G.R. No. L-5758. March 30, 1954
ISIDRO DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, in the elections held on
November 13, 1951. There were eight councilors to be elected and as a
result of the canvass made by the board of canvassers on November
18,1951, petitioner occupied the eighth place and was proclaimed
elected, having obtained 3,160 votes. On April 12, 1952, or four months
and twenty-four days after petitioner’s proclamation, Fortunato
Gutierrez, hereafter designated as respondent, filed a petition in the
Commission on Elections alleging that due to a mistake in addition the
municipal board of canvassers credited petitioner with 3,160 votes when
in fact he obtained only 3,060 votes, whereas respondent obtained 3,098
votes, or a majority of 38 votes over petitioner. Respondent prayed that
the municipal board of canvassers be ordered to make a new canvass and a
new proclamation declaring him the eighth councilor-elect in lieu of
petitioner.
On May 26, 1952, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging among
other things that the Commission on Elections has no power to order the
correction asked for on the ground that the period within which it
could be made has already prescribed. This motion was denied and the
Commission directed the municipal board of canvassers to reconvene and
recanvass the election returns as prayed for, and, having found that
respondent had polled more votes than petitioner, proclaimed the former
eighth councilor-elect of Makati.
The present petition, as amended, seeks the annulment of this
proclamation as illegal and the reinstatement of petitioner to the
office of eighth councilor of Makati. And, incidentally, it may be
stated, that petitioner has, in addition, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal an election protest dated June 2, 1952, contesting the
election of respondent.
The only question posed in this petition is whether the Commission
on Elections has the power to order the municipal board of canvassers of
Makati to correct a mistake committed in addition in the canvass it has
made after the candidate erroneously proclaimed had assumed office and
the period to contest his election had expired.
The powers of the Commission on Elections are defined in the
Constitution. It provides that it “shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials.”
(Art. X, Section 2.) The Revised Election Code supplements what other
powers may be exercised by said Commission. It is clear that powers not
expressly or impliedly granted to it are deemed withheld.
In a municipal election, the board of inspectors counts the votes,
makes a statement of the count, proclaims the result of the election,
and issues a certificate of the number of votes polled by each
candidate. After the announcement of the result, the board of inspectors
“shall not make any alteration or amendment in any of its statements,
unless it be so ordered by a competent court” (Section 154, Revised
Election Code).
The municipal board of canvassers shall meet immediately after the
election, shall count the votes cast for each candidate and proclaim as
elected those who have polled the largest number of votes. The board
shall not recount the ballots nor examine any of them but shall proceed
upon the statements presented to it. In case of contradictions or
discrepancies between the copies of the same statements, the same may be
corrected by the Court of First Instance of the province, upon
motion of the board or of any candidate affected. (Section 168, in
connection with Section 163, Revised Election Code.)
The above constitute the only pertinent provisions regarding the
canvass and proclamation of municipal officials. They clearly postulate
that any alteration or amendment in any of the statements of election,
or any contradiction or discrepancy appearing therein, whether due to
clerical” error or otherwise, cannot be made without the intervention of
a competent court, once the announcement of the result of the election,
or the proclamation of the winners, had been made. These provisions are
all-inclusive in the sense that the power to authorize the correction
can only be made by a competent court. They reject the idea, as now
entertained by respondent, that such error can be ordered corrected by
the Commission on Elections by virtue of its constitutional power to
administer the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
That the above is the correct interpretation of the law seems to be
implied from the cases decided by this Court (Galvez vs.
Miranda, et al., 36 Phil., 316, 320; Cordero vs. Judge, 40
Phil., 246). Thus, it was held that “when it appears that the board of
canvassers has failed or refused to perform a purely ministerial duty,
then mandamus is the proper remedy. If the board of canvassers
should, for example in its return, show that A had received a majority
of the votes cast and, in the face of that fact, declare that B had been
elected, certainly it should be required to make its certificate
conform with the facts stated in its return. Under such circumstances,
and in the face of such facts, A cannot be considered the person elected
to the office in question. Mandamus is the most effective and
expeditious remedy for such error.” (Municipal Council of Las Piñas vs.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 40 Phil., 279, 282-284.)
But in order that the remedy of mandamus may be available,
it is necessary that it be asserted within the two-week period within
which an election may be contested. After that period has elapsed, the
right of the candidate proclaimed to the office is deemed vested. The
reason is obvious. This period is jurisdictional, as it has the effect
of divesting a losing candidate of his remedy to contest the election.
