CORAZON ALEGRE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, MARCIANO BAO, RAFAEL ADELAN, SALUD LUALHATI, ELENA MORALES, PEDRO MARCELO, WILLIAM SAÑOSA, MILAGROS SANTIAGO, VIOLETA TAN, TOMAS IGNACIO, MAR…

Direct appeal, on questions purely of law, taken by four­teen
(14) of the original eighteen (18) plaintiffs herein, from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint.

Defendant Victorina G. de Laperal is the owner of a number of apartment houses
located at Vision Street corner Dimasalang Street and
Aurora Boulevard, Manila.  In the year
1964 and for about three (3) years prior thereto, plaintiffs herein occupied,
as defendant’s tenants, distinct and separate apartments of said houses.  On October 27, 1964, defendant notified
plaintiffs that, effective January 1, 1965, they would have to pay the
increased rentals specified in the notices respectively served upon them, and
that, if not agreeable to said increase, they should vacate their respective
premises.  Plaintiffs were, however,
unwilling, either to pay the increased rates of rentals, or to vacate their
respective apartments.  Instead, on
January 5, 1965, they judi­cially consigned the amount of the old rentals and
commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila.  Plaintiffs prayed that the defendant be
ordered to receive the rentals at the old rates; that the duration of the lease
contracts between the parties be fixed; and that the defendant be sentenced to
pay damages.

In her answer, the defendant alleged that her contract with the
plaintiffs is for a fixed term, on a month to month basis; that she is entitled
to increase the rentals at the expiration of each month; and that, if the
plaintiffs are unwilling to pay such increase, they should vacate the
apartments occupied by them.

After appropriate proceedings, or on April 30, 1965, the lower
court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, and sentencing them
to vacate the premises respectively occupied by them, as well as to pay back
rentals at the old rates, up to thirty (30) days from notice of said judgment,
and, thereafter, at the in­creased rates, until they shall have vacated said
premises, and the costs.

On May 7, 1965, plaintiffs gave notice, which was amended on May
24, 1965, of their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court.  On May 26, 1965, or prior to the approval of
plaintiffs’ record on appeal, on May 29, 1965, defendant moved for the
execution of said judgment, upon the ground that plaintiffs had failed to
deposit the monthly rentals specified in the judgment.  On May 29, 1965, the parties agreed in open
court that plaintiffs be given up to June 14, 1965, to deposit said rentals;
but, still the deposit was not made. 
Hence, on June 26, 1965, the lower court authorized the execution of its
judgment, during the pendency of the appeal.  Thereupon, or on June 30, 1965, plaintiffs
moved with the Supreme Court, in this appeal, for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the execu­tion of said judgment, but, we denied the
motion.

In their brief, plaintiffs maintain that the lower court erred:  1) in allegedly deciding that the lease
contract between the parties is for a definite period; 2) in failing to take
judicial notice of Ordi­nance No. 4841, Series of 1963, of the City of Manila,
and to hold that the increased rentals, sought to be collected by the
defendant, exceed the limit fixed in said ordinance; 3) in dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaint; and 4) in ordering the execution of the decision
appealed from, during the pendency of the appeal.

Plaintiffs argue that, since the rentals agreed upon with the
defendant were on a month to month basis, in consequence of which the lease is
deemed to be monthly, the period of the lease is consi­dered by law as not
fixed.  Based upon this premise and upon
the fact that they had occupied defendant’s premises for over one year,
plaintiffs conclude that the lower court erred in not fixing a longer term for
the lease, pursuant to Article 1687 of our Civil Code.

This legal provision does not bear out plaintiffs’ pretense.  Even if their contracts were not for a fixed
period, the law does not grant the lessees a positive right to demand a longer
term for the lease.  Said Article 1687
vests in the court the authority, which it may exercise or not, to
“fix a longer term.” Plaintiffs have not even tried to show that the
lower court had abused its discre­tion in not extending the term for the
lease.  Moreover, we have held that said
extension may be sought by the tenant before, not after
the termination of the lease.^[1]
The case at bar was com­menced, on January 5, 1965, or five (5) days after the
expiration of the lease contract, pursuant to defendant’s notice to the plain­tiffs
dated October 27, 1964.

