PAGKAKAISANG ITINATAGUYOD NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ANG TIBAY (PIMA), ELISEO SAMSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ANG TIBAY, INCORPORATED, PRUDENCIO TEODORO AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELAT…

Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ang Tibay versus Ang Tibay, Incorporated

The Case

This is a labor case about the limits of the Court of Industrial Relations. A labor union and several of its members, the petitioners, ask the Supreme Court to review a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations sitting in banc. That resolution declared illegal the strike the union staged on November 14, 1957, and dismissed the union's complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, Incorporated, and its Assistant General Manager. The case matters because it draws a clean line between two kinds of wrong: a breach of a collective bargaining agreement, which is an ordinary contract question for the regular courts, and an unfair labor practice, which is the special concern of the industrial court. It also teaches what "discrimination" must mean before it becomes an unfair labor practice.

Procedural History

The union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Company and its Assistant General Manager before the Court of Industrial Relations. After hearing, the trial Judge of that court rendered a decision. The case was then taken up by the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, which affirmed the finding that the unfair labor practice charges had not been proved. The court in banc concluded that it could only dismiss the complaint, and that it had no jurisdiction to order the reinstatement of the strikers. From that resolution, the union and its members instituted the present appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts

The union and the Company had a collective bargaining agreement entered into on August 6, 1955. Among its terms was a promise to give an increase of five centavos per hour to regular hourly workers who were not converted to piece work, effective August 5, 1955. On June 26, 1956, the union wrote the Company asking for the renewal of the agreement and the enforcement of that increase. The Company paid the increase to all the workers except Jesus Guevarra, a union member, who was not fully paid. When the union pressed for the balance, the Company paid it on September 12, 1957, but dismissed Guevarra on that same date.

Earlier, after the union requested vacation leave pay for several workers under the agreement, the Company stopped its operations in the slipper department on March 16, 1957, putting those workers, except Armando Jacinto, out of work. On June 10, 1957, the Company summarily dismissed Asuncion Ablaza, who was the union's secretary and an active member. On September 6, 1957, the union made a last effort to settle all pending differences. Failing, it filed a notice of strike on September 20, 1957. Even after the union acceded to management's proposals for Guevarra's reinstatement and for separation pay to the others, the proposal was dishonored, and the union struck on November 14, 1957.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1957, the union and the Company agreed to settle all their differences, including the return to work of all strikers on November 18, 1957. But when the strikers reported on that date, the Company refused to readmit them unless they apologized for the strike and admitted that it was wrong. The strikers refused. The Company, for its part, contended that the five slipper-makers were hired not by it but by an independent contractor, that the dismissals of Guevarra and Ablaza were justified, and that the strike was illegal.

Issues

• Whether or not the dismissal of union member Guevarra and union official Ablaza without prior investigation, in breach of the collective bargaining agreement, constituted an unfair labor practice under the Industrial Peace Act.
• Whether or not the Company committed discrimination in the readmission of the strikers that amounted to an unfair labor practice.
• Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations had authority to order the reinstatement of the strikers after the unfair labor practice charges failed.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies Section 4(a) of Republic Act Number 875, the Industrial Peace Act, which defines unfair labor practices of an employer. The Court quotes its operative language on discrimination:

to constitute an unfair labor practice, the discrimination committed by the employer must be in regard to the "hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."

This language bears on the case because the Court measures the Company's conduct against it, and finds that the condition imposed on returning strikers was not meant to encourage or discourage union membership.

The decision also refers to Section 5, paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of Republic Act Number 875, which govern the proceedings in an unfair labor practice case before the industrial court. These provisions bear on the case because they frame the action as one for unfair labor practice, and thus fix the issue on appeal as the correctness of the ruling exonerating the Company.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that even assuming the dismissals of Guevarra and Ablaza were effected without the prior investigation called for by the collective bargaining agreement, such a breach did not in itself constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 4(a) of Republic Act Number 875. The Court stated the rule plainly: the violation by the employer of the obligations imposed by the collective bargaining agreement may be redressed, not in the Court of Industrial Relations, but in the regular courts, not unlike an ordinary obligation or contract. The Court also noted that the theory now stressed by the petitioners was a change of theory in the court below.

On the second issue, the Court held that the discrimination must be of the kind the statute describes, namely, in regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. The exaction from returning strikers of a promise not to destroy company property and not to commit acts of reprisal against union members who did not join the strike cannot be considered as intended to encourage or discourage union membership. Taking the circumstances, the requirement was an act of self-preservation, designed to insure the maintenance of peace and order in the Company premises.

On the third issue, the Court held that since the charges of unfair labor practice were not substantiated, a finding it saw no reason to disturb, the dismissal of the complaint was proper. The Industrial Court indeed did not possess authority to order the reinstatement of the strikers after they had failed to prove the unfair labor practice charges against the employer.

Doctrine

A violation by an employer of the obligations imposed upon him by a collective bargaining agreement is not, in itself, an unfair labor practice under Section 4(a) of Republic Act Number 875. The remedy lies in the regular courts, as on an ordinary obligation or contract, not in the Court of Industrial Relations. To constitute an unfair labor practice, the discrimination committed by the employer must be in regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. A condition imposed on returning strikers that serves to protect company property and keep the peace is an act of self-preservation, not discrimination. And where the unfair labor practice charges fail, the industrial court has no authority to order the reinstatement of the strikers.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, with costs against the petitioners, so the Company prevailed and the complaint was dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a breach of a collective bargaining agreement is an ordinary contract claim for the regular courts, not an unfair labor practice for the industrial court. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between contract breach and unfair labor practice, and the meaning of discrimination that encourages or discourages union membership.