This is what this Court in effect said when in a recent case it made the
following pronouncement:
“Before the proclamation of election, any candidate may petition the
Court of First Instance to recount the votes cast in any precinct in
case of discrepancies between copies of statements of election (Sections
163 and 168, Revised Election Code). After the proclamation, any
candidate may file an election protest within two weeks (Section 174,
idem.). These specific legal provisions logically compel any candidate,
within short time limits, to seek in the Court of First Instance the
corresponding relief against the regularity of a canvass of election,
and to the same extent relieve the Commission on Elections from the duty
of conducting similar investigations.’ (Ramos vs. Commission
on Elections,[*] 45 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. No. 9, 345, 347.)
The theory entertained by the respondent tends to circumvent this
mandatory provision which limits the period within which an election
contest should be filed. This is the result which the action of the
Commission on Elections has led into in the present case. It appears
that Isidro de Leon, petitioner herein, was proclaimed councilor-elect
by the municipal board of canvassers on November 18, 1951, but four
months and twenty-four days thereafter, or on April 12, 1952, the
defeated candidate, Fortunato Gutierrez, petitioned the Commission on
Elections to order said board to make a recanvass of the votes alleging a
clerical mistake, and this was done on May 31, 1952, thereby
proclaiming Fortunato Gutierrez as the winner. The result was that
Isidro de Leon filed an election protest within the legal period counted
from the last proclamation disputing the legality of the election of
Gutierrez. If we will hold that the Commission on Elections has acted
properly, as entertained by the respondent, the inevitable result would
be that the election contest was filed within the statutory period. This
is a clear circumvention of the law which is destructive of the very
essence and spirit which underlies the summary nature of an election
proceeding while it sets a precedent which enlarges to a dangerous
extreme the, administrative powers conferred upon the Commission on
Elections by the Constitution. We cannot subscribe to such unwarranted
interpretation.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted, with costs
against respondent. The new proclamation made on May 31,1952 is hereby
set aside and the original proclamation made on November 18, 1951 should
stand.
Paras, C, J., Pablo, Bengzon and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.
[*] 80 Phil., 722.
CONCURRENTE
DIOKNO, M.:
Concurro con la opinion de que se conceda el remedio aqui
solicitado.
Los hechos y la cuestion en este asunto se hallan bien expuestos en
la ponencia en los siguientes terminos:
“This is a petition for certiorari.
“The facts are not in dispute. Isidro de Leon and Fortunato
Gutierrez were among the candidates for municipal councilors of Makati,
Rizal, voted for in the election held on November 13, 1951. There were 8
councilors to be elected, and on the basis of the votes shown in the
election returns from the different precincts Gutierrez had occupied 8th
place with a total of 3,098 votes in his favor as against 3,060 votes
in favor of De Leon, his closest contender for that place. But due to a
mistake in addition, the municipal board of canvassers, which met on
November 18, 1061, to canvass the returns, credited De Leon with 3,160
votes and proclaimed him the elected 8th councilor of the municipality.“Informed, of the error committed by the municipal board of
canvassers, Gutierrez on April 12, 1952, petitioned the Commission on
Elections to annul the proclamation of De Leon and order the board to
make a new canvass. De Leon opposed the petition. But the Commission,
after hearing, granted the petition, annulled the proclamation in favor
of De Leon and directed the board to reconvene and recanvass the votes
received by these two candidates and proclaim the one that came out
winner according to the result.“Proceeding as directed by the Commission, the municipal board of
‘canvassers reconvened on May 31, 1952, to recanvass the election
returns and, having found that Gutierrez had polled more votes than De
Leon, proclaimed the former elected 8th councilor of Makati.“The present petition, as amended, seeks the annulment of this
proclamation as illegal and the restoration of petitioner to the office
of 8th councilor of Makati. But it appears that petitioner has, in
addition, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an election
protest, dated June 2, 1952, contesting the election of Gutierrez.“It is admitted that the municipal board of canvassers had made a
mistake in adding up the votes reported in the election returns and that
due to this mistake in addition De Leon was proclaimed elected. The
question presented is whether a mistake of that kind may be ordered
corrected by the Commission on Elections after the candidate erroneously
proclaimed has already assumed office.” (Decision original, No.
