition for naturalization is denied.   Cost against petitioners-appellle.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.