CICERO C. JURADO AS CITY FISCAL OF ILIGAN CITY, PETITIONER, VS. SUY YAN, RESPONDENT.

This petition for certiorari
filed by City Fiscal Cicero C. Jurado of Iligan City, seeks the review of the resolution dated March
24, 1969 of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five, penned by then
Presiding Justice Julio Villamor and concurred in by
Justices Juan Enriquez and Jose Rodriguez, with Justices Angel Mojica and Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. dissenting, which resolution “directs
the respondent fiscal to elect and amend the information by charging petitioner
and his co-accused with only one offense under paragraph 2 (a) or 2 (d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and eliminating the other”.

In a decision dated September
28, 1968 penned by Associate Justice Angel Mojica
of the First Division of Three of the Court of Appeals with then Presiding
Justice Julio Villamor and Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. concurring,
the proceedings had in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Norte were recounted thus:

“Petitioner Suy Yan
alias James Yap and Chao Ce
alias Co Chiongtai were charged with the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte in Criminal Case No. 1395.  The body of the information reads as follows:

‘That on or about May 9, 1967, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, representing the Davao Good Hope Marketing,
cement dealer in Davao City, where accused Suy Yan alias James Yap is the
manager and Chao Ce alias Chiongtai is his employee and authorized representative,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent misrepresentations, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Jose Dy
Pico, Manager of the Dy Pico Sons, a business
establishment in the City of Iligan, engaged in
General Merchandise including the buy and sell of cement, in the following
manner, to wit:  the said accused, by
falsely pretending and misrepresenting themselves to have in their possession
sufficient funds in the bank to pay for every cement purchases they make with Dy Pico Sons, the said accused, knowing that they did not
have sufficient funds in the bank, induced the said Dy
Pico Sons to sell them 25,000 bags of cement at P4.82 per bag with a total
value of P120,500 and said Dy Pico Sons deceived by
the misrepresentations of the accused, sold and delivered to the accused 25,000
bags of cement, after which the said accused, paid Dy
Pico Sons in the following manner, to wit: 
said accused, issued and made out TCBT (The Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation) checks payable to Dy Pico Sons

TCBT Check No. 65333 – P30,000.00

TCBT Check No. 65339 – P20,000.00

TCBT Check No. 65340 – P57,668.90

Cash                               – P  1,500.00

Cash                               – P11,331.10

a total of P120,500 and gave said checks
and cash money to Dy Pico, Manager of the Dy Pico Sons, in payment of the said 25,000 bags of cement
purchased by them from the said Dy Pico Sons, that
upon presentation of said TCBT Check No. 65339 in the amount of P20,000.00 to
the bank for payment, the same was dishonored and refused payment, for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the accused Suy Yan alias James Yap and Chao Ce alias Co Chiongtai,
representing the Davao Good Hope Marketing, did not
have sufficient funds therein, to the damage and prejudice of the said Dy Pico Sons in the aforementioned sum of P20,000.00,
Philippine Currency.

‘Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 2(a) and (d) of the
Revised Penal Code.’

“The arraignment having been set on December 6, 1967, the
petitioner, under date of December 4, 1967, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the said information charges more than one
offense, because it clearly and expressly accused petitioner of two distinct
offenses of estafa, to wit:  (a) estafa under
paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which punishes the act
of defrauding a person by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits’, i.e., estafa through false pretenses; and (b) estafa
under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes
the act of ‘postdating a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check’.

“On December 15,
1967, the respondent fiscal filed his answer to the motion to
quash.  In his said answer, Annex C, the
respondent fiscal alleged that the information he filed charges only one
offense because only the offense of estafa is charged
and even if the information enumerates one or more means enumerated in
paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, still the crime charged
in the information is only one offense and that is estafa,
or swindling.  In other words, said respondent
alleged that although the body of the information contains a recital of the
means resorted to and availed of by the accused in the perpetration or
commission of the offense, the same charges only one offense — estafa.

“On December 27,
1967, the respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioner’s
motion to quash (Annex D).

“On February 3, 1968, herein petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash (Annex E); and in his
order dated February 17, 1968, the respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration (Annex “F”).

“While the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
was pending consideration, the respondent judge set the hearing of the case for
one whole week, on March 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 1968.  Consequently, on February 27, 1968, petitioner prayed the respondent
judge to cancel the hearing and to reset the same to another date after the
motion for reconsideration shall have been resolved (Annex G).

