TODAY’S KNITTING FREE WORKERS UNION, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR CARMELO C. NORIEL OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, TODAY’S KNITTING COMPANY, INC., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL UNION COUNC…

What is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition
petition is an order of respondent Director Carmelo
C. Noriel requiring the holding of a certification
election to determine who shall be the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in respondent’s Today’s Knitting
Company, Inc.  There was the imputation
of arbitrariness in its issuance, raising a procedural due process question. 
Petitioner Union premised its claim on the contention that it has been the duly recognized bargaining
agent with an existing collective bargaining contract.  Respondents^[1] were required to comment.  On January
27, 1977, respondent
Director did so in a pleading filed by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S.
Puno.  Such
comment as well as that submitted by respondent Philippine National Union
Council were considered as answers, and the petition was deemed submitted for
decision.  It is quite evident even from
a cursory perusal of the responsive pleadings filed by the respondents that the
challenged order is precisely in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines and is thus free from any infirmity.  Much less could the allegation of
arbitrariness be taken seriously.  There
was in addition the minor point raised that a memorandum circular of the
Department of Labor was not observed by respondent Director.  Outside of the well-settled principle that in
certiorari proceedings, only a grave abuse of discretion would call for
a reversal of the actuation complained of, a mere error of law not sufficing,
it has likewise been pointed out in the comment of the Solicitor General that
such memorandum circular, even on the assumption that there was no compliance
with it, was issued on September 5, 1974 prior to the effectivity
of the present Labor Code^[2] which came into force on November 1 of that
year.  Clearly, the petition lacks merit.

It could be that in its
attempt to impart some measure of plausibility, petitioner Union was far from precise in its allegation of
facts.  Such a deficiency was remedied in
the comment filed on behalf of respondent Director.  The matter in controversy started with the
Philippine National Union Council, on April 1, 1976, filing with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for the holding of a certification election.  It set forth therein that its ranks comprise
a majority of membership at the Today’s Knitting Company, Inc.  It was also stated that at the hearing of
such petition, the signatures of its members authorizing the filing of the
petition would be submitted.  There was,
on May 4, 1976,
a petition for intervention on behalf of petitioner Today’s Knitting Free
Workers Union.  It saw no need for a
certification election, asserting that it had already been voluntarily
recognized by the management as the bargaining representative.  The Bureau of Labor Relations received on the
same day ten one-page resolutions by the rank-and­-file employees of respondent
Today’s Knitting Company, Inc. authorizing the filing of the petition for
certification election with a total of two hundred (200) signatures.  Respondent Company apparently looked with
favor on the claim of petitioner as shown by a pleading dated June 21,
1976.  It affirmed the assertion that intervenor union, now petitioner, had been recognized by
management as representing the majority of the workers.  Respondent Union countered with the allegation in a pleading
dated June 29, 1976
that there was no legal bar to the petition for certification.  On July 19, 1976, the Med-Arbiter Eusebio
M. Jimenez issued an order granting the petition for certification
election.  The matter was then appealed
to the Bureau of Labor Relations.  On September
9, 1976, respondent
Director issued the challenged order denying the appeal.  It ordered a certification election to be
conducted by the Bureau within twenty days from receipt of the resolution.  Hence this certiorari and prohibition
petition with this Court.^[3]

As set forth at the
outset, the petition cannot prosper.

1. To sustain what on its face appears to be an insubstantial claim
of failure to abide by statutory command as set forth in the Labor Code,
petitioner would interpret its Article 257 of requiring that it be afforded the
right to examine the alleged signatures of the employees comprising at least
the 30% of the bargaining unit desirous of holding a certification
election.  That is a rather strained
construction.  The statutory provision
reads: “Requisites for certification election.  — Any petition for certification election
filed by any legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written
consent of at least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.  Upon receipt and verification of such
petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit.”^[4]
It speaks clearly and categorically.  There is no element of ambiguity.  What is required is that the petition for
certification election should have in its favor “the written consent of at
least 30% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.” The duty then cast
on the Director of Labor Relations is to ascertain whether there has been such a compliance.  There is no doubt in this case there was
evidence that more than a total of two-hundred signatures were obtained by
respondent Union in seeking such a
certification election.  The respondent Director having satisfied
himself that the codal requisite had been met, he had
no choice but to order such certification. 
In the language of the above provision, “it shall be mandatory for
the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining
the representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and
certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all
the employees in the unit.” There is, therefore, no basis for the contention
that a duty is cast on respondent Director to allow a rival labor organization,
such as petitioner, to verify the authenticity of such signatures.  At any rate, if there is any doubt as to the
required number having been met, what better way is there than the holding of a
certification election to ascertain which union really commands the allegiance
of the rank-and-file employees.

