MODESTA N. OCA AND AMADO OCA, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JUDGE DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND OSCAR A. INOCENTES, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR QU…

Appellants were charged in the municipal court of Quezon City under the following information (Criminal Case No, 30230):

“The undersigned Special Counsel for Quezon City
accuses MODESTA NANO DE CCA and AM ADO OCA Y NANO of the crime of Ill
Treatment, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd
day of November, 1959, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
without any justifiable cause, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of Maria Loreto Lintag de Garcia by then and
there strangling the latter and pushing her in the cement floor thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries which, however did not require
medical attendance, to the damage and prejudice of the said Maria
Loreto Lintag de Garcia in such amount as may be. awarded under the
Civil Code.

Contrary to law.”

After arraignment, wherein appellants entered a plea of not guilty,
they filed a motion to quash on the ground that the formation charged
two offenses: ill-treatment and physical injuries. The motion was
denied, and appellants thereupon filed a petition for prohibition
and/or certiorari with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City branch,
asking that respondents Judge of the municipal court and special
counsel handling the prosecution be enjoined from proceeding with the
trial of the case and that an order be issued quashing the information.
On September 29, 1960 the said Court, without requiring respondents to
answer or setting the petition for hearing, dismissed the same, saying
that “although there is a difference between the designation of the
offense and the statement of the acts complained of, the information in
criminal case No. 30230 charges only one offense of slight physical
injuries. “It is from this order of dismissal that the appeal now
before us has been taken.

The order should be sustained for two reasons. First, since
appellants did not move to quash the information before they pleaded
thereto they should be taken to have waived all objections which are
grounds for such a motion except “when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the
same.” Rule 113, section 10; Provincial Fiscal vs. Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 79 Phil., 165. The second reason goes to
the merits of the petition. Although the information states that the
crime charged is ill-treatment, which falls under paragraph 3 of Art.
266 of the Revised Penal Code, the allegations of facts in the body
thereof clearly describe the offense of slight physical injuries under
paragraph 2 of the same article. It is already settled doctrine that
the qualification of a crime is not governed by the designation given
by the prosecuting attorney in the first part of the information, but
by the recital in the body, thereof as to facts alleged to have been
committed by the defendant. U.S. vs. Reyes, 14 Phil., 270; U.S. vs. Urn San, 17 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Gumban, 39 Phil. 76; People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil., 656.

In the Lim San case, supra, this Court discussed at length the rationale of the doctrine in this wise:

“From a legal point of view, and in a very real
sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to
enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of
justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in
the body of “the information proved in the trial is not the crime
characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to
which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things, also, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it
is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the
information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime
the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For
his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at
all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, “Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not, “Did you commit a
crime named murder?” If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner
stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the
crime is or what it is named. If the accused performed the acts alleged
in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished adequately,
whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.”

The information under review here alleges with sufficient clarity
the specific acts committed by appellants, and it is upon such
allegations—not upon the denomination of the offense given by the
prosecuting counsel—that appellants must prepare their defense and
stand trial.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion Barera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.