OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. NANCY G. BUCOY, STENOGRAPHIC REPORTER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 142, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENT.

Respondent Nancy G. Bucoy is a Stenographic Reporter of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, presided by Judge Salvador de
Guzman. She is administratively charged
herein for acts constituting gross misconduct in connection with her
participation in the procurement of an injunction bond in connection with Civil
Case No. 90-659 pending before the same court.

It appears that on March 8, 1990, an action for sum of money with prayer for preliminary
injunction entitled “Alexander Van Twest vs. Gloria Anacleto,”
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-659, was filed and raffled to Branch 142 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati where respondent is the stenographic
reporter. The prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted on March 28, 1990, by presiding
Judge Salvador P. de Guzman “on the condition that within five (5) working
days from today, the plaintiff shall post a bond in the sum of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos” (Rollo, p. 29). Respondent volunteered to complainant’s counsel that she had a friend at
Domestic Insurance Co. who would be willing to issue a P1,000,000.00 injunction
bond against a 3% premium or P30,000.00. Van Twest, plaintiff in said civil case, then issued Bank of the Philippine
Islands check for P30,000.00 dated March 30, 1990, payable to “cash”
and transmitted the check to respondent through his secretary Remia V.
Sali. Respondent encashed the subject
check but was not able to procure the bond allegedly because Van Twest failed
to submit the documentary requirements of the bonding company. Thus, Van Twest’s counsel filed a motion for
extension of time to file an injunction bond.

Meanwhile, Van Twest was able to procure a surety bond, SB No.
00646 dated April 20, 1990 in the sum of P1,000,000.00, from First Integrated
Bonding & Insurance Co. Inc., through the help of another counsel. In view of this development, respondent upon
demand returned the balance of the money intended for the premium of the bond
to Van Twest through the latter’s secretary, after deducting expenses
therefrom.

Later, the subject check found its way to the National Bureau of
Investigation, having been referred by a “concerned citizen” who
claimed that the proceeds of the check represented the consideration given to
Judge Salvador de Guzman for favorable action in Civil Case No. 90-659. The NBI investigation however, yielded no
evidence to hold Judge de Guzman liable criminally or administratively but
recommended the filing of administrative charges against herein
respondent. Hence, the present
complaint.

In her Comment, respondent emphasized the fact that the check
issued was intended as payment of the premium for the issuance of the
injunction bond. Respondent explained
that although she already encashed the check on April 2, 1990, the bond was not
issued because Van Twest failed to submit the documentary requirements of the
bonding company, such as the Income Tax Return, Alien Certificate of
Registration, Certificate of Time Deposit, etc., thus necessitating the filing
of two motions for extension of time to file an injunction bond. However, the transaction with Domestic
Insurance never materialized because Van Twest employed another counsel who
secured the injunction bond from another company, the First Integrated Bonding
and Insurance Co.

Another defense interposed by respondent is the return of the
proceeds of the check less expenses, to Van Twest’s secretary. She presented the following liquidation of
the proceeds:

P15,065        –           Amount given to Atty. Ambrosio
(Collaborating counsel of Atty. Jimenez)

P 6,000        –           Cancellation
fee paid to employee of Domestic Insurance Co., by the name of Pat Pelayo

P 1,162        –           Cost
of Transcript of Stenographic Notes due from Plaintiff

P 1,273        –           Taxi
fares, photocopying and other miscellaneous expenses

P 6,500        –           Balance given to Remia V. Sali (Van
Twest’s secretary)

======

P30,000

Further, respondent insisted that her participation in the
transaction was very minimal to wit:

“4.4. All the undersigned did was merely to
refer plaintiff’s Atty. Ernesto Perez to Domestic Insurance Corporation and
later, when plaintiff’s BPI check for P30,000.00 was left at her table, she
encashed the same during her lunch break after which Pat Pelayo of Domestic
Insurance Corporation came over and picked up the P30,000.00. The papers were picked up by plaintiff’s
Secretary, Mrs. Remia V. Sali after which the undersigned had no more knowledge
of the matter until Mrs. Sali asked for the return of the money on the ground
that Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez had already taken a bond from First Integrated
Bonding & Insurance Co.” (Rollo, p. 202).

After respondent filed her Comment on the complaint, this case
was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The complaint at hand being administrative in nature, the quantum
of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, defined
as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 26 [1987];
Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. vs. Tanco, Jr., 193 SCRA 323 [1991]).

Evidence submitted to this Court for consideration reveals that
respondent admits her participation in the procurement of an injunction bond in
favor of Van Twest. Not only does she
acknowledge the fact that she “referred” complainant’s counsel to
Domestic Insurance, respondent likewise admits that she personally encashed the
check issued and sent by Van Twest to her for the payment of the premium of the
injunction bond and disbursed the proceeds thereof as shown by the liquidation
aforementioned. Apparently, respondent
had no qualms admitting the acts complained of.