L-5758, pp. 1-2)
Las facultades de la Comision de Elecciones se definen en ei
Articulo X, seccion 2, de la Constitution cpmo sigue:
“SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge
of the, enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct .of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may
be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the
right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of polling
places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election
officials. * * * The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission
shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.”
El administrar y hacer cumplir las leyes relativas a la celebracipn
de las elecciones y el decidir las cuestipnes administrativas que
afectan a las elecciones que no envuelvan el dereeho de votar suppnen
estistencia de tales leyes y respeto y reverencia a las mismas. No hace
de la Comision, solo por haber sido elevada al rango de cuerpo
constitutional, superior a dichas leyes.
En materia de escrutinio electoral, la Comision deberia desplegar
todo su ingenio y tener una maquinaria tan completa como los fondos a su
disposition permitan, para asegurar que las diferentes juntas al efecto
cumplan puntual y fielmente con sus deberes, y para prevenir sobre la
marcha todo posible error, irregularidad o fraude en las proclamaciones.
No es su funcion sentarse como jueces y esperar que los otros
interesados acudan a ella en demanda de remedio. Es funcion activa
durante la celebration de las eleciones la que la Constitution ha
encomendado a la Comision. Por su parte, los partidos y los candidates
deberian ejercer la maxima vigilancia, y llamar oportunamente la
atention de cuantas autoridades intervienen o deben intervenir en la
ejecucion de las leyes electorates para evitar que ocurran retrasos, a
se cometan o consuman errores, irregularidades o fraudes. En el caso de
estos autos, el alegado error de suma de votos se hubiera advertido y
evitado inmediatamente si el afectado hubiera sido un poco vigilante, o
su partido hubiere designado un interventor despierto en la junta de
escrutinio como provee el articulo 168, en relation con el articulo 159,
del Codigo Electoral Revisado. Tambien se hubiera podido evitar si un
representante de la Comision en el municipio hubiera atendido el
escrutinio municipal.
Despues de hecha la proclamation, nuevos factores entran en juego
que no pueden desconocerse. La Junta no puede, motu propio
reunirse y corregir el acta de proclamation del resultado de la
election, como no sean meros errores clericales u otros de analogo
caracter, sin orden judicial. Galvez vs. Miranda, 36 Phil.,
316, 320. Como esta Corte dijo en el caso de Cordero contra
Juez de Primera Instancia de Rizal (1919) 40 Jur. Fil., 261, 266, 267:
“Los recurridos pretenden que la Junta Municipal de Escmtinio
carecia de facultades para recontar las papeletas y hacer enmiendas en
su primitive. proclamacion. El articulo 477 de la Ley No. 2711,[1] dispone que inmediatamente despues,
de la election, el Concejo Municipal se reunird en sesion especial, y
procedera a actuar como Junta Municipal de Escrutinio; y contara los
votos emitidos para cada uno de los cargos municipales en la misma forma
que se dispone en el Articulo 469, para la Junta Provincial de
Escrutinio. Dicho articulo (477) dispone, ademas, que la Junta Municipal
de Escrutinio no tendra la facultad de recontar los votos ni die
inspeccionarlos, sino que procedera con vista de las actas, tal como se
hayan corregido, si es que ha habido necesidad de correcciones. La
resolucion de dicha Junta se hard constar por escrito en triplicado[2] firmado por los que la componen o
por la mayoria de ellos. Cuando se hayan cumplido los deberes de tal
suerte impuestos a la Junta Municipal de Escrutinio, y esta extiende su
certificado conforme exige la Ley, su tarea, como tal junta, ha
terminado, y no se dispone nada sobre su continuation como junta de
escrutinio * * *”“El objeto de la ley es dar fin de modo definitivo, por lo que a
la Junta Municipal de Escrutinio afecta, al escrutinio de los votos que
se han emitido para cada uno de los cargos municipales. Aunque la Junta
Municipal de Escrutinio se compone de los que constituyen el Concejo
Municipal, no actuan como concejales, sino como una entidad distinta y
diferenteraente organizada para un fin expreso, y cuando dicho objetivo
queda cumplido, desaparece y termina su existencia como tal Junta de
Escrutinio. “Por tanto, la Junta Municipal de Escrutinio carecia de
facultades para volver a practicar el recuento y hacer nueva
proclamacion, sin haber sido autorizada para ello por una orden del
Juzgado, de conformidad con Io que dispone el articulo 479 de la Ley No.