“On March 7, 1968,
the respondent judge issued an order (Annex H) denying ‘the motion to cancel
the trial of this case on March 22 to
29, 1968 xx xx unless the accused could
secure an injunctive order from the proper higher court restraining this court
to continue trying this case, as scheduled’. 
Hence, this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction on the grounds (a) that the respondent judge has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as
to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, correctible by the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus; (b) that the petitioner
has no remedy of appeal (the order denying the motion to quash being
interlocutory) or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law than the present petition.” (pp. 60-64, rec.)

In its decision of September 28, 1968, the Division of Three of
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that after his motion to
quash is denied, the accused Suy Yan’s
remedy was not to file certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, but to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating
his special defenses that he had invoked in his motion to quash, and, if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, since the trial
court has jurisdiction over the offense charged, citing Arches vs. Beldia, et. al.,^[1] Acharon vs. Purisima, et. al.,^[2] Chuatoco vs. Aragon, et. al.,^[3]
People vs. Macandog,^[4]
see also David vs. Miranda, et. al.^[5]

On October 17, 1968, counsel for the accused Suy
Yan filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 76-82,
rec.) on the ground that appeal in due course as the proper remedy against the
order of the court granting or denying a motion to quash in a criminal case is
no longer the hard and fast rule, citing Lopez vs. Paras,^[6]
Yap vs. Hon. D. Lutero, etc.,^[7]
and Lopez vs. Alikpala,^[8]
and that the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in denying his motion to quash and thereby denying his
constitutional rights to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him and to prepare adequately for his defense.

The City Fiscal of Iligan City filed
his opposition dated December 10, 1968
to the motion for reconsideration (pp. 83-87, rec.), to which Suy Yan filed his reply dated January 13, 1969 (pp. 89-98, rec.).

On March 24, 1969, three members of the Special Division of Five
promulgated the aforementioned resolution reconsidering the decision of
September 28, 1968 and ordering the respondent fiscal to elect and amend the
information by charging the accused Suy Yan and his co-accused with only one offense under paragraph
2 (a) or 2 (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and eliminating the
other (pp. 99-103, rec.), with Justices Mojica and Concepcion, Jr. dissenting (pp. 104-110, rec.).

The City Fiscal of Iligan City filed a
motion for reconsideration dated April 23, 1969 (pp. 112-116, rec.) of the said
resolution of March 24, 1969 and for the re-instatement of the decision of
September 28, 1968, to which the accused Suy Yan filed his opposition dated May 19, 1969 (pp. 117-118,
rec.).

In a resolution dated June
2, 1969, the same three members of the Special Division of Five denied
the motion for reconsideration of the City Fiscal, while the two dissenting
Justices voted to grant the same (p. 119, rec.).

Hence, this petition for review filed by the City Fiscal of Iligan City.

The petitioner should have been the People of the Philippines,
the real party in interest, and not the City Fiscal of Iligan
City, who is merely the counsel of the People. 
However, this formal error does not affect the resolution of the
petition on the merits.

As correctly ruled by Mr. Justice Angel H. Mojica,
speaking for the Division of Three Justices of the Court of Appeals in their
decision dated September 28, 1968,
the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by respondent Suy Yan before the Court of Appeals is without merit.

The Supreme Court with marked consistency has ruled that neither certiorari nor prohibition lies against
an order of the court denying the motion to quash the complaint or information
in a criminal case, because such an order is interlocutory and therefore not appealable as it is not a decision on the merits.  The accused after such denial of his motion
to quash must proceed to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate his
special defenses he invoked in his motion and if, after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, his remedy is to appeal therefrom.^[9]

The allegations in the information are clear and do not charge
the accused with two offenses.  As
contended by the City Fiscal of Iligan City, the
information accuses the defendant of only one estafa
committed by false pretenses under paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, but specifically describes the false pretenses or deceitful acts
employed by the accused in perpetrating the offense, namely, his falsely
pretending to possess property, credit or business under sub-paragraph (a) of
the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 315 and by postdating a check or issuing
such check in payment of an obligation knowing that he had no sufficient funds
in the bank to cover the amount of the check, without informing the payee of
such circumstances, under sub-paragraph (d) of the same paragraph 2 of Article
315.  It is emphasized herein that
sub-paragraphs (a) and (d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are two of
the five false pretenses or fraudulent acts that can be employed and were
actually employed in this case by the accused to commit the one crime of estafa charged against him in the information.

