VICENTE BARENG, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PATROCINIO ALEGRIA AND AGUSTIN RUIZ, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from that portion of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.—G.R. No. 12496-R sentencing petitioner Vicente
Bareng to pay respondent Patrocinio Alegria, in addition to the amount
of P3,600 representing his indebtedness to the latter, “sus intereses
legales desde la presentacion de esta demanda”.

The facts, insofar as material to this appeal, may be summarized as follows:

On November 29, 1951, petitioner Bareng purchased from respondent
Alegria the cinematographic equipment installed at the Pioneer (now
Rosamil) Theater in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, for the sum of P15,000,
P10,000 of which was paid, and for the balance, Bareng signed four
promissory notes falling due on the following dates: P1,000 on December
15, 1951; P1,500 on February 15, 1952; P1,500 on March 15, 1952; and
P1,000 on April, 1952.

The first promissory note was duly paid by petitioner. On February
12, 1952, shortly before the second note fell due, the other respondent
Agustin Ruiz informed petitioner that he was a co-owner of the
equipment in question, and several days thereafter, Ruiz sent
petitioner a telegram instructing him to suspend payments to Alegria of
the balance of the price as he was not agreeable to the sale. On the
same day, Alegria sought to collect upon the second note, but
petitioner refused to pay on account of Ruiz’s claims. Only P400 was
paid on the second note and thereafter, petitioner refused to make any
more payments to Alegria until the latter had settled his dispute with
Ruiz.

On March 31, 1952, Ruiz filed suit against Alegria and petitioner
Bareng (Civil Case No. 1527) for his share in the price of the cinema,
equipment in question. On May 21, 1952, Alegria and Ruiz reached a
compromise in the case, wherein the former recognized the latter as
co-owner of the equipment sold to petitioner, and promised to pay him
2/3 of whatever amount he could recover from the latter. Whereupon, on
May 28, 1952, Alegria sued Bareng for the amount of P13,500 allegedly
representing the unpaid balance of the price of said equipment. Bareng
answered the complaint, alleging that only P3,600 had not been paid on
the price of the equipment in question, prayed for the rescission of
the sale for supposed violation by Alegria of certain express
warranties as to the quality of the equipment, and asked for payment of
damages for alleged violation of Alegria’s warranty of title. After a
joint trial of the two cases, the lower court rendered judgment
declaring Alegria and Ruiz co-owners of the cinema equipment in
question in Civil Case No. 1527; and dismissing Civil Case No. 1554,
without prejudice to the co-owners’ filing another action against
petitioner Bareng for the. balance of the price of said equipment. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals by both parties, the decision of the
court a quo was reversed and instead, Bareng was ordered in
Civil Case No. 1554 to pay Alegria the sum of P3,600 plus legal
interest from the filing of the complaint; and in Civil Case No. 1527,
Alegria was ordered to pay Ruiz 2/3 of the total amount he would
recover from Bareng in Civil Case No. 1554. Not agreeable to that part
of the decision making him liable for legal interests on the principal
amount due to Alegria, Bareng, as already stated, appealed to this
Court.

Petitioner Bareng claims he ia not liable to pay interests to
Alegria because he was justified in suspending payment of the balance
of the price of the equipment in question from the time he learned of
Ruiz’ adverse claims over said equipment. In fact, Bareng adds, even
the Court of Appeals found that “bajo dichas circunstancias, la actitud
del demandado Vicente Bareng de suspender el pago de aquel saldo de
P3,600.00 estuvo justificado”.

The right of a vendee to suspend payment of the price of the thing
sold in the face of any danger that he might be disturbed in its
possession of ownership is conferred by Article 1590, New Civil Code,
to wit:

“Art. 1590. Should the vendee be disturbed in the
possession or ownership of the thing acquired, or should he have
reasonable grounds to fear such disturbance, by a vindicatory action or
a foreclosure of mortgage, he may suspend the payment of the price
until the vendor has caused the disturbance or danger to cease, unless
the latter gives security for the return of the price in a proper case,
or it has been stipulated that, notwithstanding any such contingency,
the vendee shall be bound to make the payment. A mere, act of trespass
shall not authorize the suspension of the payment of the price.”

There is no question that, as found by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner Bareng had the right to suspend payment of the balance of
the price of the cinema equipment in question to his vendor, respondent
Alegria, from the time he was informed by Ruiz of the latter’s claims
of co-ownership thereof, especially upon his receipt of Ruiz’ telegram
wherein the latter asserted that he was not agreeable to the sale.
Nevertheless, said right of Bareng ended as soon as “the vendor has
caused the disturbance or danger to cease”. In this case, respondent
Alegria had caused the disturbance or danger to petitioner’s ownership
or possession to cease when he (Alegria) reached a compromise with Ruiz
in Civil Case No. 1527 whereby Ruiz expressed his conformity to, the
sale to Bareng, subject to the payment of his share in the price by
Alegria. Petitioner Bareng cannot claim that he was not aware of this
compromise agreement between the two owners, because he was a
party-defendant in Civil Case No. 1527. From the time Alegria and Ruiz
reached this settlement, there was no longer any danger of threat to
Bareng’s ownership and full enjoyment of the equipment he bought from
Alegria. And it was by virtue of this settlement that Alegria, two
daysv later, sued petitioner for the unpaid balance of the price of
said equipment. In his answer to Alegria’s complaint, petitioner
admitted his indebtedness to Alegria in the amount of P3,600, yet he
did not tender payment of said amount nor did he deposit the same in
court, but instead sought to have the sale rescinded upon claims of
violations of warranties by Alegria, fiat the Court of Appeals found
not to have been proved or established. It is clear, therefore, that
petitioner Bareng was in default on the unpaid balance of the price of
the equipment in qrestion from the date of the filing of the complaint
by Alegria, and under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, he must pay legal
interests thereon from said date.

Petitioner also argues that his indebtedness to respondent Alegria
was unliquidated until its amount was determined by the Court of
Appeals at P3,600.00, and that consequently, he cannot be made
answerable for interests on the amount due before judgment in the Court
of Appeals. The argument is completely untenable. The price of the
equipment in question under petitioner and Alegria’s contract of sale
was determined and known, hence, liquidated; and the obligation to pay
any unpaid balance thereof did not cease to be liquidated and
determined simply because vendor and vendee, in the suit for
collection, disagreed as to its amount. If petitioner had wanted to
free himself from any responsibility for interests on the amount he had
always acknowledged he still owed his vendor, he should have deposited
the same in Court at the very start of the action.

As for the other errors raised by petitioner in his brief, we need
not consider them because they were not raised in the petition for
review and are, therefore, considered waived.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is, affirmed in toto, with costs against petitioner Vicente Bareng.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.