2711.”
Cuando el error importante se debe a que la Junta de Escrutinio no
ha tenido en cuenta actas electorales de otros precintos, o que ha
tornado ntimeros de votos distintos de los que constan en las actas
electorales, se le puede obligar mediante mandamus a que
complete el escrutinio o tenga en cuenta las cifras verdaderas y haga
nueva proclamacion conforme a lo resuelto de las actas legitimas.
“Que procede la expedicion de un mandamus para obligar a
la Junta de Escrutinio que declare en su certificado el resultado del
escrutinio, es doctrina perfectamente sentada ahora, sobre todo, cuando
resulte, con vista de las actas, que el certificado no se sjusta a los
hechos que en ellas constan. Esta apoyada por abundante jurisprudencia
la doctrina de que, cuando la Junta de Escrutinio se negare a contar
cualquiera de los votos, podra obligarsela, mediante mandamus, a
que los cuente. En principio no ouede haber diferencia entre negarse a
contar cualquiera de los votos o negarse a contar solo parte del
resultado. El mandamus es el recurso adecuado para obligar a
una junta municipal de escrutinio para que corrija su certificado, de
conformidad con sus propias actas. (15 Cyc, 383; People vs.
Nordham, 90 111. 553; State vs. Hardin County Judge, 13 Iowa,
139; Rich vs. Bogard State Canvassers, 100 Mich., 453; People vs.
Onondaga County, 129 N. W., 335.)“Aunque no procedera el mandamus para obligar a que se
declara que un individuo tiene derecho a un cargo discutido, o para
determinar cuestiones discutidas relativas al derecho al cargo, es el
recurso adecuado en casos en que los funcionarios de eleccion dejen de
cumplir con sus deberes ministeriales, en relation con la eleccion.
Procedera el mandamus para obligar a la Junta de Escrutinio a
que redacte y complete actas exactas. (Steward vs. Payton, 77
Ga., 668; McCreary sobre Elecciones, pag. 301; Paine sobre Elecciones,
pags. 755, 756.)Hasta que la Junta de Escrutinio haya complido con el preciso
deber que la ley Ie impone, debe considerarsela contumaz, y, en un caso
como este, seria una anomalia legal pennitir que la Junta se atuviera al
hecho de que habla librado un certificado de eleccion a uno que no
habia recibido el mayor numero de votos, en contra de lo que
expresamente dispone la ley, como razon bastante para que no se le
obligue a cumplir un deber imperativo. (pp. 300-301.)* * * Cuando resulta que la Junta de Escrutinio ha dejado de
cumplir, o se ha negado a cumplir un deber puramente ministerial,
cntonces el mandamus es el recurso adecuado. Si, por ejemplo,
la Junta de Escrutinio hubiera hecho constar en su acta que A recibio la
mayoria de los votos emitidos, y en vista de tal hecho declarara que B
habia sido elegido, ciertamente que se le debe exigir que redacte su
certificado con arreglo a los hechos expuestos en sus actas. En virtud
de tales circunstancias, y con vista de tales hechos, A no podrd
considerarse como elegido para el cargo en cuestion. El mandamus
es el recurso mas expedito y eficaz para subsanar tal error.” Consejo
Mun. de Las Piñascontra Juez de 1. Inst de Rizal, 40 Jur. Fil.
296, 300-301, 302.
Un recurso de mandamus no es una protesta electoral, aunque
participa en parte de la naturaleza de la misma, y la decision que alli
se dicta es inapelable.
“Aunque la solicitud de mandamus, en realidad, era una
protesta contra el resultado de la eleccion, de hecho no era
una morion de protesta. La solicitud de mandamus no tenia por
objeto que se resolviera una eleccion protestada. No puede el mandamus
utilizarse para tal fin. Cuando se hace necesario recurrir a las actas y
considerar cuestiones que afectan a la legalidad o irregularidades de
la eleccion, o al fraude, emision ilegal de votos etc., el mandamus
no es el recurso adecuado en tales casos. Dichas cuestiones deben
suscitarse, ya por una mocion de protesta, ya mediante quo warranto, en
relacion con los hechos especiales del caso. (pp. 301-302.) * * * La
sentencia del Juzgado inferior en un mandamus, asi como las
demas sentencias en asuntos electorates municipales, es firme e
inapelable.” (pag. 303.)Concejo Mun. de Las Piñascontra Juez de 1.a Inst. de
Rizal, supra.