In the case of People vs. Camerino, et.
al., this High Tribunal quoted with approval the commentary of Professor Ambrosio Padilla to the effect that the “charge is not
defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in the different
modes prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set forth under
different counts specifying the way of its perpetration, or the acts resulted
from a single criminal impulse.  Neither
is there duplicity when the other offense described is but an essential element
of the real offense charged nor when several acts are related describing the
offense”.^[10]

As heretofore stated, the allegations in the information falling
under sub-paragraphs (a) and (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, merely specify two of the various modes of committing the crime of estafa thru deceit, the only offense with which the accused
Suy Yan is charged under
the questioned information.  Then again,
the said two modes or ways of perpetrating the offense of estafa
refer to only one transaction with one and the same offended party, viz., the
purchase of 25,000 bags of cement under his fraudulent representation or false
pretense that he has property or business or credit, which deceit was made more
persuasive by another deceit — his issuing three checks of P30,000, P20,000
and P57,668.90 respectively.  The two
fraudulent acts or false pretenses were part of only one single criminal
impulse.

We reiterate the earlier jurisprudence that where an offense may
be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient,
notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same
offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute.  The allegation in the information of the various
ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one
offense^[11]
and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness.

It has been held that the allegation of the falsification of two
documents at the same time and between the same parties resulting in the
offense of estafa is but a recital of the facts that
concur in the commission of the same.^[12]

The case of Lopez vs. Paras,^[13]
where We held that the general rule that the Court will not issue a writ of certiorari to restrain an order of the
lower court denying a motion to quash and upon such denial defendant should
enter his plea of not guilty and, if convicted, raise an appeal on the same
legal questions covered by his motion to quash, is no longer the hard and fast
rule; because certiorari and
prohibition were issued to restrain the court from further proceedings in a
criminal case where it appears that the offense charged in the information is
not within its jurisdiction, does not apply to the case at bar.  In the Lopez case, the crime of falsification
of a private document charged in the information was not within the
jurisdiction of the city court of Angeles City as the two private documents
allegedly falsified by the accused therein were signed by the accused in Makati and in Quezon City, both
within the province of Rizal and therefore outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the city court of Angeles City.  In the instant case, there is no dispute as
to the fact that on the face of the information the crime of estafa with which the accused Suy
Yan is charged, was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Iligan
City.

Neither is the 1960 case of Esguerra
vs. People^[14]
decisive of the case at bar.  Even the
majority of the three Justices of the Special Division of Five of the Court of
Appeals whose resolution is the one presently under review, concur with the
opinion of Justices Angel Mojica and Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. in
their dissent that the Esguerra case is not on all
fours with the instant case (p. 30, resolution dated March 24, 1969, p. 101,
rec.; p. 5 of dissenting opinion of Justices Mojica
and Concepcion, Jr., p. 109, rec.).

Mr. Justice Mojica correctly
distinguished the Esguerra case from the case at bar
thus:

“In the case of Esguerra vs. People,
G.R. No. L-14313, July 26, 1960,
cited by petitioner in his reply to ‘opposition to motion for reconsideration’,
the Fiscal accused Esguerra of the crime of estafa.  The first
paragraph of the information ‘specifically refers to the 3rd paragraph (b) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code’ as the provision under which Esguerra was being prosecuted.  Said particular paragraph refers to estafa committed by resorting to some fraudulent practice
to insure success in a gambling game.  On
the other hand, ‘that part of the information referring to representations that
Esguerra had copras ready
for delivery, would seem to imply that the estafa charge is that defined and
penalized under paragraph 2 (a) — by falsely pretending to possess xx xx property
xx xx business, etc. 
The succeeding portion, however, of the same information which alleges
failure to deliver the copra or return the money on the dates agreed, charges
the accused of misappropriation and conversion under paragraph 1 (b) of the
same Article 315.’ In view of such ambiguity in the information, a motion to
quash was filed by the accused.  At the
hearing of the motion, ‘the fiscal and the private prosecutor both manifested
that there was a clerical error in the first paragraph of the information and
stated and assured that the accused was being charged under paragraph 1 (b) of
Article 315.  The trial court admitted
the correction and the accused went to trial with that understanding and
assurance.’ After trial, the court a quo found the accused guilty as
charged under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) and sentenced him accordingly.  However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals
where the accused ‘questioned the correctness of the judgment of conviction
under the information as corrected and on the facts proven’, the Court of
Appeals held the appellant Esguerra guilty of estafa not under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) but under
paragraph 3(2-a) of Article 315.  The
issue in the Esguerra case was ‘whether after denial
of a motion to quash, precisely on the vagueness of the information, upon
assurance by the fiscal and the private prosecutor and accepted by the court
that the offense for which the accused was being prosecuted is that of
misappropriation defined in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315, involving
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and under which the accused entered
trial, the latter could, on appeal, be convicted of an entirely different
offense with different elements, that of false pretenses of possessing property
or business made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.’
The Supreme Court held that Esguerra could not be
held guilty of an entirely different offense with different elements when such
offense is not adequately alleged in the information.  Needless to state that the Esguerra case is not in point and on all fours with the
case under consideration.” (pp. 107-109, rec.)

