PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM (PHILIPPINES), PETITIONER, VS. PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations in Case No. 1055—V dated October 10, 1959, and its resolution
en banc denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner herein.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads;

“Wherefore,
the Court orders the Chief of the Examining Division or his
representative to compute the overtime compensation duo the aforesaid
fourteen (14) aircraft mechanics and the two employees from the
Communication Department, based on the time sheet of said employees
from February 23, 1952 up to the including July 15, 1958 and to submit
his report within 30 days for further disposition by the Court; and the
company shall show to the Court Examiner such time sheets and other
documents that may be necessary in the aforesaid computation; and two
(2) representatives for the company and two (2) representatives for the
union shall be chosen to help the Court Examiner in said computation.

“The
company is also ordered to permanently adopt the straight 8-hour shift
inclusive of meal period which is mutually beneficial to the parties.

“SO ORDERED.”

In this appeal, petitioner advances five propositions which, briefly,
are as follows: (1) the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to order
the payment of overtime compensation, it being a mere monetary claim
cognizable by regular courts; (2) the finding that the one-hour meal
period should be considered overtime work (deducting 15 minutes as time
allotted for eating) is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the
court below had no authority to delegate its judicial functions by
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to
compute the overtime pay; (4) the finding that there was no agreement
to withdraw Case No. 1055-V in consideration of the wage increases in
the Collective Bargaining Contract (Exh. “A”) is not supported by
substantial evidence; and (5) the court below had no authority to order
the Company to adopt a straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal period.

On the issue of jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay, we have
since definitely ruled in a number of recent decisions that the
Industrial Court may properly take cognizance of such cases if, at the
time of the petition, the complainants were still in the service of the
employer, or, having been separated from such service, should ask for
reinstatement; otherwise, such claims should be brought before the
regular courts. (NASSCO vs. CIR, et al., 107 Phil., 1006; 58 Off. Gaz., [36] 5875; PRISCO vs. CIR, et al., 102 Phil., 515; Board of Liquidators, et al., vs. CIR, et al., 108 Phil., 162; Sta. Cecilia Sawmills Co. vs. CIR, 108 Phil., 330; Ajax-International Corp. vs. Seguritan, 109 Phil., 815; Sampaguita Pictures, Inc., et al. vs.
CIR, 109 Phil., 818). Since, in the instant case, there is no question
that the employees claiming overtime compensation were still in the
service of the company when the case was filed, the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations cannot be assailed. In fact, since it is
not pretended that, thereafter, the complainants were discharged or
otherwise terminated their relationship with the company for any
reason, all of said complainants could still be with the company up to
the present.

Petitioner herein claims that the one-hour meal
period should not be considered as overtime work (after deducting 15
minutes), because the evidence showed that complainants could rest
completely and were not in any manner under the control of the company
during that period. The court below found, on the contrary, that during
the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for
emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called,
they were reprimanded by the leadman; that as in fact it happened on
many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told
to hurry up eating to perform work during this period. Far from being
unsupported by substantial evidence, the record clearly confirms the
above factual findings of the Industrial Court.

Similarly,
this Court is satisfied with the finding that there was no agreement to
withdraw Case No. 1055-V in consideration of the wage increases
obtained by the union and set forth in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Exhibits “A”. As reasoned out by the court below, such
alleged agreement would have been incorporated in the contract if it
existed. The fact that the union filed a motion to dismiss without
prejudice, after the Collective Bargaining Contract had been signed,
did not necessarily mean that it had agreed to withdraw the case in
consideration of the wage increases. The motion itself (Annex “B”,
Petition for Certiorari) was expressly based on an understanding that
the company would “formulate a schedule of work which shall be in
consonance with C. A. 444”. All in all, there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the finding of the court below that no such
agreement was made.

It is next contended that in ordering
the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute
the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its
judicial functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do
not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to
the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the order
itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay
in the decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would
necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the decision
(see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., 99 Phil., 41; 52 Off. Gaz., 3034).

The Industrial Court’s order for permanent adoption of a straight
8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its
finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest, but was
actually a work hour, since, for its duration, the laborers had to be
on ready call. Of course, if the Company practices in this regard
should be modified to afford the mechanics a real rest during that hour
(f. ex., by installing an entirely different emergency crew, or any
similar arrangement), then the modification of this part of the
decision may be sought from the Court below. As things now stand, we
see no warrant for altering the decision.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.