2. The comment of the Solicitor General likewise included this
excerpt from this Court’s recent decision in Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations:^[5]
“Petitioner’s contention to the effect that the 30% requirement should be
satisfied suffers from an ever graver flaw. 
It fails to distinguish between the right of a labor organization to be
able to persuade 30% of the labor force
to petition for a certification election, in which case respondent Bureau with
no choice but to order it, and the power of such governmental agency precisely
entrusted with the implementation of the collective bargaining process to
determine, considering the likelihood that there may be several unions within a
bargaining unit to order such an election precisely for the purpose of
ascertaining which of them shall  be the
exclusive bargaining representative.  The
decision of respondent Bureau of April 14, 1975 was intended for that purpose.  That was why not only petitioner but also the
Philippine Federation of Labor, the National Labor Union, the National
Federation of Labor Unions and the Samahan ng mga Manggagawa
at Kawani sa AG&P were
included in the list of labor unions that could be voted on.  To reiterate a thought already expressed,
what could be more appropriate than such a procedure if the goal desired is to
enable labor to determine which of the competing organizations should represent
if for the purpose of a collective bargaining contract?  How then can it be seriously asserted that
the decision now appealed could be stigmatized as contrary to law?”^[6]

3. Such a holding reinforces the correctness of a decision arrived
at by respondent Director and negates even more conclusively the imputation of
arbitrariness.  It is not amiss to state
that petitioner has the same office address as Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions in Tondo, Manila.  So with its counsel, Attorney Julius A. Magno.  While it is a
different member of the bar who appeared for such labor organization in the
case abovecited, it thus appears that a more diligent
study of pertinent decisions could have avoided the filing of this suit and
thus hasten the effective and speedy implementation of the statutory scheme to
have a certification election conducted precisely for the purpose of living
true to the concept of industrial democracy. 
For the present, it suffices to call the attention of counsel to the
desirability of being acquainted with applicable decisions, especially one that
strikes so close to home, even if, or perhaps more precisely when, the ruling
is adverse to one’s claim.  That is to
live true to his duty as an officer of the court on whose trustworthiness
reliance may be placed.

4. Not much attention need be paid, as pointed out in the comment
of the Solicitor General, to the allegation in the petition that a memorandum
circular of the Secretary of Labor dated September
5, 1974 was disregarded by respondent Director.  It is true there was therein stated that
where there is a bona fide union comprising the majority voluntarily recognized
and in the process of negotiating a
contract, an application for a certification election should not be entertained.  In the first place, a memorandum circular
certainly cannot prevail as against the very language of the statute.  That is merely to state the obvious.  In the second place, as pointed out by the
Solicitor-General, from and after November 1, 1974 when the present Labor Code
became effective, previous circulars of the Secretary of Labor to take care of
the transitional stage prior to its coming into force, certainly were deemed
superseded.  From any standpoint then, it
cannot be gainsaid that the petition certainly lacks juridical basis.  This Court is not called upon then to
exercise its power to grant certiorari and prohibition to correct a
grave abuse of discretion.  No abuse has
been shown, much less one amounting to arbitrariness of sufficient gravity to
call for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. 
This decision is immediately executory.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
The third respondent named in the petition is the Philippine National Union
Council.

^[2]
Republic Act No. 442 (1974).

^[3]
Comment, 1-4.

^[4]
Article 257 of the New Labor Code.

^[5]
L-42115, January 29, 1976,
69 SCRA 132.

^[6]
Ibid, 161; Comment of Solicitor General, 6-7.