Upon the other hand, the city ordinance invoked by the plain­tiffs
prohibits lessors or sublessors
“from increasing the rentals to an amount in excess of ten (10%) per
centum per annum of the assessed value of the building leased or subleased and
the land on which the building stands.” There is, however, no competent
evi­dence on the assessed value of said building and land.  Hence, the lower court had no means to
ascertain, from the evidence on record, whether or not the increased rentals
exceed the limit fixed in said ordinance, even if judicial cognizance thereof
had been taken.

Inasmuch as plaintiffs’ objection to the decision appealed from
is based upon the two (2) issues we have just found to be devoid of merit, it
follows that said decision must be affirmed.

The last issue posed by the plaintiffs refers to the writ of
execution of the decision appealed from, issued by the lower court during the pendency of the appeal. 
Plaintiffs assail the authority of said court to order said execution
under Section 10 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, upon the ground that this
case is one for specific performance and consignation with damages, not a
forcible entry and detainer case, to which said
section applies.  Even if plaintiffs’
theory as regards the nature of this case were correct with respect to the
cause of action set forth in their complaint, it is untenable insofar as defendant’s
counterclaim or cross-claim is concerned. 
Indeed, it is substantially alleged in said pleading of the defendant
that plaintiffs herein, as her former lessees, were unlawfully withholding from
her the possession of her aforementioned land and buildings, after the
expiration or termination of their right of possession thereto, and that said
unlawful withholding was barely two (2) weeks at the time of the filing of said
counter­claim or cross-claim, on January 15, 1965.  In other words, all elements essential to an
unlawful detainer case, under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, were pleaded in defendant’s aforemen­tioned counterclaim or
cross-claim.  In fact, defendant
manifestly intended the same to partake of the nature of a complaint for
unlawful detainer, as evidence by the fact that said
pleading was verified,^[2]
which is not necessary in ordinary actions.

We are not unmindful of the fact that unlawful detainer cases may not be initiated in Courts of First
Instance.  Neither must we overlook,
however, that, “arising out of” or being “necessarily connected
with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter” of
plaintiffs’ complaint herein, defendant’s aforementioned counterclaim or
cross-claim was a necessary one, which would have been barred, had she not set
it up in the case at bar.^[3]
In fact, plaintiffs do not now contest the jurisdiction of the lower court over
the subject-matter of said counterclaim or cross-claim or to grant the relief
therein prayed for.

Inasmuch as plaintiffs had not deposited the amount fixed in the
decision appealed from, it follows that the lower court has not erred in
ordering the execution of said decision, pursuant to Section 10, in relation to
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Regardless, however, of defendant’s counterclaim or cross-claim,
and even if we considered plaintiffs’ complaint as character­izing this case as
an ordinary action, the lower court had authority to order the execution of its
decision, under Rule 39, Section 2, of the Rules of Court, defendant’s motion
for execution having been filed before the approval of plaintiffs’
record on appeal.  Such ap­proval did not
divest the court of its jurisdiction to entertain said motion and grant the
same, for:

“x x x the
approval given to the record on appeal filed by the petitioner in the court
below was merely provisional; and that both the court and the parties
understood that such approval was not final, since there was another
question still pending, to wit, whether a writ of execution should be issued
pending appeal.  It is to be presumed
that the court and the parties knew that if the court granted the writ of
execution, its order had to be included in the records to be elevated to the
appellate court (Rule 39, sec. 2) and hence, the record of appeal, as it
stood before the court acted on the motion for execution, could not be
considered complete and definitive. 
x x x.  That being the case, the court
retained jurisdiction to resolve the motion for execution and to order it
issued unless the appellant filed the corresponding supersedeas
bond.  The subsequent issuance of the
writs of execution were mere implementations of the power thus reserved
and consequently, it can not be said that the court acted without or in excess
of its juris­diction in issuing the same.”^[4]
(Underscoring supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1] Prieto vs. Santos,
98 Phil., 509.

^[2] Rule
70, Section 1, Rules of Court.

^[3] Rule
9, Section 4, Rules of Court.

^[4] Laurilla vs. Uichangco, 104 Phil.,
171.  See, also, Alcober
vs. Garciano, L-24665, May 23, 1968.