The allegations in the information are not ambiguous.  Couched in a language devoid of any technical
or cryptic jargon, the information particularizes and specifies the false
pretenses employed by the accused in committing the crime of estafa.  It does not
deceive the accused as to the nature of the accusation against him, much less
as to the fact that the same charges him with only one offense.  Consequently, the accused can adequately
prepare for his defense.

The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him is satisfied as long as the language employed in
the information is sufficiently clear to a person of ordinary intelligence^[15]
and as long as all the material facts that constitute the offense are alleged
in the information.^[16]
In the instant case, all the essential elements of estafa
thru deceit are categorically alleged in the information.  And, to repeat, the City Fiscal stressed the
assurance that only one crime of estafa is charged
therein, although perpetrated by two deceitful acts on the part of the accused,
falling under paragraph 2 (a and d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.

Because We find that the allegations in the information are clear
and adequately inform the accused of the accusation against him so that he can
properly prepare for his defense, accused Suy Yan is not denied any constitutional right and the remedy
of certiorari and prohibition will
not lie, thus precluding the applicability of the ruling in the cases of Yap
vs. the Honorable H. Lutero, etc.,^[17]
People vs. Ferrer,^[18]
and Lopez vs. Alikpala.^[19]

It is interesting to note that the other accused Chao Ce alias Co Chiongtai did not join the accused Suy
Yan alias James Yap in his motion to quash nor in his
petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals, giving the impression that to the
accused Chao Ce alias Co Chiongtai the questioned information charges him with only
one crime of estafa and that the allegations therein
are so sufficiently clear as to inform him of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

We have no alternative but to reverse and set aside, as We hereby
reverse and set aside the majority resolution of the Special Division of Five
of the Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1969 and hereby direct that Criminal
Case No. 1395 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Suy
Yan alias James Yap and Chao
Ce alias Co Chiongtai”
of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte in Iligan City shall proceed to trial after the defendants
have been duly arraigned and have duly entered their plea.  With costs against respondent Suy Yan alias James Yap.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., took no part.

^[1]
L-2414, May 27, 1949.

^[2]
L-23731, Jan. 26, 1965.

^[3]
L-20316, Jan. 30, 1968.

^[4]
L-18601-02, Jan. 31, 1963.

^[5]
L-6215, Sept. 28, 1954.

^[6]
L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966.

^[7]
L-12669, April 30, 1959.

^[8]
CA-GR 364-F, Oct. 28, 1965.

^[9]
People vs. Doriquez, L-24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163, 165-6; Chuatoco vs. Aragon, et. al., L-20316, Jan. 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 346, 351; Acharon vs. Purisima,
L-23731, Feb. 26, 1965, 13
SCRA 309, 311-12; Mill vs. Yatco, L-10427, May 27, 1957, Vol. 101 Phil. 599,
605-606.

^[10]
People vs. Camerino, et. al., L-13484, May 20,
1960, citing Padilla, Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 1959 Ed., p. 101, or 1965
Ed., p. 110; see also Justice Martin, Rules of Court Annotated, 1969 Ed., p.
107.

^[11]
People vs. Bienviaje, 47 Phil., 536; U.S. vs.
Tolentino, 5 Phil., 628; U.S. vs. Douglas, 2
Phil., 461; U.S. vs. Poh, 20 Phil. 140;
Justice Martin, Rules of Court Annotated, Vol. 4, 1969 Ed., pp. 107-108.

^[12]
U.S. vs. Ferrer, 34 Phil., 277; see also Guinto vs. Veluz, 77
Phil., 798; People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil. 521; Justice Martin, Rules of
Court Annotated, Vol. 4, 1969 Ed., p. 109.

^[13]
L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616, 621-22.

^[14]
L-14313, July 26, 1960, 108
Phil. 1078.

^[15] Paraiso vs. U.S.,
207 U.S. 368.

^[16]
People vs. Bandojo, 63 Phil., 1053; People vs.
Arnault, L-4288, Nov. 20, 1952.

^[17]
L-12669, April 30, 1959.

^[18]
L-8957, April 29, 1957.

^[19]
CA-GR No. 36124-R, Oct. 28, 1965.