THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CONRADO SAN MIGUEL, JESUS BUENAVENTURA, GONZALO PEREZ, ALIPIO PEREZ, RICARDO PEREZ AND RAUL MENDOZA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

People versus San Miguel

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in the murder of Remigio Tan, an assassination in what the Court itself calls gangland style, where the triggerman is rubbed out immediately after his mission in order to silence him. The People charged Conrado San Miguel, Jesus Buenaventura, Gonzalo Perez, Alipio Perez, Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza with murder. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how conspiracy is proved through the testimony of a discharged co-conspirator, it shows how the Court grades the criminal responsibility of conspirators who are not indispensable to the execution of the crime, and it shows the correct use of an accused's silence at trial.

Procedural History

The case was tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which rendered its decision on May 30, 1969. The trial court convicted all six accused of murder. It sentenced San Miguel and Buenaventura to death, and Mendoza and the three Perez defendants to reclusion perpetua, with solidary indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of Remigio Tan. In the same decision, San Miguel was separately convicted of the murder of Maximo Dacer and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All six appealed to the Supreme Court. Buenaventura died in prison on September 26, 1971, and San Miguel died on August 16, 1978. The Court dismissed the cases against them as to criminal liability in its resolutions of December 14, 1971 and November 16, 1978. What remained for adjudication was the criminal responsibility of Mendoza, Gonzalo Perez, Alipio Perez and Ricardo Perez for the murder of Tan.

Facts

On August 11, 1968, Gonzalo Perez went to the house of his boyhood friend Ricardo de la Cruz in Makati and, in the presence of Maximo Dacer, offered the mission of killing Remigio Tan for a reward of twenty thousand pesos. Gonzalo named Captain Jesus Buenaventura and Detective Corporal Conrado San Miguel of the Manila Police Department as the persons interested in the liquidation. A few days later, the group met at the house of Gonzalo's brother Alipio in Tondo, where Buenaventura promised the reward, promised employment as police informers, and assured them that the killing had the blessings of high officials. Dacer and De la Cruz stayed at the Morocco Hotel for two weeks, receiving pocket money from Gonzalo and Alipio, and Gonzalo gave Dacer the thirty-eight caliber revolver to be used in the killing.

The group conducted four surveillance operations. On the first three, they trailed Tan from his residence on Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City, to the church in Quiapo, and to a theater in Ermita, but the killing was not carried out. On the fourth operation, on September 3, 1968, Tan's car was followed to Escolta Street in Manila. Tan alighted and entered the Tuason Building. Gonzalo parked his jeep, dropped Dacer and De la Cruz near Yatco's store, and returned with Ricardo Perez and Mendoza in a white Impala. San Miguel and Buenaventura arrived in a jeep, and the group stationed themselves near the sidewalk in front of Botica Boie.

When Tan came out and walked to the corner of Escolta and T. Pinpin Streets, Dacer and De la Cruz followed him. Dacer drew his revolver and shot Tan in the nape. Tan fell and died of the gunshot wound. Dacer walked back along Escolta Street, but Patrolman Julian Gatmaitan grabbed him from behind. San Miguel arrived, pushed Dacer, elbowed the patrolman aside, and shot Dacer, who died of his wounds. De la Cruz fled, sensing that he might be killed also, and surrendered on September 27, 1968 in Malolos, Bulacan. He was discharged as a defendant and became the star prosecution witness. The reward was never paid.

Issues

• Whether or not conspiracy among the appellants to kill Remigio Tan was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the uncorroborated testimony of De la Cruz, a discharged co-conspirator, is sufficient to support conviction.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the evidence of the defense, including the alibis and denials of the appellants.
• Whether or not Mendoza's failure to testify may be taken against him.
• Whether or not the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and whether or not Alipio Perez, Ricardo Perez and Mendoza should be held liable as co-principals or merely as accomplices.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1, paragraph d, of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court provides:

A defendant's neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.

This provision governs the fourth issue, because the trial court took an unfavorable view of Mendoza's failure to take the witness stand.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The motive was the promised reward, and the compadre relationship bound the Perezes to Buenaventura and San Miguel. The Court said that if those interested in the liquidation were willing to pay twenty thousand pesos to the triggerman, it stands to reason that they would pay another amount to those who cooperated in looking for the triggerman and who took part in the surveillance.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that the testimony of a co-conspirator should be received with caution, because a culprit confessing a crime is likely to put the blame as far as possible on others. But the Court held that such testimony may suffice when it is sincere in itself, given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and replete with details that could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought or concoction. De la Cruz testified at eight hearings, withstood rigorous cross-examination, and was corroborated in part by two bellboys of the Morocco Hotel, by Tan's driver, and by an eyewitness.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the trial court's rejection of the alibis of Gonzalo and Ricardo Perez and of the denials of Alipio Perez, because positive testimony prevails over denials and alibis.

On the fourth issue, the Court corrected the trial court's misapprehension. Mendoza's silence could not be used against him. What the trial court meant was simply that Mendoza presented no evidence at all, so the testimony of De la Cruz against him remained unrebutted.

On the fifth issue, the Court affirmed the conviction of Gonzalo Perez as a co-principal, because he was very active in planning the killing, contacted the triggerman, took part in the surveillance, and was present at the scene. As to Alipio Perez, Ricardo Perez and Mendoza, the Court held that although conspiracy was established and the act of one is the act of all, their participation was not very indispensable. Alipio was not present at the scene and took part only in the first surveillance; Ricardo was drawn in as San Miguel's compadre; Mendoza was merely the family driver. Leaning to the milder form of criminal responsibility, the Court held them to be accomplices. The killing was murder qualified by evident premeditation, with treachery offset by voluntary surrender.

Doctrine

First, the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator may be sufficient for conviction when it is sincere in itself, given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and replete with details that could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought or concoction. Second, once conspiracy is established, the act of a co-conspirator is the act of all, but where the participation of an accused is not indispensable to the execution of the crime, the courts lean to the milder form of criminal responsibility and hold him an accomplice rather than a principal. Third, under Section 1, paragraph d, of Rule 115, an accused's neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him; his failure to present evidence merely leaves the prosecution's testimony unrebutted.

Disposition

The judgment as to Gonzalo Perez was affirmed. The judgment as to Mendoza, Alipio Perez and Ricardo Perez was modified: as accomplices, each was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay solidarily to the heirs of Remigio Tan an indemnity of eight thousand pesos, with subsidiary solidary responsibility for four thousand pesos, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the act of one co-conspirator is the act of all, but where participation is not indispensable, the courts lean to the milder form of criminal responsibility. Examiners use this case to test the sufficiency of a co-conspirator's testimony and the distinction between a principal and an accomplice in conspiracy.