Si el recurso de mandamus prospera y se hace nueva y
distinta proclamation en su virtud, el candidate afectado adversamente
por la modification puede protestar contra la eleccion del
nuevamente declarado electo dentro de los respectivos plazos fijados por
la ley. Arts. 172, 173 y 174, Cod. Elect. Rev. Pero si pierde el
recurso, y en el entretanto han transcurrido los diferentes plazos
legales para protestar sin que separadamnnte, haya protestado contra
la proclamada eleccion de su adversario, ha perdido definitivamente
derecho de impugnarla. De la Rosa vs. Yonson, 52 Phil, 446;
Ferrer vs. Gutierrez David, 43 PhiL, 795; Nisperos vs.
Araneta Diaz, 47 Phil., 806; Yumol vs. Palma, 52 Phil,, 412;
Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara, 44 Phil., 580;
Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 PhiL, 632.
Puede la Comision de Elecciones librar el mandamus, en vez
de los tribunales de justicia, o concurrentemente con estos? No se
encuentra en la Constitucion, ni en el Codigo Electoral Revisado una
disposicion expresa sobre el particular. Los que opinan por la
afirmativa o deducen de la facultad ejecutiva de la Comision de
administrar y hacer que se cumplan las leyes sobre la celebracion de las
elecciones. Sin embargo, en el asunto de Concejo de Las Piñasvs.
Juez de Rizal, 40 Jur. Fil., 296, esta Corte dijo:
“Hemos declarado, en casos en que la Ley Electoral era deficiente,
que podria recurrirse al procedimiento que dispone la Ley No. 190
(Arnedo contra Llorente y Liongson, 18 Jur. Fil., 267; Campos contra
Wislizenus y Aldanese, 35 Jur. Fil., 380, Deogracias cofCtra Abreu y De
la Santa, 36 Jur. Fil., 523.)”
Y la competencia para la expedition del remedio de mandamus
esta prescrita expresamente para los tribunales de justicia. Judicature
Act. Rep. Act No. 296, Sees. 17, 30, 44; Rules of Court, Rule 67, sees.
3, 4. Y ciertamente es una prerrogativa judicial.
En el asunto de Ramos vs. Comision de Elecciones, 45 Off.
Gaz. Supp. 9, pag. 345, se trataba de una peticion de mandamus
para que se ordene a la Comision a investigar y anular el escrutinio
hecho por la Junta Municipal de Escrutinio de Bato, Camarines Sur por el
fundamento de que utilizo un acta falsificada del precinto 10 del
citado municipio en lugar de la genuina, pues la Comision se abstuvo de
hacerlo por estar pendiente una protesta electoral tendente a anular la
eleccion del proclamado electo. En esta Corte hubo empate en la votacion
del recurso por lo que quedo sobreseido. Regla 56, sec 2, Reglamento de
los Tribunales. Tres de los Magistrados opuestos al recurso opinaban
por su desestimacion 1.° porque la facultad era discrecional y 2.°
porque no puede esperarse que la Comision conozca de quej as similares
que surgirian en todo Filipinas, por sus limitadas facilidades y
personal (p&gs. 346, 347). Dos de los opuestos al recurso votaron,
sin embargo, por otras razones, que el entonces Magistrado Sr. Tuason,
expuso como sigue:
“I can not share the opinion that the Commission on Elections has
discretionary power to annul a canvass by the board of canvassers. If it
had such power I would be inclined to agree that a grave abuse of
discretion was committed when the Commission denied or declined to act
on the petition of the local representatives of the Nacionalista Party,
in the face of its commission’s finding that the returns used in the
canvass were forged. In my opinion the commission had no other
alternative but to refrain, as it did, from taking cognizance of the
complaint. A machinery of justice with special, summary jurisdiction and
clearly outlined procedure has been set up to hear and decide precisely
such irregularities as are charged in the case at bar. The Commission
on Elections is an administrative body endowed with administrative
functions only. Determination of which of two or more conflicting
returns is authentic is a judicial prerogative. It requires the taking
of evidence the holding of regular trial, if justice is to be done to
both parties. It amounts to a power to declare, in some cases as in
this, that one candidate has been elected over another candidate or
other candidates. (pag. 348.)“As I have said, the subject-matter of the present petition is one
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. If ballot boxes have been destroyed together with their
contents, that is no ground for taking the case out of the method of
procedure provided by law. The counting of ballots is not the only mode
by which a protestant can established his right to be declared elected
to an office.” (pag. 349.)Ramos vs. Commission on Election, 45 Off. Gaz. Supp. 9,
pp. 848-349.
