THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FERNANDO FELIPE ALIAS “LYING,” DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Fernando Felipe alias ” Iying” appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan convicting him of rape, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended
woman, Ruth Pancho, the sum of P3 ,000.00 “for the social humiliation she has
suffered, to provide maintenance and support for the child, Marivic Pancho, and
to pay the costs.”

Prosecution evidence shows that at about 8:00 in the evening of July 9, 1971,
Ruth Pancho was in a room in their house in Sta. Barbara, Baliwag, Bulacan, when
she heard some noise by the window.  She did not pay much attention to the noise
but later saw the appellant, an uncle by affinity, who covered her mouth, poked
a gun on her chest and warned her not to shout, otherwise she would be killed. 
Notwithstanding the threat, Ruth pushed and kicked the appellant who then boxed
her on the thighs, poked his gun at her and removed her panty.  Appellant
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant following which he poked
his gun at her again and told her that if she would report the matter to anyone
he would kill her.

Afraid of the threat made upon her by the appellant, Ruth did not report the
incident to anyone until December 5, 1971, when her sister-in-law, Angelita Sta.
Maria- Pancho, noticed the enlargement of her abdomen.  Mrs. Pancho informed
complainant’s mother about her condition and the following day the matter was
reported to the police.  Ruth was examined by Dr. Artemio Marcelo and was found
six months pregnant.

Ruth was twenty-five (25) years old at the time of the trial and her
educational attainment is only first year high school because she had to stop
schooling due to low intelligence.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the accused, through counsel,
manifested that he was submitting his case on the basis of the evidence
presented by the People and that he would submit a memorandum for a judgment of
acquittal.

No direct evidence whatsoever was presented to belie the testimony of the
complainant.  Notwithstanding, we have accorded unswerving fidelity to the
constitutional canon that an accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven and that, consequently, the burden of proof as to the offense charge lies
on the prosecution.  Accordingly, an accused should be convicted on the strength
of the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
defense.  Thus, we cannot sanction a verdict of conviction on the basis solely
or mainly of the failure or refusal of the accused to take the witness stand to
deny the charges against him.

Such situation does not obtain, however, in the case at bar.

The trial court, analyzing the evidence of the prosecution and the memorandum
of the defense, arrived at the conclusion that the crime of rape was committed
by the appellant Fernando Felipe upon the complainant Ruth Pancho on the night
of July 9, 1971.

We find the conclusion of the trial court which sustained the People’s
evidence to be correct and plausible.

“In arriving at this determination, this Court has taken into consideration
the demeanor of Ruth Pancho during the Trial.  She impressed the Court as shy,
reticent and unsophisticated, reared as she was in the provincial ways,
unschooled in protecting her virtues against the proddings of the male species. 
She admitted possessing a mental weakness, a low intelligence quotient, which
caused her being removed from first year high school by her parents, and made to
attend to household chores, caring for the baby and laundering clothes.  She
appeared very modest and unassuming, her manners belied any wile or craft.  Her
testimony flowed out in simple terms, firm and sincere.  At times her answers
could not match the professional bent of the questions of the learned
cross-examiner, counsel for the defense.  Yet she replied with candor.  In her
statement to the police in the preliminary investigation, there was no deviation
from the main facts of her accusation and she repeated her story before this
Court practically four square on the material points which prompted the Defense
Counsel to state in his Memorandum, ‘All these contradicting statements reveal
the fact that the complainant has a propensity to compromise the truth.  If she
could lie on the following statements, what could have prevented her from lying
on the material points of her testimony?’ Here then is an admission on the part
of the Defense that the contradictions exhibited by the complainant were not on
material points.  Besides his observations regarding her propensity to
compromise with the truth would very well apply to a sophisticated girl wily and
crafty in mentality.  The complainant, as already observed, is guileless and
simple in her demeanor.  So the contradictions were more the product of mental
weakness rather than deliberate falsehood or concoctions which, this Court finds
the complainant is, not capable of perpetrating.

“Ordinarily, the length of time that had expired before the complainant
reported the incident to the police authorities would be suspect, but in the
case of Ruth Pancho, it would seem that her fear and shame took hold and
possessed her until such time that her shame could no longer be kept a secret. 
This was in the early part of December, 1971.  Innocent, indeed, she was, for
the irregular arrival of her menstruation, sometimes, none in two months, three
months, but then her bulging stomach could no longer hide her secret —
pregnancy.  Her fear was not only for herself but for her parents as well.  Her
demeanor and behaviour cannot be undermined.  On the contrary, it ought to be
admired and respected.  It is the dutiful daughter who would place the lives of
her parents above her own.  Fear can take on different proportions which in this
case of a girl like the complainant, can be maintained through the interplay of
the shame that possessed her hand in hand.

“The Defense is of the opinion that the force employed is of small proportion
that the resistance put up by the victim cannot support the conviction of rape. 
This proposition runs counter to the decision of the Court of Appeals in People
vs. Lim Chua Pun decided on December 13, 1962, where the appellate court
observed, ‘While we do not dispute the appellant’s argument that mere initial
token resistance is insufficient to sustain a conviction for rape, it is an
equally true and accepted doctrine that force in rape is not strictly limited to
physical force alone.  It has been held that fear is capable of producing and
having the effect of physical force required to overcome the resistance put up
by a victim of rape.  It is precisely the contention of the appellee that it was
this fear, instilled in the Complainant by the appellant’s threat to kill her
backed up by revolver he was then wielding x x x.’ This is an instance where
force in rape includes intimidation and is applicable to the present case.

