VALERIO P. TRIA, IN SUBSTITUTION OF MARIANO B. DELGADO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. WENCESLAO A. LIRAG, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur denying
a motion to set aside an alias writ of execution.

On June 19, 1946, Mariano B. Delgado, acting through his wife, and defendant
Wenceslao A. Lirag executed a deed whereby Delgado sold to Lirag a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for a specified
price, payable in the manner therein stipulated. Alleging that Lirag had
violated the terms of the agreement, on July 12, 1954, Delgado instituted this
action, in said court, for the recovery of P8,000, plus attorney’s fees and
costs.

After the filing of Lirag’s answer, or on December 20, 1954, the parties
submitted to the court the following compromise agreement:

“COME NOW the plaintiff and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
assisted by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
submit the following agreement:

1. That the parties hereby agree to rescind the deed of sale marked Annex ‘A’
   to the complaint, dated June 19, 1946, subject to the conditions stated
   below;
2. That the plaintiff will pay to the defendant the sum of P13,500.00 on or
   before December 31, 1955, in full payment and satisfaction of all sums of
   money received by the plaintiff from the defendant as well as expenses incurred
   by the latter. Upon full payment of this amount, the defendant will deliver
   to the plaintiff the land which is the subject-matter of the said deed of sale
   of June 19, 1946;
3. That the parties mutually relinquish their claims for damages and attorney’s
   fees against one another;
4. That the plaintiff may sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the land
   subject-matter of the sale dated June 19, 1946, or any part thereof in
   order to raise such sum as may be necessary to pay the aforementioned amount of
   P13,500.00 to the defendant, provided however, that no sale, mortgage or
   disposition made by the nlaintifF shall be valid unless made with the consent of
   the defendant; and that in case of disagreement the matter shall be settled
   by the Court.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully request that the foregoing agreement
be approved and judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, without
pronouncement as to costs.” (Italics supplied.)

On December 23, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered a
decision transcribing and incorporating as part thereof said compromise
agreement, the dispositive part of which decision reads:

“In view thereof, the foregoing agreement is approved and judgment is
rendered in conformity therewith, without pronouncement as to
costs.”

On May 2, 1955, Delgado conveyed all his rights in and ,to the aforementioned
property to one Valeric P. Tria, who, with Lirag’s conformity, subsequently,
substituted Delgado as plaintiff in this case. On February 29, 1956, Lirag filed
a “motion for execution”, upon the ground that Tria had not paid the sum of
P13,500.00 on or before December 31, 1955, in violation of the compromise
agreement and the decision. Over Tria’s objection, the motion was granted by an
order dated June 5, 1956. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued oh October 25, 1956. For reasons not
stated in the record, said writ was not enforced. Hence, on motion of Lirag, an
alias writ of execution was issued on January 29, 1958. Soon thereafter, or on
February 18, 1958, Tria tiled a “motion to lift alias writ of execution”, which
was denied by an order dated March 1, 1958. Hence, this appeal by Tria.

Tria maintains that his failure to pay the sum of P13,500.00—which, according
to the compromise agreement, incorporated into the decision was due on or before
December 31, 1955—was imputable to Lirag, because the latter had, in violation
of said agreement, refused to lend him (Tria) the original certificate of title
to the property in question, as well as to sign papers and pleadings necessary
to enable him (Tria) to raise funds which to pay said amount. This pretense was
rejected by the lower court in the following language:

“The motion is opposed on the ground that the movant, Wenceslao A. Lirag,
violated the decision by refusing to lend to Valerio P. Tria Original
Certificate of Title No. 181 and other papers necessary to enable him to
contract a loan. The falsity of his excuse is patent. Under the terras of the
decision, should any controversy arise between the parties over the stipulation
allowing Delgado, Tria’s predecessor in interest, to mortgage the land in
question, it should be submitted to this Court for decision. Tria failed to call
the attention of this Court to the alleged refusal of Delgado so that the
controversy could be resolved conformably to the decision. Again, on January 14,
1956, Counsel for Tria, Atty. Ruperto, sent Atty. Luntok, Lirag’s counsel, a
letter in answer to the latter’s demand that Tria pay the amount of the judgment
within 15 days. In that letter, Atty. Ruperto made no mention whatsoever of
Lirag’s alleged refusal to lend the title and other papers necessary to enable
Tria to secure a loan. On the contrary, he requested that Tria be given an
additional period within which to pay.”

We are fully in agreement with this view, which is borne out by the record.
Eesides, notice of Lirag’s motion for execution of the decision was duly served
upon Tria, who filed a written opposition thereto. Yet, when the lower court
issued its order of June 5, 1956, overruling this opposition and granting said
motion, Tria did not appeal from said order and thus allowed it to become final
and executory. He did not question its propriety until after the issuance of an
alias writ of execution on January 29, 1958, or more than a year and a half
later. It is now too late, therefore, to invoke the alleged breach of the
compromise agreement by Lirag as a ground to bar the execution of the decision
in this case. He could have, and should have, taken it up on appeal from the
order of June 5, 1956.

Tria insists that the compromise agreement was merely a contract, which may
be enforced by ordinary action for 6pecific performance, not by writ of
execution. Said compromise agreement is, however, more than a contract. It had
been submitted to the court for approval with the request that judgment be
rendered in accordance therewith, and was accordingly approved by the court and
incorporated into its decision, which was “rendered in conformity therewith”. In
other words, it was part and parcel of the judgment and may, therefore, be
enforced, as such, by writ of execution. (Art. 2037, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant, Valerio P. Tria. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and
Dizon, JJ., concur.