Pero se dice que la facultad de la Comisidn de Elecciones de anular
una proclamacion de una junta de escrutinio y ordenar un nuevo
escrutinio ya no puede ponerse en duda, por virtud de la decision de
esta Corte en el Asunto de Mintu vs. Enage, G. R. No. L-1834
(Die. 31, 1947). Conforme a la opinion de dos senores magistrados, tal
facultad esta limitada a errores cometidos en cosas ministeriales y
administrativas “which do not call for the exercise of judgment.”
Dijeron, en efecto:
“The Commission on Elections has both the power and the duty to
correct any error committed by election officials in ministerial and
administrative matters which do not call for the exercise of judgment.
The case of Mintu et al., vs. Enage et al., G. R. No. L-1834,
comes under this category- There, the board of canvassers failed to
perform an administrative duty by omitting to count the votes in some of
the returns. To count all the returns instead of only some is an
administrative function which the commission had the authority and the
duty to compel the board of canvassers to act when the latter refuses
absolutely to make any canvass.”Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, supra, pags.
348-349.
Pero todavia otra limitation a la facultad ejecutiva debe notarse.
La facultad debe y puede ejercerse solamente antes de que alguna parte
interesada pueda alegar derecho indisputable al cargo por vencimiento
del plazo para protestar. En efecto, vencido que fuese ese plazo, el
derecho al cargo queda investido f uera de toda disputa por el acta de
proclamation, ya que la tinica manera de privarsele del cargo es
mediante la protesta electoral prescrita por la ley.
En el caso de Concejo Municipal de Las Piñas vs. Juez de
Primera Instancia, supra, se declaro procedente un mandamus
judicial en un caso identico al de Mintu contra Enage, supra,
y la sec. 2 del Art. X de la Constitution no ha privado a los
tribunales de dicha jurisdiction. La jurisdiction de los tribunales en
la materia es cosa que preexistia a la Comision y a esta se ha
encargado, no usurpation de dicha jurisdiction judicial sino observancia
de dichas leyes, en el desempeno de sus funciones.
De lo expuesto se sigue que, despues de haber quedado firme el acta
de proclamation de election, por vencimiento del plazo para protestar,
la Comision de Elecciones pierde toda la autoridad que anteriormente
podia haber tenido de ordenar su anulacion y alteration de modo que otro
candidate resulte elegido en lugar del proclamado. Solo puede hacerse
esto por or den judicial en los casos y en la forma prescritos por la
ley.
Nos damos cuenta de que, asumiendo que hubo error de suma, el
proclamado electo.va a continuar en el cargo, no obstante no haber sido
elegido para el mismo. Si esto no tiene ya remedio, el candidate y
partido perjudicados no pueden quejarse, porque la culpa es de ellos por
no haber desplegado un poco de vigilancia que lo hubiera evitado. Es el
tribute que pagan por su descuido. Desde luego, no es el presente el
recurso apropiado. Si puede serlo un quo warranto iniciado por el
Procurador General por orden del Presidente de Filipinas conforme a la
Regla 68, art. 3, de los Reglamentos, o mediante permiso del Juzgado
conforme al art. 4 de dicha Regla, y si la prescription de action
prescrita en el art. 16 de la citada regla ha quedado ihterrumpida, o si
otro remedio mas existe, quaere. Lo qiie ahora debe enfatizarse es que
no de curarse un error con otro error, esto es improvisando una facultad
y un procedimiento irregular y arbitrario, por muy bien intencionado
que esto fuese. Un regimen bien ordenado requiere que los remedios se
otorguen por la autoridad llamada por la ley a ello y conforme al
procedimiento regular prescrito.
Voto por que se conceda el remedio solicitado, y consecuentemente
que se dejen sin ningun valor ni ef ecto la orden de anulacion de la
proclamacion de eleccion del recurrente ordenada por la Gomision de
Elecciones, asi como la nueva proclamacion de eleccion a favor de
Gutierrez hecha en su virtud por la Junta Municipal de Escrutinio, sin
especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.