In making a determination of whether or not these acts amount to
an administrative violation, the ethical standards by which the conduct of
court personnel are gauged should be considered. At first glance, it is readily apparent that respondent exceeded
the functions of her office as a court stenographer when she personally sought
the acquisition of an injunction bond in favor of a party-litigant. Her position is essentially limited to the
transcription of the records of the proceedings during a court session. It does not generally entail dealing in
whatever capacity with party litigants, save in cases involving stenographic
notes. By having a direct involvement
in the procurement of the injunction bond in favor of Van Twest, an act
obviously outside her official function, respondent transgressed the
established norm of conduct prescribed for court employees, that is, to
maintain a hands-off attitude where dealings with party-litigants are
concerned. On one hand, such attitude
is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the courts, and on the
other, in order to free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct. As held in the case of Re Josefina V. Palon,
213 SCRA 219 [1992], the conduct required of court personnel must be beyond
reproach and must always be free from suspicion that may taint the Judiciary.

Whereas respondent maintains that she did not benefit from the
transaction, the above liquidation of proceeds she presented indicates
otherwise. Under the fourth item of the
said liquidation, respondent charged Van Twest for “taxi fares,
photocopying and other miscellaneous expenses,” amounting to a substantial
sum of P1,273.00. The sum being claimed
by respondent is plainly inordinate, especially considering that she was
supposedly rendering a mere “favor” to Van Twest. In addition, said expenses were not broken
down into specific amounts per item. Respondent did not even bother to state what the “miscellaneous
expenses” covered were. Respondent
should have itemized her expenses and provided receipts therefor to establish
the veracity of the stated amounts, thereby rendering her immune from suspicion
of any expense-padding or fabrication. As it is however, there is nothing on record to show that respondent did
not appropriate for her own benefit any portion of the amount she claimed from
Van Twest as reimbursement. According
to the Report submitted by the investigating Judge:

“No evidence was adduced to show that P15,065.00 (first item
of liquidation) was actually given to Atty. Ambrosio. The cancellation fee of P6,000.00 (second item of liquidation)
was also not proved. As a matter of
fact, no one from Domestic Insurance Corporation was presented as a
witness” (Rollo, p. 216).

Furthermore, that financial gain or at least the promise thereof
was the primary motive for her involvement in the transaction became manifest
in her statements to the investigating judge. In her letter to the investigating judge dated November 29, 1993,
respondent implied that she was bound to get a commission as an
“agent” from the insurance company if the transaction had pushed
through, to wit:

“While bonding companies may charge as low as P10,000 for a
bond of P1.0 Million, the actual premiums are much higher considering that
payment shall be coursed thru a regional agent, a general agent, and an agent
all of whom, are entitled to an over-riding commission each” (Rollo, p.
212).

The fact that respondent was in effect moonlighting as an
“agent” for the insurance company was made more evident by her
virtual and implicit admission before the investigating judge of her
expectation of monetary gain, when she said “Kahit papaano kikita ako
riyan” (Somehow, I would profit from that transaction), (Rollo, p. 216).

The aforementioned liquidation of proceeds likewise exposes
respondent to another administrative violation by charging Van Twest the sum of
P1,162.00 for 518 pages of stenographic notes. Considering that at the time the stenographic notes were taken in March
of 1990, the legal fee then was only .20/120 words. The P5.00/250 words/page rate upon which respondent based her
computation took effect only in November 1990. (Rule 141, Section 10, Rules of Court as amended). Obviously, respondent overcharged the
litigant for the payment of the stenographic notes.

Surely, respondent’s behavior is representative of the gross and
serious misconduct penalized by the ultimate penalty of dismissal under Section
22 (c), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). As defined in the case of Amosco vs. Magro, 73 SCRA 107 [1976],
misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. Her conduct is an example of
the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct that so quickly and surely corrodes
the respect for the courts without which the government cannot continue and
that tears apart the bonds of our polity. (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the disposition of justice, like the courts below, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility (Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258 [1981]; Garcia
vs. Eullaran, 196 SCRA 1 [1991]). Court personnel should be reminded that they
have no business getting personally involved in matters directly emanating from
court proceedings, unless expressly so provided by law. The preservation and maintenance of the
integrity of the judicial process is of paramount importance. They should at all times be aware that they
are accountable to the people and as such, they must serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives (Lim Arce vs. Arce, 205 SCRA 21 [1992]).

Under the circumstances, respondent failed to live up to these
high ethical standards. By committing
the questioned acts, respondent undermined the integrity of the service and
jeopardized the public’s faith in the impartiality of the courts. In this case, respondent was inspired by an
opportunity for financial gain, without even considering whether the same was
proper vis-a-vis her standing as an employee in the very court where the case
of the party-litigant involved is being tried.

Respondent’s materialistic orientation and seeming obsession over
money, not to mention her blatant disregard for ethical rules, amounts to gross
or serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent obviously lacks moral integrity
required of court employees. Her actuations in the premises destroy
the very image of the Judiciary and shall not be countenanced by this Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent NANCY G. BUCOY is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of
leave and retirement credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or
reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., on official leave.