G.R. No. L-7785. November 25, 1955
CHANG YUNG FA, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HONORABLE ROBERTO A. GIANZON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND HONORABLE VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, AS COMMISSI…
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Instance of Manila wherein petitioners prayed that the court declare if the
Commissioner of Immigration has a right to limit their period of stay in the
Philippines as immigrants and if Opinion No. 314, series of 1952, of the
Secretary of Justice on the same subject matter is valid and constitutional.
The Government in its answer set up as special defense that petitioners were
admitted to the Philippines under Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 with
the express condition that their stay shall be not more than two years; that
this condition is not violative of the law merely because under section 13
(a) of said Act they could have come under the category of non-quota
immigrants who may be admitted for permanent residence in the Philippines; and
that by having consented to their admission to this country with such limitation
petitioners are now estopped from claiming that they are entitled to stay
permanently.
After due trial, and after counsel had submitted memoranda in support of
their respective contentions, the court in an order entered on March 4, 1954
found “that the herein petitioners have no right to stay any longer in the
Philippines and they should be deported, in accordance with our laws, to their
country where they have come from.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioners interposed the present appeal.
On November 11, 1949, petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on
pre-arranged employment as immigrants under section 13 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, known as Commonwealth Act No. 613, with the
express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. On June 12,
1950, the Immigration Act was amended by Republic Act No. 503 introducing
therein certain amendments among them that which changes the classification of
pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants.
On November 21, 1952, upon proper request, the Secretary of Justice rendered
an opinion (Opinion No. 314, series of 1952) holding in effect that the
condition imposed for the admission of petitioners to this country whereby their
stay shall be for not more than two years was valid intimating therein that,
should they fail to comply with said condition after the expiration of that
period, they shall be subject to deportation. Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of this petition, and having failed to obtain a favorable reply,
instituted the present action for declaratory judgment.
Appellants contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”
under section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, they should have been admitted for
permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to
be a person who comes into a country for permanent residence, and, therefore,
the imposition of the condition limiting their stay to not more than two years
by the Commissioner of Immigration is in violation of law.
While the term “immigrant” under its ordinary definition denotes one who
comes for permanent residence, there is nothing in the law which would preclude
the view that that term may also refer to an alien who comes to this country
either to reside permanently or for a limited duration. The only definition
given by our law to the term “immigrant” is what is stated in section
50(j) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, to wit, “any alien departing from
any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a
nonimmigrant.” The law, on the other hand, gives no definition to the term
“nonimmigrant” from which we may imply that the term “immigrant” is merely
intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as
now contended by appellants. Indeed, a careful review of the whole law would
disclose no such intention or meaning, which silence denotes an apparent
implication that the purpose of the law is to give broad power and discretion to
the Commissioner of Immigration on matters which pertain to the admission of
immigrants into the Philippines. The only classification of immigrants we find
in the law is that of “quota immigrants” and “non-quota immigrants”, but such
qualification has reference merely to the number of aliens who may be allowed to
enter and not to the duration of their residence (section 13, Commonwealth Act
No. 613).
Our interpretation of the meaning and scope of the term “immigrant” finds
support in the case of Karnuth vs. U. S. 279 XL S. 231, 242-243,
wherein it was held:
“In construing section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act, we are not concerned
with the ordinary definition of the word ‘immigrant’, as one who comes for
permanent residence. The act makes its own definition, which is that ‘the term
‘immigrant’ means any alien departing from any place outside the United States
destined for the United States.’ The term thus includes every alien coming to
this country either to reside permanently or for temporary purposes, unless he
can bring himself within one of the exceptions.”
Viewed, therefore, in the light of the meaning of the term “immigrant” as
above interpreted which includes aliens coming both for permanent or temporary
purposes, it cannot be correctly pretended that the limitation imposed upon
petitioners as regards their stay in the Philippines by the Commissioner of
Immigration does violence to the law since it does not clearly appear therein
that such class of aliens can only be admitted with the status of permanent
residence. On the contrary, the power of the Commissioner of Immigration under
section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 would appear to be broad enough to
include the authority to impose such limitation, for if the Commissioner has the
power to deny completely the admission of an alien who seeks to enter this
country on a pre-arranged employment by withholding the issuance of an
immigration visa on the ground of public interest, with more reason can he
impose a condition which is less onerous such as limiting the duration of his
stay in the country.
Counsel for appellants invokes the explanatory note of House Bill No. 1044,
which later became Republic Act No. 503, wherein mention is made of the apparent
purpose of the amendment which is to change the classification of alliens coming
with pre-arranged employment from temporary to permanent, in support of his
proposition that the intendment of the original law in allowing the admission of
immigrants is to classify them as aliens who are allowed to enter for permanent
stay in contrast to non-immigrants who by statutory provision are allowed to
come merely for temporary purposes. Apparently, the explanatory note above
referred to gives the impression that the term “immigrant” as classified under
section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 refers only to aliens who are supposed to
be admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, but such meaning does
not appear, nor is reflected, in the very language of the statute. That
interpretation may be of some value to clarify doubtful or ambiguous provisions
in the amendatory Republic Act No. 503 but cannot certainly be of any aid as
regards the interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 613 which was adopted by a
different legislative body. In this respect, we find cogent and tenable the
opinion given by the Secretary of Justice to the effect that “the most that can
be deduced from said Explanatory Note is that the legislative body which passed
Republic Act No. 503 was of the impression, unfounded or otherwise that
immigrants who were admitted under section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 were
entitled to or may be allowed permanent residence in the Philippines. Being of
this impression, they found it necessary to remedy the situation by amending the
law so that thence forth it would no longer be possible for aliens who came to
pre-arranged employment in the Philippines to stay permanently.” (Annex C)
In any event, it appearing that petitioners were admitted to the Philippines
subject to the express condition that their stay would only be for two years and
they consented to their admission under such condition, they cannot now be heard
to complain that the Commissioner of Immigration acted in excess of his power in
imposing that limitation. They are now estopped from disputing such power even
if when they entered they were not disqualified for admission as permanent
residents because of their failure to a.iJk for the cancellation of such
limitation. They have perhaps labored under the impression that if they had
asked for their unconditional admission the immigration authorities would have
denied altogether their entry into this country. And such apprehension is well
within the realm of possibility considering the broad power granted by law to
the Commissioner of Immigration with regard to the entrance of aliens into the
Philippines.
Premises considered, we find no justifiable reason to disturb the decision
reached by the lower court, and so we affirm the same, with costs against
appellants.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.