[1] Ahora, arts. 168 y 169,
C6d. Electoral Revisado Ley No. 180 de la Republics.
[2] Ahora cuadruplicado. Art.
169, Cod. Electoral Rev.
DISSENTING
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari. As stated in the majority
opinion, the only question posed is whether the Commission on Elections
may order a municipal board of canvassers to correct a patent error
committed by said board in adding up the total votes reported in the
returns from the different precincts when the candidates erroneously
proclaimed as a result of the wrong addition has already assumed office
and the period for contesting his election has already expired. The
returns are not here in dispute. The error in addition is admitted. Its
correction is a purely clerical and ministerial task not calling for the
exercise of judgment. And yet the majority opinion answers the question
in the negative and would install in an elective public office one who,
admittedly, has not been thereunto elected. To this I can not agree.
The facts are not in dispute. Isidro de Leon and Fortunato Gutierrez
were among the candidates for municipal councilors of Makati, Rizal,
voted for in the election held on November 13, 1951. There were 8
councilors to be elected, and on the basis of the votes shown in the
election returns from the different precincts Gutierrez had occupied 8th
place with a total of 3,098 votes in his favor as against 3,060 votes
in favor of De Leon, his closest contender for that place. But due to a
mistake in addition the municipal board of canvassers, which met on
November 18, 1951, to canvass the returns, credited De Leon with 3,160
votes and proclaimed him the elected 8th councilor of the municipality.
Informed of the error committed by the municipal board of
canvassers, Gutierrez on April 12, 1952, petitioned the Commission on
Elections to annul the proclamation of De Leon and order the board to
make a new canvass. De Leon opposed the petition. Bat the Commission,
after hearing, granted the petition, annulled the proclamation in favor
of De Leon and directed the board to reconvene and recanvass the votes
received by these two candidates and proclaim the one that came out the
winner according to the result.
Proceeding as directed by the Commission, the municipal board of
canvassers reconvened on May 31, 1952, to recanvass the election returns
and, having found that Gutierrez had polled more votes than De Leon,
proclaimed the former elected 8th councilor of Makati.
The present petition, as amended, seeks the annulment of this
proclamation as illegal and the restoration of petitioner to the office
of 8th councilor of Makati. But it appears that petitioner has, in
addition, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an election
protest, dated June 2, 1952, contesting the election of Gutierrez.
It is admitted that the municipal board of canvassers had made a
mistake in adding up the votes reported in the election returns and that
due to this mistake in addition De Leon was proclaimed elected. The
question presented is whether a mistake of that kind may be ordered
corrected by the Commission on Elections after the candidate erroneously
proclaimed has already assumed office.
Section 168 of the Revised Election Law provides that the municipal
board of canvassers shall meet immediately after the election, count the
votes cast for candidates for municipal offices as reported in the
returns or statements of election from the different precincts “and
proclaim as elected for said offices those who have polled the largest
number of votes for the different offices.” The next section then
provides that immediately after the completion of the canvass, the board
shall make a statement in quadruplicate of the results, which statement
shall be signed by the members of the board present, and a copy of the
same shall be filed with each of the offices mentioned in said section.
The signing of this statement concludes the work of the board and for
that reason the board is thereafter usually deemed functus oficio.
But this notwithstanding, it has been held that where the board has
made an illegal proclamation, it may thereafter, without any court
order, meet again, annul the proclamation and make a new one (Yap vs.
Court of First Instance, 66 Phil., 112). And the board may also meet
again to correct an error in its certificate when “by some proper
authority it is ordered so to do”. (Cordero vs. Judge, 40
Phil., 246-) Thus, in the case of Municipality of Las Piñas vs.
Judge, 40 Phil., 279, where the board of canvassers had certified that a
certain candidate for a municipal office received 139 votes in one
precinct when actually he received 143 votes, it was held that the board
could be ordered to reconvene to correct its certificate. Citing Paine
on Elections, this Court said in that case that “until the board of
canvassers had performed the exact duties imposed upon it by law it must
be considered as in default.”
It is argued, however, that after the board has made its certificate
of election only a court could order it to reconvene, and this seems to
be implied in the decisions above cited. Petitioner also cites section
154 of the Revised Election Law which forbids “the board of inspectors”
from altering or amending any of its statements after the announcement
of the result of the election unless so ordered by a competent court.