“FINALLY, the Defense has insinuated that there had been a relationship,
beyond that of uncle-in-law and niece between the accused and the complainant. 
Such allegation demands the presentation of evidence on the part of the
accused.  This, he did not do.  Again, there are many more things that were
insinuated and evidence ought to have been presented.  Other allegations of fact
were made, such as the possession of the gun that ought to have been denied by
the accused if it were not true at all.  The failure of the defense to put up
any denial as to these allegations of fact and as to the rape itself is an
indication that the incident actually occurred.  On this point, the accused
would rely on mere presumptions for his defense.  Ironically, the presumption is
against the accused, for the Honorable the Supreme Court intoned in People vs.
Francisquite, 56 SCRA 765, that ‘(It) is apparent that the accused is so
situated that he could produce evidence of all the facts and circumstances to
overcome the evidence of the prosecution, but fails without justifiable cause to
offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that such proof, if produced,
instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge.  x x x’

“FURTHERMORE, there is no evidence to show that the complainant has harbored
any grudge of any sort whatsoever for her to concoct evidence or to tell a
sordid story against the husband of a close relative, the sister of her own
mother.  This is contrary to the natural course of human behavior.  It would
take the sophistication of a Macchiavelli to invent such a distorted picture of
a close relative (even an in-law), or of any man for that matter, without rancor
and without motivation.  The failure of the Defense to produce evidence in
respect to any kind of hate existing either on her part, or that of her kins,
against the accused produces in the mind of the Court the respect to which her
candid testimony in open session merits.  A true Filipina would not go around in
public declaring the facts of her defloration for no reason if such were not the
true facts.”

Defendant-appellant alleges that the trial court erred –

“I

“x x x in giving weight to the testimony of Ruth Pancho and making it the
basis of its judgment of conviction despite the fact that –

“( a)  said testimony is highly improbable, unnatural and borders on the
absurd;

“(b)  it is fraught with inconsistencies and is self-contradictory;

“(c)  it proceeds from a necessarily biased and polluted source; and

“(d)  it lacks corroboration on material and significant points and is
contradicted by the other evidence on record.

“II

“x x x in not holding that the evidence for the prosecution is legally
insufficient to establish the commission of the crime of rape.

“III

“x x x in motu propio postponing the testimony of Ruth Pancho , thus
providing the prosecution ample opportunity to coach its principal witness.

“IV

“x x x in not acquitting appellant for lack of proof of his guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt.”

The thrust of the errors assigned was that the act complained of was
consummated with the consent of the complainant or at least with some degree of
acquiescence in her part.  Such theory does not, however, find support in the
evidence on record.  As aptly observed by the trial court, the undenied,
unrebutted and uncontradicted testimony of Ruth Pancho as corroborated by the
medico-legal findings of Dr. Artemio Marcelo clearly shows that appellant
Fernando Felipe had sexual intercourse with the complainant by means of force
and intimidation.  The trial court even conducted an occular inspection of the
place in the presence of the fiscal, the private prosecutor, the defense counsel
and the accused, and found that “the window that complaining witness was talking
about is about 2 x 1½ meters in width and 1½ meter in height; the window sill
has a height of about 4 to 5 m. from the ground, and immediately in front of it
is a guava tree which has a branch of about 1½ meters away from the window sill,
and it was there during the incident; demonstrating how she was lying down that
evening, witness demonstrated that her head was at the middle of the room, at a
distance of her head to the window is 3½ feet and the distance of her head from
the door leading to the sala is around 4 feet; she heard the creeping sound on
the window near her feet; witness also demonstrated that the three panes of the
window were closed with a small portion slightly opened; the electric bulb above
her head was working at the time but it was not lighted at the time of the
incident; it was also dark outside and there was no moon; it was not raining.”

Anent the contention that the trial court erred in holding that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt,
suffice it to say that “absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law
as basis for conviction of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required
as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.” ( U.S.
vs. Lasada , G.R. No. 5324, December 28, 1910, 18 Phil. 90; People vs. Dramayo ,
G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59).  Such requirement has been
complied with in the case at bar.  Besides, it has been the consistent ruling of
this Court that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their department and manner
of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value, that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.

Further, the defense contends that the fact that a child was born of the
complainant on March 13, 1972 shows that the latter could not have been raped on
July 9, 1971 because there are only 247 days between these dates; that the
normal period of gestation is 280 days and that the Civil Code considers 300
days as the length of uterine development of a child.

The claim is without merit.  As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in
his brief, ” a child born 8 months and seven days after conception is considered
normal.  x x x ; that in certain instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as
the length of the uterine development of a child, but by providing that a
premature child is one which has an intra-uterine life of less than seven months
(Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a child which had an
intra-uterine life of 8 months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child.”

As aforestated, the essential elements of the crime of rape have been proven
satisfactorily by the prosecution.  Not only is the testimony of the victim
corroborated and unrebutted by a disinterested and expert witness, Dr. Artemio
Marcelo, but also this Court has time and again observed that it is hard to
believe that an unmarried woman like the victim would publicly disclose that she
was raped by a relative by affinity and subject her private parts to examination
unless she is motivated by a strong desire to bring to justice the culprit who
had previously wronged her.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
with costs against defendant-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., and Melencio-Herrera,
J., took no part.