But the section cited refers to the election inspectors and not to the
municipal board of canvassers, which, as declared in Galvez vs.
Miranda et al., 36 Phil., 316, 320, is authorized “to correct clerical
errors and other errors of a like character.” And as to the decisions
requiring judicial authority for making corrections, it should be
recalled that those decisions were rendered before the creation of the
Commission on Elections, the agency set up by the Constitution for “the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections” (Art. X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.)
The authority of the Commission on Elections in a proper case to
annul a proclamation made by a municipal board of canvassers and order a
new canvass of the election returns can no longer be doubted. That
authority has already been upheld by this court in Mintu vs.
Enage, G. R. No. L-1834 (Dec. 31, 1947). In that case the Commission had
annulled a proclamation made by a municipal board of canvassers on the
basis of returns from only some of the election precincts, and this
court ruled that the Commission in so doing had neither exceeded its
jurisdiction nor committed a grave abuse of discretion. If the
Commission has to correct an irregularity of this nature there is no
reason why it may not also correct a mere clerical error such as that
committed by the municipal board of canvassers in the present case. As
stated by Mr. Justice Tuason in Ramos vs. Commission on
Elections, 45 Off. Gaz. (Supp. No. 9) 345, 348, “the Commission on
Elections has both the power and the duty to correct any error committed
by election officials in the ministerial and administrative matters
which do not call for the exercise of judgment.”
There is nothing to the suggestion that the petition for correction
which Gutierrez addressed to the Commission was but “a disguised
election protest” cognizable only by the courts. The petition did not
make it “necessary to go behind the returns and to consider questions
touching the legality or irregularities of the election, or of fraud,
illegal voting, etc.” (Municipality of Las Piñasvs. Judge supra.)
All that was required was the correction of a manifest mistake in
addition, which was a purely ministerial or mechanical duty. Not being
an election protest, the petition for correction did not have to be
filed in the Court of First Instance and within a time prescribed in
section 174 of the Revised Election Law. The remedy invoked was purely
administrative for which no prescription period has so far been
provided.
Neither could the fact that the candidate erroneously proclaimed has
already assumed office preclude the exercise of the corrective power of
the Commission. If the Commission had that power before the candidate
assumed office, there can be no reason why it should not have that same
power thereafter. The doctrine of estoppel or laches cannot properly be
invoked in this case for the office of the municipal councilor is a
public trust and it is against the law to have it occupied by one who is
not the true choice of the electorate.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the denial of the present
petition for certiorari.
Padilla, Jugo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
MONTEMAYOR, J.,:
In the learned dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes, I fully
concur. I just wish to stress the point that in ordering the correction
of a clear, undisputed, simple mistake—either a clerical error or a
mistake in addition the Commission on Elections did not exercise a
judicial power of function and invade the province and jurisdiction of
the courts, but it merely performed a purely administrative duty in
connection with its being in charge of the enforcement and
administration of laws related to the conduct of elections, and its
right and obligation to decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions affecting elections, as set forth in the
Constitution.
Respondent Gutierrez may have been a little negligent and law in his
vigilance. But his fault if any was his trust and confidence in the
care and ability of the members of the Board of Canvassers to add short
and simple numbers of two or three digits. Anyone of us unless extremely
wary, and suspicious of fraud or deception, is liable to incur in the
same laxity or fault arid repose implicit confidence in the ability of
the Board of Canvassers, composed of the members of the municipal
council to perform a ministerial and mathematical duty—simple addition,
known and daily performed by elementary grade pupils.
The ordinary citizen who makes up the bulk of our population, not
versed in the law and its intricacies and technicalities, finds it
difficult if not impossible to understand why a candidate for councilor
receiving 3,060 votes js made to win over another candidate garnering a
larger number of votes—3,098, just because thru a clerical error or a
mistake in addition the votes for the first candidate were made to
appear as 3,160 instead of 3,060. Said ordinary citizen’s immediate and
only reaction would be to wonder and ask why such a thing can happen in a
free country, and why the error should not and cannot forthwith be
corrected. He is confused, and added to his confusion, he is baffled by
the refusal of the majority of this Tribunal to correct the mistake, and
its insistence in continuing and perpetuating a grievious error—that of
maintaining in the municipal council a candidate not duly elected
thereto except thru a clerical error or mistake in addition, in place of
another candidate receiving a larger number of votes and therefore the
choice of the electorate:
Petition granted.